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Drawing on evidence from Africa -  especially Ethiopia 
and Uganda -  the authors of this volume draw 
conclusions about economic policy in the aftermath of 
civil war. A sample of conclusions follows. 
Civil wars differ from international wars. They are 
informal, often have no clear beginning and end, weaken 
rather than strengthen the authority of the state, and 
leave two unreconciled armies to be demobilized within 
one territory. Civil wars erode the institutions of  civil 
society, leading to a decline in the stock of social capital, 
which takes some time to restore. Private investment and 
government revenue are slow to recover, and military 
expenditures are not easily reduced. As a result, there is 
little or no peace dividend in the short run. 
The period of transition to peace is a particularly 
suitable time for radical policy reform, despite the high 
degree of polarization typical in countries engaged in 
civil war. And speedy reform, far from increasing 
uncertainty, is likely to reduce it. After a civil war, 
private agents are fearful both of each other and of  the 
government. This, perhaps even more than physical 
damage to infrastructure, hinders private-sector-led 
recovery, as irreversible investment is delayed despite 
being financeable. The transition to peace is primarily 
the transition from fear and the defensive responses that 
became ingrained in wartime. The peace dividend comes 
as a gradual recovery of confidence induces repatriation 
of financial and human capital. 
Such confidence can be boosted by the early 
sequencing of investment-sensitive policy reforms and by 
preserving low inflation through direct consumer price 
index targeting. Lack of confidence can be compensated 
for by temporary undervaluation of  the exchange rate, or 
by temporary tax incentives for investment which, 
however, may prove more difficult to make credibly 
time-bound. Finally, aid can permit accelerated 
rehabilitation of the infrastructure (especially transport 
networks) needed to return to a market economy. 
Contrary to the study's hypothesis, the authors found 
that demobilization -  at least in Uganda -  did not lead 
to a significant upsurge in insecurity. In the short term, 
demobilization significantly reduced crime, unless the 
demobilized lacked access to land. If  the demobilized 
returned to their home areas and were given some 
assistance, with identifiable exceptions they were able to 
find income-earning opportunities. 
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This  study  attempts  to  draw  some  general 
economic inferences about economic policy in the 
aftermath of  civil  war.  It draws upon  evidence 
from Africa, particularly Uganda and Ethiopia, but 
the  emphasis is  analytic rather  than  empirical. 
Civil wars differ from international wars: they are 
informal, often having no clear beginning and end, 
they weaken rather than strengthen the authority of 
the state, and they leave two irreconciled armies to 
be demobilized within the one territory. My main 
argument is that civil wars erode the institutions of 
civil society, leading to a decline in the stock of 
social capital. One consequence, discussed in the 
next  section, is  that there is  little or no  instant 
peace dividend. Section 3 discusses the gradual 
restoration of security. Sections 4 and 5 consider 
inter-sectoral  and  inter-temporal  resource 
reallocations induced by  civil war, and the scope 
for  policy  to  assist  in  the  reversal  of  these 
responses during the post-war recovery. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Is there a Peace Dividend? 
Civil  wars  vary  greatly  in  terms of  economic 
damage. The relatively short civil war in Nigeria 
appears from the National Accounts to have caused 
only a fairly small output loss which was fully 
recovered within three years of peace. By contrast, 
in  Uganda, a conservative counterfactual is that 
without the long and intermittent civil war, by the 
arrival of more peaceful conditions GDP  would 
have  been  double  its  actual  level.  Similarly 
dramatic magnitudes would apply to Mozambique 
and Angola. 
However,  while  the  potential  for  a  peace 
dividend may thereby seem to be  larger in these 
long wars, the post-war recoveries have only been 
partial. There appears to be  an  initial  boost to 
output: in Uganda, in the first two post-war years 
(1987 and  1988)  the  economy  averaged  8.3% 
growth, and in Ethiopia in the first post-war year 
(1992) growth was 7%. These are high growth 
rates both historically and by African standards but 
left  both  economies  well  below  plausible 
counterfactuals. In Uganda, even eight years after 
peace the economy is still far below its pre-war 
peak. Civil wars also lead to a loss of exchange 
efficiency and rapid recovery is a potential part of 
the  peace  dividend.  However,  a  study  of  the 
reintegration  of  the  Ethiopian  grain  market 
(Dercon, Chapter 6) finds that the contribution of 
peace was modest. Neither the  private  nor  the 
public sectors behave as though in receipt of  a 
prospective  windfall.  Collier  and  Gunning 
(Chapters 2 and 3) show that the private sector 
remained wary of recovery. It neither invested nor 
dissaved  as  might  have  been  expected  had  it 
anticipated recovery with confidence. The fiscal 
implications of peace are also discouraging (Bevan 
and  Pradhan,  Chapter  7).  Because  of  their 
informality, civil wars generally do not end in the 
same decisive manner as international wars and so 
military expenditure cannot be very easily reduced. 
In Uganda it actually rose 40% in the early years 
of peace. Further, revenue may riot be buoyant. In 
Ethiopia during wartime the state used coercive 
measures for  revenue-raising  which  had  to  be 
abandoned  during  peace,  causing  a  revenue 
declirie. In Uganda, where revenue had collapsed 
during the war, it was very slow to recover, for 
reasohs discussed below. Finally, during the last 
years  of  a  civil  war  the  fiscal  position  may 
deteriorate to a position which is unsustainable. In effect.  the  post-war  government  inherits  an 
imperative  need  for  fiscal  retrenchment.  In 
summary,  there should  be  no  expectation  of  a 
substantial 'peace dividend' either for the economy 
as a whole or for the government. 
3. Re-establishing Security 
Civil wars generate two types of insecurity. Micro- 
insecurity is the fear of personal violence and theft 
which  is  present  in  any  society  but  is  usually 
heightened  in  the  context  of  civil  war  by  the 
breakdown  of policing.  Macro-insecurity  is  the 
fear that the state will be used in a partisan way 
against some social groups. casting doubt over all 
aspects of economic life which depend upon the 
impartiality of state services, such as the enforce- 
ment of property rights. Evidently, during a civil 
war the state is partial, and the social groups which 
will in future control the state is contingent. Hence. 
both  opponents  and  supporters  of  the  current 
government face macro-insecurity.  Both types of 
insecurity  can  be  expected  to  have  economic 
consequences, these being analyzed in Section 5. 
The ending of a civil war does not usually substan- 
tially  resolve  these  concerns.  Micro-insecurity 
persists  because the reconstruction of peacetime 
security services takes time. Indeed, criminality 
may increase due to demobilization. Macro-insecu- 
rity is diminished, but there is a continuing risk 
that the war will be resumed and the state over- 
thrown. Civil war starts in societies with underly- 
ing causes for conflict. and the war itself increases 
bitterness.  Hence,  when  a  war stops  there  is a 
significant risk that it will resume, as happened in 
Angola and, intermittently, in Uganda. 
The study investigated whether demobilization 
worsens  micro-insecurity,  using data on the de- 
rnobilizatio~l  of 20,000  Ugandan soldiers in  late 
1992 (Collier.  Chapter 5). The approach was to 
determine  whether changes in  crime  in  the  38 
districts of Uganda could be related to the district- 
level incidence of demobilization. The composi- 
tion of the army is also somewhat distinctive as a 
result of a civil war. In Uganda much of the army 
had  been recmited in the bush as a guerilla force 
while very young and so had  few  non-military 
skills and little education. Almost all demobilized 
soldiers would  need to earn their livelihoods  in 
peasant agriculture. The results showed a signifi- 
cant  and  distinctive  impact  effect  in  the  three 
months following the demobilization: soldiers who 
had reported no access to land were one hundred 
times  more  likely than the  Ugandan average to 
commit  crime,  while  those  with  access  to  land 
significantly reduced crime. The latter effect was 
substantiated by interview evidence from commu- 
nity leaders who claimed that the presence of men 
with  military training had  discouraged  existing 
criminals. In Uganda most soldiers had access to 
land and so the latter effect outweighed the former: 
crime fell by  7% folIowing demobilization. Nei- 
ther of these effects was sustained in the following 
nine months: there appeared to be no relationship 
between demobilization and the level of criminal- 
ity. This may be because  both types of soldiers 
rapidly  civilianised.  Alternatively,  it  might  be 
because demobilized soldiers relocated from the 
home  district  to  which  they  were  discharged, 
although there is some evidence that this did not 
happen on a significant scale. The Ugandan demo- 
bilization  was  well-managed  and  indeed  long- 
delayed after the end of the war, but could have 
been improved upon. Given the high propensity of 
the landless to commit crime and that only 12% of 
the army described themselves as landless, access 
to land could have  been used as a criterion for 
selecting those to be demobilized. 
Macro-insecurity is less amenabIe to investiga- 
tion. Azam (Chapter 4) uses a simple game-theo- 
retic framework in which peace can be maintained 
by a combination of military expenditure and re- 
distributive expenditures in favor of the losers. The 
conversion of swords into plough-shares directly 
increases macro-insecurity and needs to be offset 
by a visible redistribution of plough-shares to the 
potential enemy. The winner is obviously regarded 
as partisan. Since this perception  motivates the 
potential threat to the government, public gestures 
of redistributive expenditure are needed to counter 
it. On this analysis, the Angolan government made 
the  mistake  of  reducing  military  expenditures 
without  pre-committing  to  high  redistributive 
expenditures. Demobilization can increase macro- 
insecurity not only by reducing the capacity of the 
government  to defend  itself,  but  by  furnishing 
opponents or others with  potential recruits.  The 
demobilization of the Ethiopian  army may have 
contributed in this direct way to the insurrection in Oromo, and the Ugandan demobilization may have 
contributed to the civil war in Rwanda. 
The implication is that military expenditures 
can be reduced without increasing either micro- 
insecurity or macro-insecurity, but that the govern- 
ment  may  need  to  have offsetting increases in 
expenditure in the form of compensation to losers. 
4. Civil War and Inter-Sectoral Substitution 
The breakdown of security is not just an aggregate 
shock to the economy. Rather it induces both inter- 
temporal and inter-sectoral resource reallocations 
which the return to peace gradually reverses. I now 
consider the sectoral implications of social disor- 
der. The argument is that social disruption jeopar- 
dizes transactions and  assets and  that  this has 
differential consequences as between sectors of the 
economy. 
An  environment in which transactions can be 
conducted cheaply  requires considerable social 
capital. The  range  of social  capital  required is 
rather wide. In  the early 20th  century  informal 
agricultural marketing was greatly eased by the 
introduction of standardized weights and measures, 
which  requires a continuous  process of  public 
checks (Ensminger (1992)). The provision of a 
legal system enables the parties to a contract to 
enforce it  relatively cheaply. The provision of a 
communications  system  reduces  the  costs  of 
information, and a transport system reduces the 
costs of movement. Many aspects of a transaction 
cannot be specified in  a contract because not all 
contingencies can be anticipated. An environment 
of cooperation, achieved either by the internaliza- 
tion of activities within an organization (the inte- 
grated fim)  or a high expectation of repeat trans- 
actions. is  necessary to reduce the incidence of 
opportunistic behavior. 
Activities vary considerably in  their transac- 
tions  intensity. The  least  transactions-intensive 
activity is  subsistence  production.  However,  it 
should be noted that although subsistence produc- 
tion does not, by definition, involve the marketing 
of output, it will still usually involve the purchase 
of some inputs. Hence, it is not immune from a rise 
in the cost of transactions. An  intermediate stage in 
the hierarchy of transactions intensity are activities 
which depend  upon  the  market  for  the sale of 
output,  but  are not  very dependent upon  it  for 
inputs.  Marketed  agricultural  produce  has  this 
characteristic. The most vulnerable activities are 
those  which  depend  upon  the  market  for  both 
inputs and outputs. Formal sector manufacturing is 
the main instance of such an activity. 
That war jeopardizes assets follows as a spe- 
cial, but important, case of the more general decay 
of social capital. Assets depend upon enforceable 
rights. For example, in Uganda, when the Asians 
lost property the new owners held their claims in a 
most insecure form. Not only might they anticipate 
that at some stage the property might be restored to 
its Asian owners, but of more immediate concern, 
they lacked clear title and so could neither sell not 
borrow  against  the  asset,  and  risked  having  it 
reassigned  to  some  other  'owner'  through  the 
same arbitrary process by which they themselves 
had acquired it. The illegitimate possession of an 
asset creates powerful incentives to strip it. Since 
possession  is  likely  only  to  be  temporary it  is 
safest to transform it into an invisible form: invisi- 
bility is  the best substitute for legitimacy other 
than the possession of overwhelming force. This 
transformation is worthwhile even if in the process 
a substantial part of the value of the asset is forfeit. 
Invisible  assets  take  various  forms.  The  least 
visible is an asset held abroad. Cash may also be 
easy to conceal. Finally, crops which can be kept 
underground (tubers) are safer than those which 
must be stored above ground (grains). In addition 
to invisibility, immobility is desirable in an asset. 
Immobility will not constitute a defense against 
large scale predation such as the arbitrary power of 
a ruler, but it is a defense against the micro-insecu- 
rity of casual theft. An  immobile asset is  only 
forfeit if another agent is able to secure the space 
on a long-term basis. Obvious immobile assets are 
land and buildings. There are no assets which are 
both  immobile and  invisible, but there are some 
which are both mobile and visible, such as vehicles 
and consumer durables. 
Just  as activities vary  in  their  transactions 
intensity, so they vary in their intensity in  visible 
and mobile assets. Manufacturing is again highly 
vulnerable since both  its  inputs and its outputs 
must be  stored at the site of production and are by 
their nature mobile. Subsistence is in  one respect 
more asset-vulnerable  than production for market 
in  that the latter can  be  sold as  it  is  harvested, 
whereas the former cannot usually be eaten as it is harvested (except for some tubers) and so must be 
stored on site. Livestock is a disastrously asset- 
vulnerable activity in that it is capital-intensive and 
the entire capital is fairly visible and highly mo- 
bile. The service sector is relatively invulnerable in 
that its inputs are largely people and buildings. 
So far I have considered how sectors differ 
according to whether they use visible or mobile 
assets,  and  whether their  production  process is 
intensive in transactions. A particularly vulnerable 
sector on these criteria suffers a large cost-shock. 
However, additionally, some sectors produce either 
assets  or  transactions.  These  sectors  suffer  a 
demand collapse because war operates like a tax 
on their output. In African civil war contexts the 
asset-producing sectors are usually construction 
and  livestock.  Transactions  production  covers 
transport, trade, and the financial services sector. 
To give an illustrative parody of the above analy- 
sis,  the worst possible activity  in  which to  be 
engaged might be the manufacture of cash-regis- 
ters. The production process is vulnerable because 
manufacturing uses mobile assets and has a high 
ratio of transactions to value-added. The demand 
for output collapses because it is a mobile capital 
good and one used only for processing transac- 
tions. At the other end of the spectrum would be 
growing cassava for own-consumption. 
To summarize, I have distinguished activities 
according to whether they are transactions-inten- 
sive, vulnerable asset-intensive, transaction-pro- 
viding, and asset-providing. I now show how this 
is consistent with the remarkable changes in  the 
composition of Ugandan GDP  both during and 
after the period of war. 
In  1972  Amin  declared  "economic  war" 
against the Asian community. Although violence 
did not erupt until later, from this date the business 
community could no longer regard the state as a 
neutral  provider  of  services and  the economic 
manifestations associated with civil war appeared: 
an exodus of human and physical capital, falling 
aggregate output, and a shift in the composition of 
output.  The  subsequent  periodic  warfare  was 
substantially resolved in 1986 when the NRA 
forces  took  Kampala.  although  low-intensity 
fighting continued until 1990.  Hence, unlike an 
international war, a civil war tends to have some- 
what  imprecise  dates.  On  economic  criteria  it 
seems reasonable to date the commencement from 
1972 and the ending around 1986. 
A measure of the relative performance of a 
sector  is  how  the  quantity  of  its  value-added 
changed  relative  to GDP  (see  Table  1.1).  The 
manufacturing sector, which I have suggested is 
both transactions intensive and asset-vulnerable, 
halved relative to GDP (which itself halved rela- 
tive to a reasonable counterfactual). Manufacturing 
recovered post-  1986, although even by  1993194 it 
was still far below  its 1971 share of GDP. The 
sector which contracted most severely during the 
war was the asset-providing sector, construction. 
This was the most  successful sector post-1986. 
More limited evidence on livestock suggests that it 
followed a qualitatively similar pattern to construc- 
tion. From  1982-86 there was a  rapid absolute 
decline in  the sector, which  was reversed post- 
1986. However, since the livestock is concentrated 
in the North, which was the last part of the country 
to be pacified, the recovery would be expected to 
be  limited. The other sector which suffered se- 
verely during the war period was the transactions- 
providing sector, commerce and transport. Again 
this grew more rapidly than GDP post-war, but 
remained much smaller relative to GDP than its 
pre-war level. The sector which did relatively well 
out of the war was subsistence agriculture. Subsis- 
tence grew relative to GDP during the war and 
contracted  relatively  thereafter.  However,  it  is 
noteworthy that even subsistence output grew only 
slowly between 1971 and 1986: its performance is 
only good in relative terms. In effect, the substitu- 
tion of resources into subsistence as they became 
less productive in other sectors, was offset by the 
negative effects of the war through the disruption 
of inputs and assets such as stored grain. Post-war, 
subsistence  activities have  grown  least  (25%), 
though only around half of the retreat in subsis- 
tence has been reversed. Table 1.1.  The Composition of Ugandan GDP by War-Vulnerability 
(% share of GDP at 199  1 constant prices) 
1971  1986  1993194 
Transaction and asset intensity: 
high: manufacturing  8.8  4.4  6.0 
medium: marketed agriculture  22.6  24.5  22.7 
low: subsistence  20.5  36.0  32.1 
Transaction-providing: transport and commerce  2  1.2  16.1  17.2 
Asset-providing: construction  12.5  3.5  5.5 
Unassigned activities  14.4  15.5  16.5 
Note: The National Accounts provide data at 1966 prices for 1963-85 and at 1991 prices from 
1982-93194. 1982 was selected as the year to be used for conversion from 1966 to 1991 prices. 
Since output changes 197 1-92 are only measured at 1966 relative prices, the conversion of 197  1 
output to 199  1 prices is only approximate. Sector i in 197 1 at 1991 prices is approximated 
=:[(sector  i in 197  1 at 1966 prices)l(sector i in 1982 at 1966 prices):l.[sector i in 1982 at 199  1 
prices]. This has the advantage that since 1982-91 GDP was calculated on a consistent set of 
definitions of sectors, changes in definitions between the 1966 series and the 1991 series only 
lead to a mis-estimate to the extent that the alter the growth rate of the sector between 197  1-82. 
Total GDP in 197  1 at 1991 prices was then calculated as the sum of the sectoral outputs so 
revaiued. Note that this will differ from a direct adjustment of total GDP in 1971 by the factor 
[(total GDP in 1982 at 199  1 prices)l(total GDP in  1982 at 1966 prices)]. Sector shares in 197  1 
at 199  1 prices are then sector outputfGDP. 
The post-war recovery thus involves a return to 
the  market  and  a  restoration of  confidence  in 
assets. The latter is taken up  in the next section, 
here  the  policy  implications of  the former are 
considered. 
The  return  to the market is  important both 
because market-based activities are normally more 
productive and because they provide opportunities 
for  risk-reduction.  The  latter  gives  rise  to  an 
externality arising from the substitution of activi- 
ties from  subsistence  back  into the market: as 
markets become denser they become more reliable, 
so that society has an interest in subsidizing the 
return to the market. 
One way in which this can be done is by  the 
government  setting  both  explicit  and  implicit 
taxation of transactions low in the early post-war 
years. Explicit taxation rates are commonly high in 
war economies as the government searches for 
revenue  and  uses  coercion  to  offset  the  dis- 
incentive  problems  which  this  would  normally 
induce. Implicit taxation of transactions  occurs 
through the inflation tax since domestic currency 
is  held  for  market-derived income  but  not for 
subsistence  income.  The  government  should 
therefore set the inflation rate below the revenue- 
maximizing rate. The revenue-maximizing infla- 
tion rate for Uganda is not known, but that for 
Kenya is in the range 10-  1  5% (Adam (1992)) so 
that the appropriate policy response might be  to 
aim for inflation somewhat below this. 
A second policy implication is that the return 
on the rehabilitation of transport infrastructure is 
likely to be high. Collier and Pradhan (Chapter 9) 
review all the road transport projects undertaken in 
Uganda since 1986 and find  an average rate of 
return of 39%, clearly a very high rate of return by 
the standards of public expenditure. This is sup- 
ported by a rural household survey conducted in 
1990 which asked which government actions had been  most appreciated since 1986 (Bigsten and 
Kayizzi-Mugerwa). Road improvements were the 
most popular choice. 
5. Civil War and Inter-Temporal Substitu- 
tion 
During civil war private profits can be high. As 
markets become disrupted they become less com- 
petitive and so marketing margins widen. Taken to 
the limit, disruption eliminates trade and so elimi- 
nates profits, but at less severe levels profits might 
be sustained or even enhanced as reduced volumes 
of trade are offset by wider margins. Collier and 
Gunning (Chapter 2) cite evidence from Mozarn- 
bique and Somalia, and Keen (1994) analyses the 
Sudan.  in  each  case  wartime  conditions being 
associated with high profits. There are also oppor- 
tunities to acquire assets  by  means that  would 
normally be illegitimate but which become feasible 
once the state has abandoned its role of impartial 
defender  of  property  rights.  Those  who  make 
substantial trading  profits  or  acquire assets  in 
questionable ways have an incentive to have a high 
savings rate. The circumstances which have gener- 
ated these opportunities are unlikely to persist, and 
luxury consumption is generally difficult and even 
dangerous in  civil war conditions. Hence, those 
who do well out of civil war face portfolio choices. 
Civil  war  is  not  an  environment conducive to 
investment (see Sen (1991)):  there is  too much 
uncertainty  and,  as  discussed  below,  physical 
assets are vulnerable. The corollary is that savings 
are held in liquid form since during periods of high 
uncertainty liquid assets cany a premium in  the 
form of an option value. Normally, during civil 
war domestic financial assets are subject to a high 
and variable inflation tax so that the only liquid 
financial assets available are foreign. The capital 
flight common during civil wars might therefore in 
part be a reflection of increased demand for liquid- 
ity. An indication of this is that in Ethiopia, where 
unusually civil war did not jeopardize price stabil- 
ity, there was a substantial increase in  domestic 
liquidity. During the intensive phase of the war, 
1986-9 1, the ratio of currency to GDP increased by 
93%. Hence. by the onset of peace. a significant 
group of private agents are highly liquid, usually 
holding foreign assets. 
The economics of the transition to peace can 
therefore be thought of in  part as the process of 
shifting  private  portfolios  from  foreign  liquid 
assets to domestic  liquid assets. An  equivalent 
gradual repatriation takes place with  respect to 
human capital, since civil wars generate an exodus 
of the skilled. If these repatriations can be induced 
they deliver a genuine 'peace dividend' of poten- 
tially substantial proportions. For example,  private 
transfers to Uganda are estimated to have grown at 
35% per annum (in current dollars) in the past four 
years (199019 1-93194). By  1 992193 they exceeded 
exports. Net emigration of Ugandan citizens fell 
from massive proportions during the civil war era 
to a few thousand a year in the late 1980s and a 
few hundred a year in  the early  1990s, with net 
immigration of non-resident citizens. Here I focus 
upon financial repatriation, although some of the 
argument may extend to return migration of the 
skilled. 
The uncertainties which gave rise to liquidity 
are not automatically removed by the end of civil 
war. A central proposition of the paper is that both 
micro and macro-insecurity continue at high levels 
in the post-war environment, so that the realization 
of a peace dividend is contingent upon the recov- 
ery of private sector confidence. The policy prob- 
lem  is therefore to allow for the initial  lack of 
confidence and to assist in  its restoration. Collier 
and Gunning (Chapters 2 and 3) explore the impli- 
cations of a highly liquid private sector which is 
too fearful to make irreversible investments. They 
advance four policy prescriptions, two of which 
have  as the  objective  the  recovery  of  private 
investment and two of which are concerned with 
government macroeconomic management. 
They argue that the recovery of private invest- 
ment  can  be  encouraged by  a  combination of 
reassurance and subsidy. A post-civil war govern- 
ment  lacks reputation and  so its  promises  lack 
value. Yet typically, during wartime the economy 
will have become heavily regulated and so one of 
the  post-war tasks  is  policy  liberalization.  The 
most reassuring action that such a government can 
do with respect to economic reform is to imple- 
ment it. Since not all reforms can be implemented 
at once due to bottlenecks in  the legislative and 
policy formulation processes, prospective reforms 
should  be  sequenced according to their  impact 
upon investment. The most urgent reforms concern those which impact directly upon the capital values 
of prospective investment. For example, civil wars 
leave a legacy of contested property rights, and it 
is important that these should be resolved rapidly. 
Even  with  efficient  sequencing of reforms, 
there is a high irreducible element of investor risk. 
Since private investment is likely to have substan- 
tial externalities whereas much of the risk which 
private investors consider should not be taken into 
account by society, there is a case for the govern- 
ment to subsidize  the act of commitment. One 
policy instrument which can be used for subsidiz- 
ing investment is the exchange rate. Typically in 
Africa the exchange rate has been overvalued, and 
this  has  subsidized  the  purchase  of  imported 
capital goods purchased with domestic currency. 
By contrast,  in post-war conditions liquid assets 
are in foreign currency, while the least reversible, 
and  hence  most  risky,  investments are not  im- 
ported capital goods (such as transport equipment) 
but non-tradable capital goods such as buildings. 
Such  capital  goods  are  location-specific  and 
depreciate  slowly,  and so are more sensitive  to 
uncertainty. An  under-valued exchange rate subsi- 
dizes the transfer of foreign currency assets into 
non-tradable assets. Combining the two points, for 
the same reason that the exchange rate can subsi- 
dize the repatriation  for investment decision,  it 
directly affects the asset value of investment, and 
so it is an urgent reform. 
Undervaluation  is not the only policy instru- 
ment which can encourage repatriation into irre- 
versible investment, but it  has the advantage of 
being  unsustainable.  A  manifestly  temporary 
subsidy is more effective in bringing forward the 
act of commitment. Tax benefits may be harder to 
make credibly temporary and are administratively 
more cumbersome, but have the advantage that 
they  can  be  confined  to  productive  investment 
whereas  undervaluation  also subsidizes the pur- 
chase of residential property. 
The  high  level  of private liquidity also  has 
implications for macroeconomic management: the 
demand for domestic currency might alter substan- 
tially, and  the government  has some scope  for 
selling assets. In Ethiopia part of the excess liquid- 
ity is in domestic currency, whereas in Uganda it 
has been in foreign currency. Thus, in  Ethiopia a 
recovery of confidence would induce a switch out 
of money into real assets. and so be inflationary, 
whereas in Uganda a recovery of confidence would 
include a switch into domestic currency and so be 
counter-inflationary. Since changes in confidence 
are unpredictable,  the high  liquidity  makes the 
demand for domestic currency unusually volatile 
so that monetary targeting would  produce  price 
volatility. In current formal models of the costs of 
inflation, inflation shocks have no cost and so the 
inflation  tax  becomes  the  ideal  buffer  policy. 
However, the transfers to which such shocks give 
rise can be disruptive, provoking bankruptcy, and 
will accentuate the already severe problem of low 
confidence. If these costs are sufficiently severe 
then  the stability  of the  price  level  becomes a 
legitimate objective. Since monetary targeting will 
not achieve this objective, the CPI must itself be 
directly targeted, with some combination of the 
fiscal deficit and the reserves as control variables. 
The liquidity of the private sector and its lack 
of confidence in the government also has implica- 
tions  for the government's  scope  for domestic 
funding of its deficit. Government liabilities, such 
as bonds and treasury bills, have the wrong risk 
properties, whereas the large stock of fairly safe 
real assets such as residential property held by  the 
governments  in  Ethiopia,  Uganda  and  Angola 
might  be  purchased  by  private  agents  without 
being so heavily discounted. In Uganda the gov- 
ernment borrowed through three month Treasury 
Bills at a real interest rate in excess of 20%. In 
1992 it attempted to sell longer, nine month matu- 
rities but could find no purchasers. In 1993 it was 
able to find takers, but only at real interest rates of 
around  40% which  it  was  not prepared  to pay. 
Clearly, the act of borrowing at such high interest 
rates would itself have signalled that the govern- 
ment had little confidence in  its continued exis- 
tence. In 1994, shortly after the elections for the 
Constituent Assembly, n  hich were successful for 
the government  in  both their conduct and their 
result,  real  interest  rates  fell  swiftly  to single 
figures  and  longer  term  borrowing  became  a 
possibility. That the government faces a steep yield 
curve may be a common feature of the post-civil 
war legacy, and the gradual flattening of the curve 
is a way of conceptualizing the return to peacetime 
levels of confidence. 
Finally, in a post-civil war environment the 
private sector is not only suspicious of the state, it 
is afraid of it. The power of the state has been used in a partisan manner. This provides an argument 
for restoring the tax base only gradually. Due to 
the decay of the institutions and conventions of 
civil society the state has lost most of the mecha- 
nisms needed for compliance with tax-gathering 
systems. The private sector has  learned  how to 
evade the state, by corruption and a failure to keep 
records, and these practices can only be changed 
slowly. For example, in  the absence of audited 
business records, the tax authorities essentially 
bargain with enterprises over lump sums rather 
than tax in proportion to activity. In this situation 
a rapid attempt to increase revenue requires the 
state to intensify just the arbitrary actions which 
have defined the decay of civil institutions and 
procedures. In  Uganda  government expenditure 
has recovered its pre-war share of GDP long before 
other components of GDP  have recovered. It  is 
arguable that at the margin, the discouragement to 
the return to the market-sector involved in fairly 
arbitrary taxation slows recovery by more that the 
extra government expenditure induces it. In rural 
Uganda the same survey that found road infrastruc- 
ture had been most appreciated found a high hre 
priority was the reform of the authority of local 
government, since the institutions did  not  have 
clearly defined and well-understood powers. In 
Ethiopia, one of the first post-war actions was the 
grass-roots  dismantling  of  the  institutions  of 
government rural authority. A period of low gov- 
ernment revenue might thus be an  investment in 
the revival of private sector confidence. 
6. Conclusion 
To summarize, during a prolonged civil war the 
institutions and trust through which civil society 
assists the  economy are  eroded.  The  economy 
loses some of its 'social capita!'.  Like other types 
of capital, this takes time to restore: in the after- 
math of a civil war private agents are fearful both 
of each other and of the government. This, perhaps 
even more that physical damage to infiastmcture, 
is the obstacle to a private-led recovery as irrevers- 
ible investment is  delayed  despite being  finan- 
cable. The peace dividend comes not from a swift 
resumption of activities directly disrupted by the 
war, such an affect being modest, but rather from 
a gradual recovery of confidence which induces 
repatriation of financial and human capital. Public- 
led recovery financed through aggressive increases 
in taxation risks confirming the fears of the private 
sector. The policy environment can, however, be 
made conducive to private recovery. Confidence 
can be assisted through the early sequencing of 
investment-sensitive  reforms and by the preserva- 
tion of low inflation using direct CPI targeting. 
The lack of confidence can  be compensated by 
temporary undervaluation of the exchange rate or 
temporary tax incentives for investment. Finally, 
aid can permit eccelerated rehabilitation of infra- 
structure needed for the return to a market econ- 
omy, most notably the transport network. Chapter 2 
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Abstract 
During civil wars trading is profitable as markets fvagment.  Pro$ts  may be saved in liquid form, because 
investment is too risky. In a successful economic transition to peace these liquid assets are switched into 
investment. However, continuing fears of insecurity may keep portfolios liquid. We consider three policy 
consequences. The unpredictable return of confidence causes erratic changes in  the demand for money, 
complicating monetav targeting. Government liabilities become unmarketable except at prohibitive interest 
rates, though the state may be able to sell real assets. The government can subsidize the act ojinvestment 
commitment by temporarily undervaluing the exchange rate. 
1. Introduction 
In parts of Africa prolonged civil wars have now 
ended (e.g. in Ethiopia and in  Uganda) and there 
are prospects for peace in  several of the current 
African conflicts.  The analysis of the economic 
consequences of peace  tends  to  focus on three 
issues:  demobilization,  the  rebuilding  of  war- 
damaged  infrastructure  and  the  reallocation of 
resources previously allocated to war, the "peace 
dividend". In this paper we focus on a different 
issue which has received relatively little attention. 
This is how the end of war affects the portfolio 
choices of private agents and the implications of 
those choices for government policy. 
Peace  finds  private  agents  with  portfolios 
which reflect war circumstances and are therefore 
no longer appropriate. In particular, the legacy of 
war  is  likely  to  be  reflected  in  private  agents 
holding an unusually large part of their portfolio as 
liquid  assets  (either  domestic  or  foreign).  In 
addition  the  war-peace  transition  is  typically 
characterized by considerable uncertainty, both as 
to the extent and the timing of the lifting of war- 
time economic controls and as to whether there 
will be a resumption of warfare. The conjunction 
of  uncertainty  and  liquidity  can  arise  in  other 
circumstances, but it is particularly poignant in the 
aftermath of civil war and  has important policy 
implications.  Since private agents are atypically 
liquid at the start of the transition, governments 
can benefit from private portfolio adjustment. At 
the same time the scope for government policy is 
limited  as  uncertainty  makes  private  agents 
unwilling  to commit  themselves  to irreversible 
investments and  unwilling  to  hold  government 
liabilities except at high real interest rates. 
In  this  paper  we  argue  that  in  these 
circumstances  three  policies are  appropriate:  a 
monetary policy targeted on the price level rather 
than  on  any  monetary  aggregate;  the  sale  of 
government assets such as housing and land as a 
substitute  for  government  borrowing;  and  a 
subsidy on fixed investment through a policy of 
undervaluing the exchange rate. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the 
next section we consider the consequences of a 
war-peace transition for private portfolio choices. We  then  consider  three  aspects  of  economic 
policy: in section 3 the implications for short run 
monetary management, in  section 4 the medium 
run policy towards the government's own portfolio, 
and in section 5 the policy towards the promotion 
of private fixed investment. 
2.  Private Portfolio Responses to War 
-  African civil wars, especially in the context of an 
attempt  by  the  government  to  maintain  an 
economic  control  regime,  create  remarkable 
opportunities for profit. The environment of war 
and  illegality  causes  the  disintegration  of 
competitive markets and so creates haphazard but 
substantial rents for a whole new class of agent. 
the  illegal  trader.  The  circumstances  which  in 
Britain had  by  1920 produced the 'men who had 
done well out of the war,' and which in America 
during the  1930s produced  bootleg  millionaires 
like the Kennedys, are combined. By their nature, 
these opportunities for high income are not easy to 
observe. Nor is profit monotonically increasing in 
market disruption: profits are zero both when the 
market is 'perfect' and when transactions costs are 
so  high  that  trade  is  eliminated.  It  is  the 
intermediate  range  in  which  markets  are 
sufficiently  fragmented  by  civil  war  to  widen 
trading margins, but in  which trade volumes are 
not massively curtailed, which is conducive to high 
profits. We give three examples from African civil 
war environments.  Azam  (1993)  shows that  in 
Ethiopia the onset of peace reduced geographic 
price dispersion in the grain market, which would 
imply  reduced profit margins for trading. Little 
(  1992) shows that in Mozambique between 1988 
and 199  1  peri-urban market trading became less 
profitable as it became less subject to predation: 
'Most traders appreciate the ability to transact trade 
without fear of government reprisal or sanctions'. 
However,  'trade  was  more  profitable  in 
1988  ... when there was not so much competition' 
(p. 7). Finally, a study of the Somali cattle trade 
(Little and Coloane (1993)) concluded  that 'the 
Somali materials show that, even  under the so- 
called  'crisis'  conditions,  certain  traders  and 
producers do quite  well'  (p.  1 18).  'Because  of 
internal warfare and limited agricultural resources, 
few countries better typify the African 'crisis' than 
does Somalia. The analysis presented here shows 
that rather than collapsing, as implied in the use of 
the term 'crisis', the economy of Southern Somalia 
has  gone  underground.  and  many  herders  and 
traders  have  benefited  from  the  growth  in 
unofficial exports' (p. 1 19). 
The  agents  who  benefit  from  high  income 
opportunities during wartime are  likely to have 
unusually  high  savings  rates.  First,  they  are 
unlikely  to  be  established  wealthy  persons:  the 
traditional  occupations  of  economic  elites  are, 
likely to be adversely affected during African civil 
wars.  In  Ethiopia,  Uganda  and  Angola  ethnic 
minorities were disproportionately represented in 
the established economic elite and in each case 
there was a voluntary exodus'.  Hence the agents 
who benefit from war circumstances will wish, like 
any other nouveau riches, to accumulate wealth. 
Secondly, they have an additional incentive in that 
the  circumstances  which  provide  their  own 
opportunity to acquire rents are unlikely to persist. 
Hence,  during  wartime  illegal  traders  have  a 
powerful incentive to build up assets. 
If traders have high savings rates they must 
make portfolio choices. Investment in  fixed real 
assets is likely to be unattractive. First, as long as 
the duration of war is uncertain there is a premium 
on liquidity: activities which are profitable during 
war may cease to be profitable during peace. When 
investment is irreversible this creates option value 
(Dixit  (1989)):  rather  than  investing  now  the 
entrepreneur remains liquid  until  uncertainty  is 
resolved. Secondly, real assets are vulnerable  in 
wartime.  They may be damaged but in  addition 
war  makes  property  rights  insecure:  thefts are 
more common and  the  legal  system  and  other 
supporting conventions of ownership may break 
down. For example, in a household survey of post- 
war Uganda which included long recall questions 
on assets, Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugwenva (1992) 
found  that peace brought a particularly marked 
increase in land transactions. They argue that this 
reflected the pent-up  need for asset transactions 
which were infeasible during the period of social 
breakdown. 
Hence,  because war leads to a premium on 
liquidity and to asset vulnerability, illegal traders 
wanting to accumulate assets are likely to prefer 
financia!  assets.  They  must  choose  between 
domestic and foreign financial assets and between 
currency  and  interest-bearing  instruments.  The safest and highest return financial asset is probably 
a foreign interest-bearing claim such as a bond or 
bank  deposit.  However,  holding  such  an  asset 
involves  the inconvenience  of  access,  both  for 
deposits and  withdrawals  since all  transactions 
must  be  conducted  externally.  By  contrast, 
transactions can be conducted locally for the other 
three financial assets: foreign currency, domestic 
currency  and  domestic  interest-bearing  assets 
(such as bank deposits or bonds).  Even foreign 
currency can be bought or sold in  exchange for 
domestic  currency  on  local  illegal  foreign 
exchange markets. This difference in transactions 
costs  reduces  the  liquidity  of  foreign  interest- 
bearing assets relative to the other financial assets. 
Foreign currency may offer a higher return than 
domestic financial assets and yet still not dominate 
the latter in portfolios. This is analyzed by Dowd 
and Greenaway (1993) who show that despite poor 
returns  the  transactions  demand  for  domestic 
currency may persist because of the high costs of 
coordinated switching. Hence, portfolios are likely 
to include domestic currency as well as foreign 
assets unless the penalty from holding domestic 
financial  assets  is  very high.  In  the context  of 
African civil wars, domestic bank deposits were 
largely a claim on the government and so liable to 
default,  while  being  highly  visible  to  the 
authorities.  The  offsetting  advantage,  that they 
paid interest, was modest since interest rates were 
set low. Hence, they offered little advantage and 
particular costs compared to domestic currency. 
The use of the inflation tax in wartorn Africa has 
been  highly  variable.  Uganda  and  Angola  had 
bouts of hyper-inflation. By contrast, Ethiopia and 
Chad  have  had  fairly  stable  price  levels.  In 
Ethiopia,  over  the  entire  period  1960-91,  the 
depreciation of the parallel exchange rate against 
the dollar (which is the pertinent rate for the choice 
between  the two  currencies)  was  only  4%  per 
annum. Since the acquisition of domestic financial 
assets is in  aggregate observable
3, unlike that of 
foreign assets, this affords a testable proposition: 
if the conjunction of civil war and a government 
economic control regime leads to the accumulation 
of significant financial assets, then in Ethiopia it 
should  be  visible  as  a  continuous  build-up  of 
domestic  currency  relative  to  expenditure. 
Throughout the Ethiopian civil war this has been 
the case. Most spectacularly, during the intensive 
phase of the war,  1986187-  199  1/92, the ratio of 
currency  outside  banks  to  Gross  Domestic 
Expenditure  increased  by  93%  (Collier  and 
Gunning (1992)). 
By  contrast,  in  Uganda  during  the  highly 
disturbed times from the mid-1970s until  1986, 
there was a decline in domestic currency relative to 
expenditure. Given the history of high and variable 
inflation and outright currency default this is not 
surprising. Our hypothesis is that Ugandan trading 
profits  were  disproportionately  held  in  foreign 
currencies. While this is intrinsically unobservable, 
during 1992 there was an unofficial private capital 
inflow of around $200m, some of which is likely 
to have reflected previous capital outflows. 
To summarize, at the onset of peace, a group 
of private agents, those engaged in illegal trading 
in  wartime,  is  likely  to  be  holding  substantial 
liquidity  in  a  range  of  foreign  and  domestic 
financial  assets.  We now turn to how portfolio 
choices change in the early stages of the return to 
peace. Civil war economies will have been starved 
of private investment even if there are high return 
opportunities as agents preserve their options by 
holding liquidity. Although it is not possible to get 
direct evidence on the rate of return on private 
investment in the aftermath of civil war, indirect 
evidence  is  provided  by  a  study  of  public 
investment  in  Uganda  (Collier  and  Pradhan, 
Chapter 9). During the early post-war years, the 
evaluation reports on the major category of public 
infrastructure, roads, showed an average real rate 
of return of 39%. Clearly, this is an exceptionally 
high rate of return for public investment and is at 
least  suggestive  that  the  return  to  private 
investment  was  also  high.  Thus,  a  distinctive 
feature of Africa's post-civil war economies may 
be that important groups of entrepreneurial private 
agents face high return opportunities without being 
constrained by lack of finance. We now consider 
whether they will use these opportunities. 
The ending of a civil war does not necessarily 
reestablish  economic  security.  We  distinguish 
three types of insecurity which, though not unique 
to  post-civil-war  economies  are  present  in  a 
heightened form. First, micro-level insecurity will 
be a concern because civil warfare leaves a legacy 
of an armed population desensitized to violence. 
Somalia,  Sudan,  Uganda,  Ethiopia,  Rwanda, 
Burundi, Angola and Liberia all now have heavily armed civilian populations. A high level of micro- 
insecurity discourages the acquisition of visible 
assets. For example, interview evidence suggests 
that in Ethiopia lack of personal security was the 
main  obstacle  to  investment  in  commercial 
agriculture during the immediate post-war period 
1992193  .4 
The second risk heightened in the aftermath of 
civil war is macro-insecurity. Whether the conflict 
has  been  resolved  by  military victory (Uganda, 
Ethiopia) or a brokered peace agreement (Angola, 
Mozambique,  Rwanda  and  Burundi)  there  are 
considerable risks that the government will  not 
survive.  This  risk  may  be  exacerbated  by 
demobilization  since  demobilized  soldiers 
constitute  a  potential  recruiting  ground  for 
subsequent  rebellions.  There  is  now  clear 
econometric  evidence  that  political  instability 
directly discourages private investment (Alesina 
and Perotti (1993), Alesina et al. (1992)) and such 
a link is scarcely surprising. Interview evidence 
from  commercial  banks  and  private  potential 
investors in Ethiopia during 1992 suggested that 
the primary explanation for the lack of investment 
was  concern  about  the  forthcoming  Eritrean 
referendum, since this might conceivably lead to 
circumstances in which warfare would be resumed. 
In  Uganda,  where  the  government  has  made 
sustained efforts to reassure the Asian community, 
interviews conducted in 1993 revealed irreducible 
fears that the complexion of the government might 
change after elections. 
A  third  type  of  risk  arises  because  the 
transition to  peace  creates  large  fiscal  shocks. 
Peace  reduces  some  military  expenditure  (the 
public sector "peace dividend"), but increases other 
expenditures. It  may  permit the government to 
increase some components of revenue collection 
such  as  import  duty  (Uganda),  but  wartime 
methods of  expropriation and coercion  become 
unacceptable,  reducing  other  components 
(agricultural taxation in Ethiopia). Each of these 
effects is large and unpredictable, the net effect 
being that the fiscal deficit is subject to extreme 
fluctuation  (Bevan  (1993,  1993a)).  Since  the 
government has little or no recourse to domestic 
debt instruments (as private agents fear that the 
government may default), these shocks must be 
monetized, resulting in large variations in inflation. 
In  Uganda,  the  annualized  inflation  rate  has 
fluctuated in  the  range  +230% to  -I%,  and  in 
Ethiopia after years of low and stable inflation the 
rate jumped to  40% and then fell to zero. Such 
variable inflation discourages investment. 
In  a war-peace transition all three forms of 
uncertainty are likely to be temporarily high so that 
there  is  an  incentive  to  avoid  irreversible 
investment:  the  premium  on  liquidity  which 
existed during war  is maintained during peace. 
Hence,  despite  the  onset  of  peace,  potential 
investors  may  continue to  hold  their assets  in 
liquid  forms.  Further,  to  the  extent  that 
consumption has been repressed during the war, 
there  may  be  a  switch  out  of  liquidity  into 
consumption rather than investment. In Ethiopia, 
where some liquid assets are visible because there 
is greater confidence in domestic financial assets, 
it is possible to observe the behavior of liquidity in 
the post-war environment. The  banking system 
remained  highly liquid,  with  banks reporting a 
shortage of investment projects and implying that 
any consumption spree was modest (Collier and 
Gunning (1 992)). 
An alternative to remaining liquid is to make 
investments  which  are  relatively  safe.  The 
riskiness of a capital good is related to its degree of 
sector-specificity,  duration,  and  country- 
specificity.  Country-specific  capital  goods  are 
clearly most prone to macro-insecurity  since they 
cannot be removed from the area of jurisdiction. 
The least desirable type of investment is therefore 
one which cannot be removed from the country, 
cannot  be  redeployed  between  sectors,  and 
depreciates  only  slowly.  For  example,  an 
investment in worker housing for a tea plantation 
would  have  all  these  characteristics,  whereas 
investment in a vehicle would have none of them. 
We would therefore predict that, to the extent that 
asset holders venture out of  liquidity, they will 
favor investments such as vehicles over those such 
as tea estates, even if (abstracting from risk) the 
return on the latter is considerably higher. More 
generally, investment in agriculture tends to be less 
easily reversible than in other sectors. 
This is indeed reflected in the pattern of post- 
war investment in Uganda and Ethiopia. In Uganda 
only 3% of private investment is being directed to 
agric~lture.~  Analysis of  private investment in 
Ethiopia reveals a similarly extreme skew away 
from  the  agricultural  sector
6.  Yet  in  both economies,  not  only  is  agriculture  by  far  the 
largest sector, but it is the dominant export activity 
and  the sector favored  by  policy changes. The 
investment  that  does  take  place  is  largely  in 
transport  equipment  and  machinery  for  light 
manufacturing, both of which are highly mobile. 
Currently  even  Mozambique is  able  to  attract 
textile investment into export processing zones, in 
spite  of  the  high  degree  of  country-specific 
uncertainty.'  This reflects the relative ease with 
which such investment can be reversed: investors 
are able to take advantage of special tax incentives 
without having to take a view of the long term. 
In summary, private portfolios at the onset of 
peace are highly liquid, agents have an incentive to 
maintain this liquidity, and to the extent that they 
do switch from liquid assets to fixed investment 
they  have  an  incentive  to  avoid  the  type  of 
investment which is most needed. We now turn to 
three  public policy  problems generated  by  this 
private behavior. 
3. Implications For Short Term Monetary 
Policy 
As  discussed  above,  during  the  war-peace 
transition the fiscal deficit will be volatile. Further, 
the inflationary consequences of a given deficit 
become  unpredictable  because  the  demand  for 
money is also liable to be subject to unpredictable 
shifts. First, to the extent that investor confidence 
returns, there will  be  a portfolio switch out of 
liquid  assets  into  real  assets.  This  will  have 
different implications for the demand for domestic 
money depending upon  which liquid assets are 
being  reduced.  In  Uganda  and  Angola,  since 
holdings of domestic money were so depleted, a 
switch  into  real  assets  must  be  financed from 
foreign  assets.  Such  an  increase  in  real 
expenditures would actually increase the demand 
for  domestic  money  since  some  of  the  new 
transactions will require it. By contrast, in Ethiopia 
an increase in investor confidence is inflationary 
since the asset demand for domestic money would 
decline and this would be offset only partly by the 
increase in  transactions demand associated with 
the rise in investment expenditure. Secondly, the 
demand  for  money is  likely to  be  affected  by 
switches back into (or out of) the monetized part of 
the economy. In  Uganda, the war-torn economy 
retreated  into subsistence so that  peace induces 
remonetization.  In  Ethiopia,  more  systematic 
coercion of the peasantry gave rise to involuntary 
peasant integration into the market, so that peace 
may  even  increase the size  of  the  subsistence 
sector. Thirdly, the volatility of inflation will lead 
to switches into and out of domestic currency. In 
Angola, the stabilization of the price level induced 
a portfolio switch out of durable goods into money 
(Azam et al. (1994)). In Uganda, during the year of 
a falling price level (1992193) the demand for real 
money balances rose by 20%. 
One  implication of this volatility  in  money 
demand and supply is that monetary targeting is 
impractical. If donor conditions include monetary 
targets (as they do in Uganda) they are liable to be 
breached  unless  the  government  matches  its 
expenditure to its revenue on  a high-frequency 
basis.  More  importantly, monetary  targeting  is 
under  these  circumstances  an  inappropriate 
instrument for avoiding monetary shocks, since 
shocks originating on the demand side now need to 
be  neutralized  by  changes  in  supply.  Money 
demand shocks may  potentially affect either the 
price level or real output since money demand is 
not stable. For example, when money demand falls 
(as would happen when investor confidence returns 
in  Ethiopia) then  monetary targeting  would  be 
counterproductive:  keeping  the  money  supply 
constant when demand falls would be inflationary. 
By  contrast,  in  Uganda  the  recent  rise  in  real 
money demand permitted a non-inflationary breach 
of  a  monetary  target.  Had  money  supply  not 
accommodated  this  demand  then  either  prices 
would have fallen or output contracted. 
One alternative to monetary targeting is fiscal 
targeting, whether of expenditure or of the budget 
deficit. However, the government must then accept 
the resulting high degree of volatility in inflation. 
A corollary is that private agents will continually 
be wrong-footed in their inflation expectations and 
so  domestic  financial  liberalization  should  be 
delayed.  Otherwise,  domestic  financial 
intermediation  will  generate  large  transfers 
between agents orthogonal to economic efficiency. 
For  example,  during  the  extraordinarily  rapid 
Ugandan disinflation of 1992, expost real interest 
rates rose to around 70%, rewarding depositors and 
penalizing lenders. Fortunately, there was so little 
financial intermediation that these transfers were not noticeably disruptive. 
An alternative to fiscal targeting is to target the 
price level directly. Rather than setting a target for 
a monetary or a fiscal aggregate the government 
would set a target for the price level itself. Fiscal 
instruments would be used but only in  response to 
a deviation of the price level from the target. Such 
a  strategy would  imply that  shocks originating 
from the demand for money would be borne by 
fiscal responses rather than by the price leveL8  To 
implement such a strategy of direct targeting of the 
price  level  requires  an  accurate  and  prompt 
consumer price index. The Ugandan government 
gave this a high priority, undertaking a household 
expenditure survey in 1989, some two years after 
the establishment of peace, and two years before a 
census.  The Ethiopian  government  is currently 
reversing these priorities,  planning a census for 
1994, two-and-a-half  years post  peace, with  no 
firm plans for an expenditure survey. Its existing 
price index is too unreliable to be used as a guide 
to fiscal policy: the government might find itself 
tightening fiscal policy in response to a statistical 
artifact. 
To summarize, the transition to peace is likely 
to cause large and difficult to predict changes in 
money demand so that monetary targeting will fail 
to  keep  the  price  level  constant.  In  these 
circumstances fiscal rather than monetary policy 
should be used, with fiscal policy being tightened 
or relaxed in  response to observed deviations of 
the price level from a target. 
4. Medium Term Portfolio Policy 
During  wartime  African  governments  will 
obviously  not  find  willing  buyers  for  their 
financial instruments. Since such instruments offer 
the government  the prospect of non-inflationary 
financing, it is natural that post-war governments 
should attempt to develop the market as soon as 
possible. The Ethiopian government indeed plans 
to start a market in Treasury Bills (TB) at the time 
of writing, some two years after the end of the war. 
The Ugandan government has been operating one 
for two years. However,  the Ugandan market in 
TBs is still extremely thin. The only buyers are 
four banks which  between  them  hold around  $ 
30m.'  The sale of TBs poses two problems. First, 
these assets are very liquid, having a maturity of 
only three months and being rediscountable at the 
Central Bank.''  They are therefore not as distinct 
from  money  as  would  be  desirable  for  non- 
inflationary financing. Second, despite their short 
maturity, they remain domestic currency li~bilities 
of the government and as such can be vif ~.ed  as 
rather risky. The local Treasury Departm  ,it of a 
multinational company in Uganda explained that it 
did not hold TBs in  spite of an attractive yield: 
were there to be a default corporate headquarters 
would penalize local executives for an event which 
would  be  regarded  as  predictable  given  prior 
history."  By mid-1993 the real interest rate on 
Ugandan  TBs was still around 23% despite the 
modest level of sales: the total outstanding stock of 
government domestic currency debt was only one 
percent of GDP.  Attempts by the Central Bank to 
sell debt of longer maturity, nine months instead of 
three months, found  no buyers in  1992,  and  in 
1993 could only find buyers at a real interest rate 
of 40%. This extreme steepening of the yield curve 
is a symptom of the doubts about the viability of 
the state  which  persist  after the  restoration  of 
peace. The scope for deficit financing from sales of 
government debt is therefore very limited: were 
the government to use it to any extent, the interest 
burden would seriously inflate future government 
expenditure. Even with modest sales, real interest 
rates  at  23%  should  have  been  regarded  as 
prohibitive for government borrowing. 
While  post-war  governments  are  in  an 
unusually weak position to borrow domestically, 
they own assets (public enterprises,  commercial 
and residential property) which private agents may 
prefer  over  government  debt.  In  Angola  and 
Ethiopia the government owns all urban residential 
property  and  all  urban  land.  In  Uganda  public 
ownership is less extensive, but still includes large 
quantities  of housing.  The government can sell 
such  assets  provided  its  ownership  is 
uncontested.'* 
Whether  the  government  can  raise  money 
more easily by selling such assets than by selling 
government debt depends on how private agents 
compare the associated risks. First, all such assets 
are less vulnerable to predation by the government 
than  are  government  liabilities.  While  the 
government may confiscate them, and so they are 
not entirely secure, the acts of confiscation and 
default are not equally easy: omission  is  easier than commission. Secondly, equity in  privatized 
public enterprises is more risky than the ownership 
of real estate, since the future profits stream of an 
enterprise is more vulnerable to policy change than 
is the rental stream from residential (and to a lesser 
extent  commercial)  property.  Real  estate  is 
therefore likely to be considered an attractive asset. 
This  is  confirmed  by  the  Ugandan 
phenomenon of 'dollar houses', luxury residences 
constructed in  the immediate post-war years  by 
private  investors for rental to expatriates.  Such 
investment is country-specific, slow depreciating 
and  in  the  export  sector.  However,  unlike 
investment in, for example, the rehabilitation of a 
tea estate which shares these characteristics, it is 
relatively invulnerable to policy change since not 
being  a  production  process  it  is  not  input- 
dependent, payment for the services can be made 
by the expatriate from a foreign bank account into 
a foreig bank account without being controllable 
by the government, and its services can always be 
sold on the domestic market, so that the investment 
is  mobile  between  the export and non-tradable 
sectors. Finally, because house rental is not a skill- 
intensive process, the asset is saleable on a much 
wider market than is a tea estate. The number of 
investors in Ugandan tea estates is so limited that, 
even if profitable, the investor must presume that 
it is unmarketable, whereas houses are marketable 
in all but catastrophic circumstances. If investment 
in "dollar houses" was sufficiently attractive in the 
immediate  post-war  years  to  induce  new 
construction, at least part of the existing stock of 
public residential property is probably marketable. 
In  the earliest stages of peace private agents 
will  probably  not  be  willing to purchase either 
government  liabilities  or  public  real  assets. 
However, as peace is sustained, they are likely to 
accept,  because  of  the  differences  in  risks,  a 
substantially  lower  implicit  rate  of  return  on 
unconfiscated  residential property and land than 
upon government liabilities. In effect, the risks of 
subsequent  loss  of property rights  recede  more 
rapidly than the risks of a government implicit or 
explicit default on  liabilities.  Further,  since the 
housing market has a naturally broader base than 
that for  government  liabilities,  there should  be 
considerably  more  scope  to  expand  this  asset 
market without forcing up implicit  interest rates 
than there is for sales of government liabilities. 
Currently, in Africa's post-war economies, the 
government is often holding a substantial part of 
its portfolio in real estate. a low risk. low yielding 
asset, while attempting to fund its deficit through 
sales of  liabilities at high  real interest rates. To 
illustrate,  the Ugandan  government owns some 
4,000 houses with a market value of perhaps $ 
The typical rental return on the Kampala 
housing  stock  is  around  8%,14 so  that  if  the 
government rented  this asset out at commercial 
rates  it  would  receive an  income  of $ 8m.  By 
contrast,  it  has  only around  $30m of domestic 
currency debt on which. as noted above, it pays 
23% real interest, or $7m. The government should 
substitute  in  its  portfolio away  from  safe,  low 
yielding assets which the private sector is willing 
to hold,  and from  liabilities  which  the private 
sector is unwilling to hold, towards development 
expenditures  which  the  private  sector will  not 
undertake.  A  further  advantage  of  selling 
government property is that because it is less liquid 
than TBs it sterilizes money more effectively. A 
dollar of real asset sales may therefore be more 
counter-inflationary than a dollar of TI3 sales. 
Ethiopia  currently  has  neither  a  market  in 
government  liabilities  nor  a  market  in  public 
assets. The government owns a very substantial 
part of the urban housing stock and here there is 
the same scope for a profitable portfolio switch as 
in  Uganda.  In  addition  all  land  is government 
owned. Land sales therefore offer enormous scope 
for an improvement in the public portfolio. Until 
early 1993 the government effectively rented out 
land for free and administrative allocation systems 
rationed  the  resulting  excess  demand.  An 
important rationing mechanism involves approval 
of an investment project by the Investment Office. 
While such approval does not guarantee access to 
land, it makes it considerably more likely: when a 
project is approved the Investment Office writes a 
letter to the regional government in support of the 
investor's application for land. Since access to land 
is highly profitable a substantial part of investment 
proposals are probably bogus. For example, there 
are numerous applications for the construction of 
hotels. Commercial bankers think  that the most 
likely explanation for this is that such applications 
offer a good prospect of prime commercial sites 
which can then  be  retained  by  the partial,  or if 
necessary complete, construction of a building the use of which can remain flexible." In March 1993 
the Addis Ababa regional government instituted a 
'service charge' and thereby de facto started to sell 
urban land. It charged around Birr 20,000 (about $ 
4,000) per acre for prime sites. This was levied as 
a  charge  on  the  transaction  which  would  be 
repeated  if  the  land  were  to  be  resold.  This 
approach to a land market has several weaknesses. 
First, it is a transactions tax rather than a sale and 
so discourages resale. Second, the price charged is 
far below the market-clearing price to the extent 
that it can be determined. The price at which prime 
sites informally change hands is reportedly around 
Birr 800,000 (around $ 150,000) per acre. There 
was therefore a strong incentive to acquire land, 
even given the new service charge, but the charge 
then encouraged owners to retain the land even if 
they had no use for it. Third, the public beneficiary 
of urban land charges was the regional government 
of Addis, which is easily the richest of the regions. 
Hence, the policy in effect permitted the richest of 
the regional governments to dispose of  national 
public assets at a small fraction of their worth.16 
Hence  in  post-war  circumstances  placing 
government  liabilities is  an  expensive form  of 
government finance as government default is still 
considered a non-negligible risk  so that private 
agents require high real interest rates. At the same 
time the government is likely to own asset. such as 
reaI estate and land which private agents consider 
more secure and are therefore willing to hold at 
lower rates of return than government liabilities. 
5.  Long  Term  Policy  For  Stimulating 
Exports 
Civil  war  disproportionately  damages  the 
agricultural export sector of the economy: wartime 
governments over-tax it given their extraordinary 
need for revenue, and rural transportation of goods 
becomes vulnerable. Since the sector is the major 
source both of foreign exchange and government 
revenue, there is a social premium  upon  private 
investment in it. 
Even if currently profitable, investment in the 
sector is  highly  risky  because it  happens to  be 
atypically irreversible (since depreciation rates for 
such  investment  are  very  low)  and  process- 
dependent. Agricultural investments are largely 
sector-specific  and  more  particularly  country- 
specific.  Non-tradable  capital  goods  must  be 
constructed  on-site  and  are  ex  post  location- 
specific.  By  contrast, tradable capital goods are 
intrinsically ex ante not country-specific, and are 
often mobile expost and therefore less subject to 
country-risk, but  non-tradable capital inherently 
contains  country-risk.  Further,  sector-risk  is 
largely country-specific: the predominant reason 
why the return in  a sector might  decline in  the 
African  context  is  if  government  policy  turns 
against the sector. Hence, capital goods which are 
country-mobile largely avoid sector-risk even if 
they  are  sector-specific.  If  the  government  of 
Uganda removes protection from the textile sector, 
there is some scope for relocating machinery in 
neighboring countries. Non-tradable capital goods 
are therefore not only inherently more prone to 
country-risk than  tradable capital, they are also 
likely to be more prone to sector-risk. The neglect 
of the agricultural export sector during wartime 
implies that the non-tradable capital stock in which 
the sector is normally fairly intensive (trees, feeder 
roads, storage facilities) is in need of replacement. 
Yet  the  high  degree  of  macro-insecurity  and 
policy-risk  in  post-war  economies discourages 
precisely this type of investment. This is confirmed 
by the experience of Uganda and Ethiopia noted 
above: in both countries investment in agriculture 
is extremely low. 
To  summarize the  Uganda  experience,  the 
economy has been starved of private investment, 
especially  in  export  agriculture.  The  post-war 
government introduces a legal environment suited 
to private investment with an Investment Authority 
to aid the process. What it gets is dollar houses and 
light  manufacturing.  This  is  not  because these 
investments offer the highest return but  because 
they  are  substantially  less  risky  than  the 
investments which are most needed. 
Many of the factors which make non-tradable 
investment  risky  for  private  agents  should  be 
discounted by society because they are generated 
by  the  society.  Ideally,  the  risks  should  be 
removed, but some of them are irreducible in the 
aftermath of civil war. A possible strategy is for 
the government itself to make the investment in 
non-tradable  capital,  leasing  it  to  private 
entrepreneurs on short, but renewable, tenure. This 
would  shift the risk involved  in  the irreversible commitment associated with ownership from the 
private entrepreneur to the government. Even if the 
government is able to finance such investment. the 
more specific the non-tradable capital purchased 
by  the government  the more severely does the 
government encounter the problem of 'backing 
winners', namely that it  lacks the knowledge on 
which to make good choices. Further, much of the 
problem is the fear of government on the part of 
private  investors.  Although  leasing  avoids  an 
irreversible commitment in non-tradable capital by 
the  private  investor,  it  does so at  the  cost  of 
increasing  the  direct  relationship  between  the 
private agent and the government: the government 
becomes the landlord. This actually increases the 
scope for the government to be predatory and so 
may  make  the  entrepreneur  wary  of  other 
irreversible non-marketable investments such as 
reputation, without which activity can only remain 
limited. 
If  the  government  does  not  take  on  the 
investment itself  then  in  effect,  it  needs  some 
mechanism for subsidizing the act of commitment 
of private investors, because otherwise irreversible 
investment will be socially sub-optimal. What is 
needed is a simple mechanism for implementing 
such a subsidy. 
However,  strategies  of  subsidy  can  be 
problematic.  The  African  record  of  'backing 
winners' is so poor and the political pressures to 
misappropriate targeted subsidies are so acute that 
the subsidizing of particular investment projects is 
not likely to be desirable. 
At  present  the  Ugandan  government  is 
subsidizing investment by  precommiting itself to 
five year tax holidays.  This  policy  has several 
drawbacks. First, a tax holiday is not a credible act 
of commitment since the government has several 
explicit and implicit tax instruments in addition to 
corporation tax. Most notably, it could revert to an 
over-valued exchange rate, extracting any desired 
rate of taxation on investments while leaving the 
corporate tax rate at zero. Second, a tax holiday 
obviously  provides  no  insurance  against  the 
collapse  of  profits  due  to a  reversion  to civil 
unrest. Third, it permits the government to impose 
high corporate tax rates once the tax holiday period 
is over. Knowing this, investors will favor projects 
which generate profits only in  the short term, or 
install only e-rpost mobile capital goods so that the 
investment can be removed once the tax holiday 
ends." 
In  the  past  most  African  governments 
implicitly subsidized  investment through  over- 
valued  exchange  rates.  The  over-valuation 
subsidized all  imports purchased  with domestic 
resources,  but rationing gave priority to capital 
goods. This was, therefore, not a general subsidy 
on investment, but a subsidy on imported capital 
goods  purchased with  domestic  resources.  The 
subsidy needed in Africa's post-war economies is 
precisely the converse of this: there is a case for 
using the exchange rate to subsidize investment but 
now in the form of an under-valuation. 
This will have two effects. First, it will induce 
substitution of non-tradable for tradable capital. 
Secondly,  as  noted,  private  agents  hold  large 
amounts of liquid assets and part of this is held 
abroad.  For  example,  at  present  Ethiopian 
businessmen  living  abroad  hold  very  large 
amounts of foreign assets which they may want to 
bring  into  the  country  to  finance  domestic 
investment. Such foreign capital inflows will be 
encouraged  by  a  policy  of  undervaluation. An 
additional administrative advantage of working 
through  the  exchange  rate  is  that  a firm  only 
receives the subsidy if it actually makes the desired 
expenditure. 
During  exchange  rate  under-valuation  the 
government  will  be  temporarily  accumulating 
reserves. Under-valuation cannot be a long-term 
policy because it would imply ever-rising reserves. 
However, this is  itself quite a desirable feature 
since  smart  private  agents  should  therefore 
recognize  that  the  subsidy  is  temporary.  This 
recognition  should  both  limit  the  tendency  to 
misallocate irreversible factors to activities which 
are only profitable because of the under-valuation 
and further induce the purchase of non-tradable 
capital goods since delay is expected to reduce the 
subsidy. 
Such a policy will certainly not be sufficient to 
attract investment commitments in the absence of 
complementary  public  investments  in 
infrastructure.  Nor  should  investment  be  the 
primary  objective  of  exchange  rate  policy. 
However, to the extent that undervaluation indeed 
implicitly subsidizes commitment, which is itself 
socially desirable, there is a case for including it as 
a consideration in  the setting of economic policies. 6. Conclusion 
African economies in post-war environments. such 
as Ethiopia and Uganda, are likely to have some 
common  characteristics.  Some  private  agents. 
whether  illegal  traders  or  expatriated  ethnic 
minority  business  communities,  are  financially 
liquid and so in  a position to afford investment. 
The economy has been extremely short of private 
investment  for many years and so the return  is 
likely to be high. Yet private agents are resistant to 
non-tradable capital goods investments of the type 
that the export sector needs for recovery. We have 
proposed  three  policies  as appropriate  in  these 
circumstances which are fairly distinctive to war- 
peace transition situations. Since money demand is 
highly unstable the government should target the 
price level (changing its fiscal stance in response 
to deviations of the price level from some target) 
directly rather than attempting to control inflation 
through  monetary  or  fiscal  targeting.  It should 
secure its medium term financing needs through 
the sale of property and land rather than through 
attempts  to  establish  a  domestic  market  in  its 
liabilities since as long as default is considered 
likely debt financing will be unnecessarily costly. 
Finally, it should subsidize the act of commitment 
implied  by  investment  in  irreversible  capital 
through  temporarily  undervaluing the exchange 
rate. Notes 
1.  The  authors  would  like  to  thank  two anonymous  referees for extremely  useful  comments  on an 
earlier version of this paper. 
2. Obviously, in Uganda there was also an involuntary exodus. 
3. The exception to this is the Franc Zone member countries such as Chad since there is no national' 
currency. 
4. Interviews conducted by the authors during 1993. 
5.  Figures  from  the  Uganda  Investment  Authority,  covering  all  planned  and  implemented  private 
investment (other than very small scale informal activities) since its inception in 199  1 to mid-  1993. 
6. Source: Ethiopian Investment Authority, 1993. 
7. Authors' interview with Zimbabwean textile entrepreneurs. June 1993. 
8. An advantage of this policy is that it is conducive to the revenue-maximizing amount of seigniorage. 
Recent analyses of the demand for money in Africa (Adam (1992), Adam, Ndulu and Sowa (1993)) suggest 
that fairly low and stable inflation rates is revenue-maximizing. 
9. TBs have been supplemented by Promissory Notes, issued to suppliers with whom the government has 
fallen into serious arrears in its payments. They cany a maturity of one year and pay interest at 15% and are 
not rediscountable at the central bank. They are therefore forced sales of government paper. However, since 
they can serve as collateral for credit they are in effect rediscountable at the commercial banks. The banks 
must  then  hold  them  to  maturity  but  they are clearly close substitutes  in  the banks'  portfolios  for 
TBs. 
10.  In  Zambia  in  a  post-Kaunda  transition  not  dissimilar  from  those  considered  here,  the  maturity 
of TBs has been shortened to only 28 days. 
1  1. Authors' interview. 
12.  Government ownership is  likely to be contested when it results from confiscation. In Uganda and 
Ethiopia part of public property is owned by the present government following confiscation from private 
owners by a previous government. Since the post-war government has come to power by overthrowing its 
predecessor, it is under no obligation to regard these actions as legitimate and so restitution is at least 
potentially on the political agenda. The Ugandan government committed itself to restitution, but with a time 
limit on claims. If the government is at some stage to raise revenue from asset disposals such a limitation 
is necessary because until that date the government cannot establish its ownership of properties for disposal. 
The Ethiopian government has resisted general restitution of property. 
13. There  is  no current valuation of the publicly  owned  housing stock. However,  there are believed 
to be 4.000 properties. Most of these are in very poor condition but some of them are on very valuable sites. 
The market price for newly constructed housing of similar size to the average of the public housing stock 
is $ 50.000. The estimate in the text halves this to allow for poor condition and the depression in the market 
from the greatly increased volume of sales implied by disposal of the public housing stock. However, it is 
probably a conservative figure because some government properties are extremely valuable because of their 
locations. 14.  Data  on  house  prices and  rentals were supplied  by  Mr.  Kasekende,  General  Manager,  National 
Housing and Construction Corporation. 
15. There is also a hotel  boom  in  Uganda, where again there is evidence in the form of uncompleted 
buildings  which  serve as security  for  loans,  that  investors  favor hotels  because  of the high  content 
of sector-unspecific fixed capital combined with an explicit activity which is attractive both to government 
and bankers. 
16. The central government consequently declared the Addis user fee system to be illegal and established 
a study group to consider land policy. In August 1993 the study group participated in a televised debate with 
the business community, as the government edged towards making its major asset marketable. 
17. The government of Botswana encouraged manufacturing investment through tax holidays, but has found 
that at the end of the holiday period the investment is footloose. Chapter 3 
Policy Uncertainty, Repatriation and Investment 
Paul Collier and Jan Willem  Gunning' 
1.  Introduction 
In 'War, Peace and Private Portfolios' we argued 
that  in  a  post-civil-war economy  private agents 
would hold considerable foreign financial assets. A 
second feature of war economies is that they are 
usually heavily regulated. We consider a post-war 
economy  such  as  Ethiopia  in  which  the 
government  inherits  a  'control  regime'  during 
which there has been considerable capital flight. 
As in our previous paper, the policy objective is to 
induce  repatriation  for  purposes  of  private 
investment. However, while in that paper our focus 
was on compensating for irreducible risk, here we 
consider  the  sensitivity  of  repatriation  to  the 
control regime and its reform. The policy problem 
arises because policy reform is a slow process due 
to legislative and political obstacles so that it must 
be spread over several years. While it is common 
for governments in this position to pre-announce 
their  agenda in  broad  terms as  a  statement  of 
intent,  a  post-war  government  is  at  best  an 
unknown  quantity  (more  likely  during  the 
insurgency phase it will have created a frightening 
impression), and so some of the promised reforms 
will inevitably be less than fully credible. Doubts 
will arise both as to whether the government will 
stick  to  its  timing,  and  more  fundamentally 
whether some proposed reforms will happen at all 
or, even if implemented, be reversed. In the worst 
scenario the government may be so little trusted 
that potential repatriators will not repatriate until 
many years after all reforms have been made. 
To date, the main focus of the literature which 
addresses  this  problem  has  been  on  how  the 
government might increase the credibility of its 
promises to undertake or maintain reforms. The 
government  may  enhance  its  credibility  by 
adopting signalling rules which distinguish it from 
a government which intends to break its promises.' 
Alternatively, credibility may be achieved through 
institutional  arrangements  which  make  policy 
reversal extremely ~ostly.~  Here we take a different 
and indeed perhaps more obvious approach. The 
typical prospective reform package includes a wide 
range of policy intentions. These policy intentions 
vary both with respect to the credibility with which 
they are viewed and the impact they will have if 
implemented. We  abstract from fears of  policy 
reversal:  the  government  can  resolve  the 
uncertainty surrounding a prospective reform by 
implementing if  but because of administrative and 
political constraints, implementing one policy now 
has  the opportunity  cost  that  another must  be 
deferred. The  pace of reform  is given, but  the 
govenunent has scope for choice in determining its 
sequence. We therefore investigate whether, given 
different credibility ratings of different policies, 
there  are  more  and  less  efficient sequences of 
reform.  We  distinguish  between  two  types  of 
doubt:  those  which  concern  the  timing  of  a 
promised reform and those which concern whether 
a promised reform will in fact completely drop of 
the agenda. We refer to these as timing doubts and 
fundamental  doubts.  Some  componenrts  of  the 
reform package are subject to each of these types 
of doubt and  the government can  only resolve 
them by  implementation. We  further distinguish 
policies  by  their impact if  implemented. Some 
policies directly affect the price or worth of an 
asset, whereas others do so only indirectly through 
altering the return upon it. 
Policy incredibility may  have consequences 
for  various  aspects  of  private  behavior.  A 
particular focus of the literature has been the effect 
on private investment. It may reduce investment because  capital  once  installed  is  immobile.  A 
broken  policy promise may change the relative 
profitability of sectors (Rodrik, 1989), or reduce 
the  return on  domestic  investment  below other 
assets  (van  Wijnbergen,  1985;  Rodrik,  199 1). 
Additionally,  policy  uncertainty  might  reduce 
investment  due  to  its effect upon  savings (van 
Wijnbergen, 1992). Here our focus is specifically 
upon private investment financed by repatriation. 
There are two reasons for this narrower focus. 
First, arguably it  is these funds which are most 
policy-sensitive. In the economies most in need of 
private investment due to a  long history of  its 
discouragement,  such  as Ethiopia and  Uganda, 
private foreign assets are probably large relative to 
domestic assets. Second, since the government can 
attach  a  low  weight  to  the  non-domestic 
expenditure of  unrepatriated funds,  investment 
financed  by  repatriation  has  a  lower  social 
opportunity cost than domestic savings. 
Recent policy debates in Ethiopia can serve to 
illustrate the distinctions we will be making. Our 
taxonomy of  policy  doubts  and  policy  impact 
generates four possible cases: doubts can be timing 
or fundamental and the impact can affect either the 
return on capital or directly affect asset values. 
Four  policy  reforms  which  were  under 
consideration by the Ethiopian government during 
1992 fall into each of these categories, as depicted 
in  Table 3.1. First consider property rights. As in 
other post-war and post-communist situations there 
was considerable uncertainty as to the ownership 
of property. Assets currently operated by the state 
could at some stage be subject to rival property 
claims  from  previous  owners  who  had  been 
expropriated. Hence, the purchase of non-tradable 
capital goods (like buildings) carried the risk that 
title  might  subsequently  be  contested.  The 
acquisition of land for industrial or commercial use 
carried the same risk but in a more extreme form 
since all that was available was the acquisition of 
a right of  usage  rather than  of  ownership. The 
government was aware of the problem posed by 
the lack of clarity over property rights but faced a 
choice. It could, as in Uganda, recognize and invite 
claims  from  previous owners.  Alternatively, it 
could declare such claims invalid ab initio, vesting 
ownership in  itself. The former course implied a 
much longer period of uncertainty on the validity 
of title for a repatriator than the latter. Hence, a 
reasonable expectation would  be  that land rights 
would definitely be  settled but over an  uncertain 
period depending upon policy choice. This was 
therefore a timing doubt and the policy impact was 
directly on the worth of the asset. The acquisition 
of  good  title to  urban  land  would  not  of  itself 
confer the right to sell it at the market-clearing 
price. Given the ideological background of the new 
government,  it  was  uncertain  whether  it  could 
permit  the  emergence  of  a  competitive  land 
market, as its program hinted, or whether it would 
continue to control prices. As with property rights 
the impact of policy was directly on the worth of 
an asset, but doubt was now fundamental. Inherited 
labor laws reduced the return on investment by 
conceding to workers many of the powers which 
would normally be reserved for management. This 
included restrictions upon dismissal which had led 
to  substantial  overmanning.  These  laws  were 
naturally a sensitive issue for the new government 
because existing employees wished  to preserve 
there entrenched rights. There was therefore again 
fundamental doubt as to whether policy reform in 
this area would be other than cosmetic, but the 
impact was on the return on capital. Finally, the 
rate of return was also reduced by corporate taxes 
which were virtually confiscatory in the Mengistu 
period. It was apparent that the new government 
would  reduce  corporate  taxes  as  part  of  its 
promulgation of an investment code. However, it 
was unclear what priority the government would 
assign to the new code given that it had so many 
other  commitments  on  its  legislative  capacity. 
Hence, doubt concerned timing and the impact was 
on the return on capital. 
The first question we address is whether, a 
priori, there are grounds for the government to 
prioritize the urgency of making these reforms, 
given that the policy and legislative process is slow 
so  that  not  all  changes  can  be  undertaken 
simultaneously.  We  consider  only  otherwise 
commensurate  policies.  By  commensurate  we 
mean  policy  stances  which,  if  sustained  with 
certainty,  have the same effect upon  permanent 
income. That is, we are not investigating whether 
uncertainty about labor laws is necessarily more or 
less costly  than  that about  property rights,  but 
rather  the relative urgency of reform  were the 
effect  of  permanent  unreformed  labor  laws  to 
depress the return on capital by the same extent as a  permanent  failure  to  clarify  property  rights. 
Section 2 sets out the analysis of prioritising this 
topology of policies. 
Our second question concerns exchange rate 
policy.  In  many  developing  countries  the 
overvaluation of exchange rates was probably the 
single  most  serious  policy  failure  of  the  early 
1980s and  it  has consequently been the central 
focus of reform. On the argument of our previous 
paper. exchange rate reform is yet more important 
in transition to peace economies: the rate needs not 
only  to  be  corrected  from  over-valuation,  but 
switched to under-valuation in order to create an 
implicit subsidy on repatriation into irreversible 
domestic investment. Whereas it is straightforward 
to classify the four Ethiopian policies discussed 
above into those which affect the return on capital 
and  those  which  directly  affect  its  price,  the 
classification  of  the  exchange  rate  is  more 
complex. In Section 3 we show that the exchange 
rate may  have very different  effects depending 
upon other aspects of the control regime, so that 
the urgency of reform differs accordingly. 
2.  Ranking  the  Consequences  of  Policy 
Uncertainty 
Consider an investor who has to decide whether to 
repatriate assets held abroad. The domestic rate of 
return is r,  if policies are unchanged and rr after 
reform. The return on foreign assets is r*. All rates 
of return are finite and we assume rr > r* > ru.  The 
returns are measured in foreign currency and in the 
case of domestic investment profits are measured 
after being remitted abr~ad.~ 
The investor is risk-neutral; he maximizes the 
expected value of the return on his assets over an 
infinite  horizon,  discounting at  a  fixed  rate  r,. 
Foreign assets are liquid, but domestic investment 
is  irreversible.  If  reform  is  implemented  it  is 
sustained indefinitely. We consider, on the basis of 
the distinctions between fundamental and timing 
doubts and between rate of return and capital value 
impacts, three types of policy uncertainty. 
In the first case there is timing doubt. Reform 
will take place either in period  1 or in period 2. 
Viewed from the start of period  1, the domestic 
rate of return will rise from r,, to r,  with probability 
I-p in period  1 and with probability p in period 2. 
Hence. at the start of the first period, when the 
agent has to decide whether or not to repatriate, he 
is uncertain as to which policy will prevail in that 
period.  The  decision  problem  is  in  this  case 
extremely  simple:  since  it  is  certain  that  the 
domestic rate of return will exceed the foreign one 
(rr > r*) for all  later  periods,  the investor  will 
choose to remain liquid for at most one period. He 
will do so if the return over the infinite horizon is 
higher than if he repatriates immediately: 
Clearly, only the first period returns need to be 
compared:  the  investor  will  repatriate  if  the 
expected  value  of  the  return  on  domestic 
investment  in  that  period  exceeds  r*. From  (1) 
repatriation will be postponed if: 
This defines a critical probability p,. If delay of 
reform is sufficiently likely (p > p,) repatriation 
will be postponed. 
In the second case there is fundamental doubt. 
The reform is either implemented in period  1 (with 
probability  I -p), or it is completely discounted. If 
the investor remains liquid  in  period  1,  he will 
repatriate in the second period only if reform has 
then taken place. Hence he will decide to keep his 
assets abroad during period  1 (that is to remain 
liquid for the time being) if: 
Note  that  after the  first  period  he then  has the 
option  to  repatriate,  which  he  will  exercise  if 
reform has then taken place. In this case there is a 
premium on liquidity: even though the expected 
return on domestic investment in period 1 may be 
much higher than the foreign rate of return, it may 
still be advantageous (since r* > r,)  to hold assets 
abroad  during  the  first  period  to  avoid  being 
locked in should reform  not take place. This, of 
course, is the option value of waiting. 
Condition (3) defines a critical probability p,; 
if reform is sufficiently unlikely (p > p,)  then the 
repatriation decision will be postponed. From (2) 
and (3) the critical probabilities in  the two cases 
satisfy: and since r, > r* > r,  this implies p,  > p,.  The 
critical probability is lower than in the first case 
because investment is irreversible: in the first case 
repatriation involves a risk of a return lower than 
on the foreign asset (r, < r*), but only for the first 
period; in the second case the risk applies to all 
future income. 
Finally, in our third case reform applies to the 
value of capital (unlike in the first case) and there 
is timing doubt (unlike the second case). The agent 
must decide whether to repatriate at the start of 
period  1,  not  knowing  whether  policy  will  be 
changed for period 1 or only for period 2. If policy 
is not reformed until period 2, a rival claimant for 
his  newly  purchased  asset  may  come  forward 
during period 1. 
It is convenient to establish a baseline case. 
Suppose that should policy reform be delayed until 
period 2 the risk of asset loss during period  1  is 
ru/r, and that allowing for this risk, the expected 
rate of return  is ru.  Hence,  in  the event of the 
reform not being delayed, the return will be r,.  In 
this  case  the  expected  return  on  domestic 
investment is [(I -p)r, + prJ( l+  I /r,),  just as in case 
2, in spite of the difference between fundamental 
and timing doubt. However, there is a distinction 
between  the two cases.  If the investor  remains 
liquid in period 1 (earning r*), he will thereafter 
earn  r,  indefinitely  in  case 3  (since  reform  is 
certain5) but only (I-p)r, + pr* in case 2 (because 
then there may be no reform). Hence postponing 
repatriation is even more attractive  in  this case 
than in case 2. The investor will choose liquidity in 
the first period if: 
r* + rjr, > [(1 -p)rr + pru](l+l/rd)  (5) 
Comparing (3) and (5) the critical probabilities 
must satisfy: 
which implies that p,  > p,,  as expected. 
Our results imply 1 > p,  > p,  > p3 > 0.  Hence, as 
the  probability,  p,  of  delay  or  non-reform 
approaches unity (p > p, ) then in all three cases 
the investor will prefer liquidity. Conversely, for 
very  low  values of p (p < p,)  the  investor will 
repatriate in  the first period in  zll three cases. In 
between these extremes, the combination of timing 
doubt and a policy  impact directly on the asset 
value  (the  third  case)  is  most  damaging  for 
repatriation  (in  the  sense  that  the  critical 
probability  is  lowest),  fundamental  doubt 
combined with a policy impact on either the asset 
value  or  its  return  is  intermediate,  and  the 
combination of timing doubt and a policy impact 
upon the return on capital is least damaging to 
repatriation  (in  the  sense  that  the  critical 
probability, p,, is relatively high). 
The conclusion from this is that even at modest 
probabilities  of  postponement  or  non-reform, 
policy uncertainty can induce investment deferral 
if it relates to timing and the policy impact is on 
asset values so the government needs to resolve it 
by giving the needed legislation high priority. By 
contrast  if  uncertainty  relates to timing but the 
impact is on the return on capital, reform can be 
postponed  until later in the legislative program. 
Applying the results to the previous example of 
four policies in the prospective Ethiopian reform 
program, the implication is that the most urgent 
refom  would  be  to  establish  unchallengeable 
ownership claims. The least urgent reform would 
be  to  amend  profits  taxation.  The  other  two 
reforms,  the  resolution  of  whether  urban  land 
markets should be permitted, and whether the labor 
code  should  be  substantially  revised,  are  of an 
equal and intermediate urgency. 
Our results differ in several ways from those of 
Rodrik (1991). In our formulation uncertainty is 
resolved after the first period. In the timing doubt 
case of condition (I), at the end of period 1 either 
reform has taken place or the agent knows with 
certainty  that  it  will  occur  in  period  2. 
Alternatively,  in  the  fundamental  doubt  case, 
reform has either taken place in  period  1 (and it 
will then be sustained) or it has not (and one then 
knows that it will not occur). In Rodrik's model the 
reform  is  introduced  in  period  1  and  in  each 
subsequent period there is a (constant) prcbability 
(p) of policy reversal. Hence even though Rodrik 
considers  policies  which  affect  the  return  on 
capital rather directly impact upon capital values, 
and uncertainty relates to timing, his result is much 
closer to our second and third cases than to our 
first,  apparently  eq$valent,  case.  Indeed,  he concludes that even  low  probabilities of policy 
reversal may deter investment. This simply reflects 
that in Rodrik's model policy reversal is possible in 
every period so that policy uncertainty affecting 
the return on capital  is analytically  identical to 
uncertainty affecting asset values. An option value 
cannot arise in  his model. If the agent decides to 
remain  liquid  initially  he  will  never  have  to 
reconsider  that  decision  since  matters  cannot 
improve: if the reform is sustained for one more 
period  the  probability  of  a  future  reversal  is 
unaffected. Hence when the agent reconsiders the 
profitability of investment after a period of waiting 
the problem is either still the same as before or the 
reform has collapsed in the mean time so that the 
investor will decide to remain liquid. In our case a 
reform may be adopted (rather than reversed) and 
hence the option value argument for staying liquid 
does apply (in case 2). 
3.  Exchange  Rate  Uncertainty  and 
Repatriation 
We now consider how uncertainty attached to the 
official  exchange  rate  should  be  classified 
according to the above schema. The question arises 
because the official exchange rate may, depending 
upon details of economic structure, directly affect 
either or both of the price of capital and its rate of 
return  viewed  from  the  perspective  of  the 
repatriator. 
The official exchange rate may directly affect 
the price of capital. Suppose that it  is devalued 
from e, to e,. If domestic prices of tradable capital 
goods rise in proportion, then, if all capital goods 
involved in the investment project are tradable, the 
price of capital to the repatriator is unaffected by 
the devaluation. This will be the case if tradable 
capital goods are imported at the official exchange 
rate both before and after the reform. Since capital 
goods  imports  tend  to  be  highly  visible  (and 
therefore  more  difficult  to  smuggle)  this 
assumption  may  not  be  unrealistic.  However, 
prices of non-tradable capital goods are unlikely to 
rise proportionately. We consider the limiting case 
(which  may  be  applicable  in  the short  run)  in 
which these prices are unaffected by devaluatiom6 
In  this  case,  if  the  asset  purchased  by  the 
repatriator is non-tradable, the devaluation lowers 
the price of capital by the factor e,/e,.'  Hence the 
price  effect  depends  on  the  composition  of 
investment. 
The official exchange rate may also affect the 
rate of return on capital. It can do so through two 
routes, the return in  domestic currency and the 
mapping to remitted profits. Consider, first, the 
return in domestic currency. In the limiting case a 
change in the official exchange rate has no effect 
upon the rate of return. Again let the price of non- 
tradables be unaffected by the devaluation, so the 
limiting case holds if all inputs (other than capital) 
and outputs of the investment project are non- 
tradable. If the characteristics of the project are 
reversed, so that all non-factor inputs and outputs 
are tradable and their prices  reflect the official 
exchange  rate  both  before  and  after  the 
devaluation,  then  the  rate  of  return  rises  in 
proportion to it. This positive effect may be seen as 
the removal of an implicit tax, the overvaluation of 
the domestic currency. 
Now  consider  the  return  as  measured  by 
remitted  profits,  taking  the  domestic  currency 
return as given. Again there is a limiting case in 
which a change in the oficial exchange rate has no 
effect. Suppose, analogously to our assumption 
about  non-tradable  goods  prices,  that  the 
devaluation of the oficial rate has no impact upon 
the parallel exchange rate, and that the devaluation 
is sufficient to achieve convergence at that rate. 
The limiting case now holds if, prior to reform, 
profits were remitted at the parallel rate. Note that 
this is not a curiosum. In the more extreme control 
regimes the remittance of profits was illegal. The 
usual private response was to remit profits by the 
device  of  over-invoicing  of  imports.  Bevan et 
a1.(1990) establish that the implicit exchange rate 
at which such remittances take place varies with 
the details of the control regime, but that in  the 
most common case it is the parallel rate.  While 
this  is a  limiting  case,  in  less  severe  control 
regimes profits of fcreign firms could be remitted 
at  the official rate. In  this case the devaluation 
reduces the profitability of domestic investment in 
proportion (i.e. by a factor eJe,).  While the former 
effect on the return on capital can be interpreted as 
the removal of a tax, this effect amounts to the 
removal of a subsidy: before the reform foreign 
investors were implicitly subsidized through the 
overvaluation of the exchange rate. The  above  effects  generate  the  taxonomy 
shown in Table 3.2. The 'capital' column indicates 
whether the capital goods acquired by the investor 
are tradable (T) or  non-tradable (N). The  next 
column similarly classifies (non-capital) inputs and 
outputs. The third column classifies according to 
the pre-reform remittance regime, a P indicating 
remittance at the parallel rate  and  an 0 at  the 
official  rate.  The  'effects'  column  summarizes 
which of the three effects (if any) a devaluation 
has: a change in the price of capital (I), in the rate 
of  return  in  domestic  currency  (11)  or  in  the 
exchange  rate  for  remitted  profits  (111).  These 
effects  are  aggregated  and  signed  in  the  last 
column. 
In  the  third  case  none  of  the  three effects 
operates: all capital is tradable, so the quantity of 
investment  is  not affected, all other inputs and 
outputs are non-tradable so that the domestic rate 
of return does not change and the exchange rate 
relevant for sending profits abroad does not change 
since prior to the reform the parallel rate applied. 
In  two other cases two effects operate and they 
offset each other precisely. In case 2 the rate of 
return rises in  proportion to the devaluation, but 
this  is  exactly offset  by  the rise  in  the official 
exchange  rate  at  which  profits  are  remitted. 
Similarly, in the last case the price of capital falls, 
but this is precisely offset by the removal of the 
subsidy  implicit  in  the exchange rate at which 
profits were remitted. In one case, 4, the net effect 
is negative. Here the removal of the subsidy is the 
only  effect  of  the  devaluation.  These  cases 
demonstrate  that  there  can  be  no  general 
presumption  that  devaluation  increases  the  ' 
incentive to repatriate. A  fortiori, in these cases the 
degree of  uncertainty  related  to  a  prospective 
devaluation is  irrelevant for  repatriation. Since 
under certainty the effect is either zero or negative 
and since without reform the investor prefers to 
keep his assets abroad, an uncertain prospect of 
devaluation  can  neither  induce  nor  deter 
repatriation.  On  the  criterion  of  inducing 
repatriation it would therefore be  prioritized later 
than other reforms. 
However, in the remaining four cases, the net 
effect  is  positive.  Since  in  these  cases  a 
devaluation induces repatriation, uncertainty with 
respect to the course of exchange rate policy is a 
deterrent. The  magnitude of the  deterrent  now 
follows from the analysis of Section 2. Recall that 
for  fundamental  doubt  there  is  no  distinction 
between the impact upon the price of capital and 
its  return.  The  four  cases  are  thus  similarly 
affected by  fundamental doubt. By contrast, for 
timing doubt, effects on the rate of return ::re less 
serious than those which operate directlq  %jn  the 
price  of  capital.  The  four  cases  in  which 
devaluation alters the incentive to repatriate span 
these routes, since effects I1 and 111 are on the rate 
of return whereas effect I is on the price of capital. 
Table 3.2 shows that in one of the four cases, 7, the 
only  route  by  which  devaluation  induces 
repatriation is  through a price of capital effect, 
implying  that  with  this  economic  structure 
devaluation is urgent. In another, case 1, the only 
route is through a rate of return effect, implying a 
lower degree of urgency. The remaining cases, 5 
and 6,  are intermediate since both routes operate. 
4.  Conclusion 
We have considered a post-war economy in which 
the government has the typical inheritance of an 
economic  control  regime  with  private 
entrepreneurs holding substantial foreign assets. 
The policy objective is to induce repatriation for 
purposes of private investment, but policy reform 
is a slow process due to legislative and political 
obstacles so that it  must be  spread over several 
years. The government pre-announces its agenda, 
but some of the promised reforms are less than 
fully credible because the new government has no 
reputation. Doubts arise  both  as to whether the 
government  will  stick  to  its  timing,  and  more 
fundamentally  whether some  proposed  reforms 
will  happen  at all.  The  question then  becomes 
whether, a priori, some aspects of uncertainty are 
a more severe deterrent to repatriation than others, 
and thus which reforms are most urgent and which 
can be postponed with relatively little damage. If 
it  chooses  the  most appropriate sequence then 
repatriation for investment will begin prior to the 
completion of the reform program, whereas if it 
chooses the least appropriate repatriation will be 
delayed until after program completion. 
We  have  shown  that some  types of policy 
uncertainty  are  more  detrimental  than  others. 
Three  types  of  uncertainty  need  to  be 
distinguished, depending upon whether the price of capital  is  affected  directly,  or  only  indirectly 
through the return on capital. and upon whether the 
reform  itself  is  in  doubt or  merely  its  timing. 
Intuitively it might seem that it is more important 
to resolve doubts as to whether a reform will be 
implemented than doubts as to timing, so that the 
first  round  of  reforms  should  be  those  which 
repatriators  would  otherwise  doubt  might  be 
undertaken at all.  This intuition  is shown to be 
incorrect. Uncertainty about the timing of a reform 
is  found to be  more serious  than doubts about 
whether  a  reform  will  be  implemented  if  the 
impact of the reform  is directly on the price of 
capital. 
The  implications  for the order of structural 
adjustment  measures  were first  illustrated  with 
respect  to  four  prospective  Ethiopian  policy 
reforms each of which could be classified into one 
or other of the categories distinguished. We then 
turned  to the most  important  economic policy 
reform during the transition to peace, namely the 
exchange rate. Whereas some policies are readily 
classifiable,  we showed that the implications of 
exchange rate uncertainty for repatriation depend 
upon details of economic structure. We identified 
those structures in which exchange rate uncertainty 
was irrelevant to repatriation, and those in which it 
would fit into each of our categories. 
Table 3.1. A Taxonomy of Policy Uncertainty 
Impact  Type of Doubt 
Fundamental  Timing 
Value of Capital  Land Prices  Property Rights 
Return on Capital  Labor Laws  Profits Taxation 
Table 3.2. Effects of a Devaluation on the Incentive to Repatriate 
Initial rate for 
Case  Capital  Inputs/outputs  repatriation  Effects  Net effect 
1  T  T  P  I1  + 
3  T  N  P  none  0 Notes 
1.  The authors are grateful to  Robert  Bates  and  Mohsin  Khan  for comments on  an  earlier version 
of this paper. 
2.  A bizarre case involves a government imposing trade restrictions to convince private agents that it 
will eventually, once  its credibility has  been  fully established, adopt free trade  (Engel and  Kletzer, 
199 1). 
3. Elsewhere we  have argued that the credibility of African trade reform  could be enhanced were the 
EC and African customs unions to establish reciprocal free trade. Reversal of trade reform would then lead 
to loss of free access to the EC market (Collier and Gunning, 1993). 
4. Hence the rise from rr to r,  may  reflect a change in  the profitability (in domestic currency) but also 
a change  in  the  rate  at  which  profits  remitted  abroad are  taxed  or  in  the exchange rate  applicable 
to remittances. 
5.  Hence  in  case 3 there is  no  option value. The  investor may  decide to wait but  if  he  does so his 
decision at the end of period 1 is a foregone conclusion: he will repatriate, because by  then the rate of return 
will have risen to rr. 
6. In some contexts this is a reasonable assumption. For example, the very large Ethiopian devaluation of 
1992 had no impact upon either the parallel exchange rate or the domestic price level, and the similarly large 
Nigerian devaluation of 1986 had a negligible effect. 
7.  This can  have a powerful effect on the incentive to repatriate. For example, in  Ethiopia e)eU was 
about 3. Chapter 4 
How to Pay for the Peace? 
A Theoretical Framework with References to African Countries 
Jean-Paul Azam 
Abstract 
This chapter analyses a simple game-theoretic model to highlight the choice of the government between 
raising its defense expenditures or giving away some "gzjls '90  his opponents, as a means to defend his 
position in power. Ifthe government is a Cournot-Nash player, then there is no gift in equilibrium, and 
any increase in the budget will lead to more ineflcient defense expenditures. However, if the government 
is a Stackelberg-leader, then he will use the "gift" as a tool in his policy for staying in power. 
1. Introduction 
The outbreak of a civil war is the worst failure of 
a peace-keeping policy, or the dreadful result of 
the lack of it. Most countries in the world are made 
of a heterogenous population, divided by ethnicity, 
religion, language, ideology, etc. It generally takes 
some conscious efforts by  the government for a 
state of peace to be  maintained, with some clear 
impact on public finances. 
In many parts of the world, at various points in 
time, open war between countries, or within the 
boundaries of various countries, was the normal 
state of life. This was the case in Europe for most 
of its history, and it is now ravaging many parts of 
Africa, from  Liberia to Somalia, from  Chad  to 
Angola,  etc.  A  recurrent  cause  of  conflict  in 
African  countries  is  ethnic  diversity,  and 
"tribalism"  is  often  a  cause of  civil  war.  The 
perennial rivalry between the Utus and the Tutsis 
in  Rwanda  and  Burundi  are  cases  in  point. 
Religion  is  often  a  cause  of  conflict  as  well. 
However, foreign intervention has often played a 
role  in  igniting  violent  conflicts  in  African 
countries, especially during the Cold War.  The 
Lybian  leader  Khadafi  has  often  been  held 
responsible  for various  rebellions, whereas the 
former two Super-powers, the USA and the USSR, 
played a part in  supporting civil wars in various 
parts of the continent, including the Honl of Africa 
(Africa  Watch,  1991,  Doornbos  et  al.,  1992, 
Wubneh and Abate. 1988). 
However, there are havens of peace in  this 
violent continent. The examples of countries like 
Cdte d'lvoire or SCnCgal prove that it is possible to 
live  in  peace  in  Africa.  Cdte  d'lvoire offers  a 
striking example of political stability, as the late 
President  Houphouet-Boigny  was  ruling  the 
country even before independence in 1961, up to 
his death in  December 1993. He was a Cabinet 
Minister in the French Govenunent in the 1950s. 
Nevertheless, this is a clear example of a country 
with a population divided between different ethnic 
groups, whose territories extend largely over the 
neighboring countries (Azam, 1994).  While the 
largest ethnic group, the Akan, is related to the Ashanti from Ghana, the Krou group in the south 
west  is  part  of  the  largest  ethnic  group  in 
neighboring Liberia. The Senoufo in the north are 
more closely related, ethnically, to most people in 
Burkina-Faso,  than  to  the  southern  Ivorians. 
Moreover, immigration has been going on during 
the recent decades, and it is estimated that 50% of 
the  population  in  Abidjan, the capital-city,  and 
25% of the whole population, are of foreign origin. 
Many come from Burkina-Faso and Mali in  the 
north. Therefore, this example shows that ethnical 
division can be reconciled with internal peace in 
Africa.  Moreover,  the  north  is  predominantly 
Muslim, while the south is Christian or animist, 
showing  that  religious  diversity  can  also  be 
accommodated  peacefully. But this country had 
only one political party, the PDCI, up to 1990. On 
the contrary,  SCnCgal  was  long regarded  as the 
almost unique example of African democracy, with 
regular  elections  being  held  with  competitive 
candidates,  and  limited  violence.  Therefore, 
multipartism can exist together with peace, and a 
single party is not necessary, as the case of CGte 
dlIvoire might suggest, for avoiding conflict. 
Although  it  is  not  possible  to  build  a 
convincing  counterfactual  analysis  showing 
whether this country would have experienced more 
political violence had it pursued a different set of 
policies, it is interesting to use the case of CGte 
d'Ivoire for illustrating two important ingredients 
of a peace-keeping policy. First, the late President 
had not spent much effort fighting his potential 
opponents,  whose  opposition  he  overturned  by 
other means: with an extremely small number of 
exceptions, he had always managed to share some 
of the spoiIs of the state power with  the rising 
politicians,  even  if  they  initially  seemed  to  be 
confronting  him  (Azam,  1994).  They  have 
generally been attracted by the President's offers, 
and subsequently involved in the government and 
the ruling party, in prominent positions. Second, an 
important  share of the government  budget  was 
used for redistributing between regions some of the 
fruit of the economic miracle of the two decades 
following  independence.  The coffee  and  cocoa 
growing farmers  from  the south,  including  the 
BaoulC farmers of the President's  ethnic group, 
have been heavily taxed for funding, among other 
things, a  lot of public  investment  in  the  poorer 
north  (Azam,  1994).  Hence,  there  is  a  public 
finance aspect of a peace-keeping policy, as well 
as an "attitudinal" one (Brown, Hassan and Fole, 
1992). 
This example sheds some light on the contrast 
between the policies pursued in Uganda by Obote, 
after the fall of Idi Amin's  dictatorship,  and  by 
Museveni, after the overthrow of Obote. Whereas 
the former tried to favor systematically his own 
ethnic group and its close allies, the latter tried on 
the  contrary  to  open  his  government  to 
representatives  from  all  the  groups  (Mutibwa, 
1992).  Obote's  attitude  has  triggered  a  violent 
opposition  with  a  strong  ethnical  character, 
whereas the latter mainly got some fairly irrational 
opposition, with a definite  religious  or magical 
content,  as  was  the  case  with  Alice  Lakwena 
(Behrend, 1991). As a result, Museveni's Uganda 
may be regarded as almost completely peaceful, 
whereas  Obote's  Uganda  witnessed  one of the 
worst slaughters ever, sometimes compared to that 
of the Pol Pot regime in  Kampuchea (Mutibwa, 
1992). 
Similarly,  one  can  interpret  as  a  case  of 
voluntary  redistribution  in  favor  of  potential 
opponents  some  aspects  of the  demobilization 
policy pursued currently in Ethiopia. For example, 
whereas  some of  the  veterans  of the  defeated 
Mengistu  army  have  been  maintained  in  the 
military, or, having been demobilized, have kept 
their ranks and their pension rights, a large number 
of the victorious soldiers have been simply asked 
to go back to their homeland  with no particular 
personal advantage.' 
The aim of the present chapter is to provide a 
theoretical framework for discussing these issues. 
In a simple game-theoretic setting, we discuss the 
appropriate relative weights to be given to (defense 
expenditure  and  to  redistribution  of  the  state 
money within a peace-keeping policy. The model 
presented  highlights the trade off that faces the 
government between spending budgetary resources 
for fighting  the opponent on  the one hand, and 
giving  up  some  resources  for  reducing  the 
opponent's willingness to seize power, by sharing some of the  benefits of being  in  power, on  the 
other hand. This game may result in an inefficient 
equilibrium,  where  the  two  contenders  are 
spending too much in military expenditures. This 
case is somewhat akin to the type of competitive 
rent-seeking discussed by Krueger (1974), where 
resources  are  wasted  by  agents  competing  for 
getting the benefit of a rent. But a less inefficient 
equilibrium is possible, where less resources are 
wasted  in  military  expenditures,  and  more 
resources are used for redistribution. 
The outcome is shown to depend heavily on 
the government strategy. By contrasting the case of 
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium  to that where the 
government is a Stackelberg leader, this exercise 
gives a game-theoretic content to the "attitudinal" 
aspect of a peace-keeping policy. This attitude of 
the government is crucial for predicting how public 
expenditures will be shared between defense and 
redistribution. This is an important ingredient for 
deciding whether a given government sl~ould  be 
given some aid (or some loans) or not.  Deger and 
Sen (1992) have recently discussed the issue of the 
appropriate  allocation  of aid, or other financial 
support, to developing countries, when there is a 
risk of an  increase in  military expenditures. As 
emphasized by these authors, aid  is fungible to 
some extent, and might thus indirectly be used for 
increasing military spending. We discuss here why 
some  governments  prefer  redistributing  some 
public money to increasing defense expenditures. 
as a means to defend their position in power. 
2. The Model 
Let  A  be  in  power,  and  B be  the opponent. It 
simplifies the analysis to model this problem as a 
two-stage game. In the first stage, the government 
.4  spends  D  in  defense  expenditures,  and  the 
opponent B spends F with a view to take power. 
One can view these expenditures as being paid out 
of  some  initial  endowments,  which  we  do not 
model  explicitly.  In  the  following,  we  will 
sometimes  refer  to  D  and  F  as  military 
expenditures, for short.  In the real world,  many 
non military expenditures are involved in the battle 
for  power.  We  neglect  these  subtleties  in  the 
following.  Assume  that  this  probability  of  A 
staying in  power is an increasing function of the 
ratio DIF, given by: 
0 i  p=p(D/F)i  1, pl>O,  p" <O, 
and  pl(0)  -m.  (1) 
We assume that this function is known with 
certainty by A and B. 
In the second stage, the players enjoy the fruit 
of their action. If he stays in power, A has access to 
a given budget T,  that must be allocated between 
two possible types of expenditures. S  = T-  G is the 
type of expenditures that gives some utility to A, 
while G gives utility to B. One can think of G as 
the "gift" that A gives away to B. We assume that 
A can make a credible commitment about G. This 
is again a convenient simplification, which could 
be endogenized in a repeated game setting. If he is 
overthrown, A does not get anything, and has just 
lost D, paid at the first stage. 
Assume that A has a utility function which is 
strictly  increasing,  twice  differentiable  and 
concave with respect to S, denoted U(S).  Then, his 
problem is to maximize his expected utility under 
the constraint that G cannot be negative: 
max W = p(D/F) U(T-G) - D,  (2) 
D, G 
We will compare the outcomes of this game 
resulting from two alternative assumptions about 
the government's  attitude about F. It can either 
have a Cournot-Nash attitude, taking as given the 
level F of the opponent's forces, or it can adopt the 
role of a Stackelberg leader. taking as given the 
reaction function governing F. We now analyze the 
determinants of the latter. 
The opponent spends F in the first stage, which 
may be thought of as being paid out of some initial 
endowment, and  enjoys G if  he does not  seize 
power,  whereas  he  gets  T if  A  is  overthrown. 
Because of the assumption  that  A  can  make a 
credible  commitment  about  G, B  behaves a la 
Cournot-Nash, taking D and G as given. Assuming that he has a strictly increasing, concave. and twice 
differentiable utility function  VG)  (V'>O.  V"<U), 
then his program is to select F  such that: 
The first-order condition for this problem can 
be written: 
Assume that a unique solution to (5) exists, 
and that T>  G.  Define x=  - pffD/Fpf  and assume, 
for the moment, that  x  < I.  Then B's  reaction 
function can be written: 
F=F(T, G, D), FT>  0, FG<O,FD>O.  (6) 
Moreover,  it  can  be  shown  that d log F/a  log 
D = (I-x)/(2-x)  < I.  This can be seen intuitively 
by  examining  (5).  If  D  and  F are  increased 
proportionately, so that D/F does not change, then 
the right-hand side does not move, while the left- 
hand side increases. Therefore, in order for (5) to 
hold, D/F must increase when F increases. 
If  the condition x =  - pffD/Fpf  < I does  not 
hold,  with x~J1,  2[,  then  pf(D/F) D/F becomes 
a decreasing function of D/F, and a F/a  D < 0. As 
a function of D/F,  x  is first increasing, and then 
decreasing for large values of D/F, because of tile 
assumed  concavity  and  boundedness  of  the 
function  p(-)  E [0,  I].  It  is thus  reasonable to 
conclude  that  F is  first  increasing,  and  then 
decreasing in D, as  D .'  6 F , where 6  is  such 
that  x(6)  = I. We  can safely neglect the case 
where  x  2  2 , which  is  liable to give rise to a 
multiplicity of equilibria. 
Hence, in  this model, F is not a monotonic 
function of D. There is a very high level of defense 
expenditures  by  the  government  where  the 
opponent is discouraged from increasing his forces 
as  a  response  to  the  government  increase  in 
defense expenditures. and reduces them instead. 
There is no ambiguity regarding the two other 
effects, provided  2 2 x .  The positive impact of T 
is not surprising, and captures the effect of the 
expected gain: the larger the latter, the higher the 
incentive  to  bid  for  power.  Conversely,  the 
negative iqpact of G results from the same type of 
mechanism.  As  ~n examination  of  (5)  clearly 
shows, one of the main incentives for the opponent 
to build up his forces is the difference V(ZJ  - V(G) 
between  the  utility  levels  reached  in  the  two 
possible states of the world. This result shows the 
potential of a redistribution policy as a part of a 
peace-keeping policy. 
Let  us  now  analyze  the  Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium of this game. 
3. The "No Gift" Equilibrium 
It  is  intuitively  obvious  that  a  Cournot-Nash 
government will not give away,anything  as a "gift" 
to his opponent. As the level of G does not enter 
directly  in  the  function  p(-),  and  oniy  acts 
indirectly as an incentive for B to reduce his forces 
F, it cannot affect A's behavior under the Cournot- 
Nash assumption. 
This can be shown formally by defining A.2 0 
as the Lagrange multiplier attached to constraint 
(3),  with  complementary  slackness.  Then, 
maximizing (2) under (3) yields the following first 
order conditions: 
and 
Notice the formal analogy between (7) and (5). 
Because of complementary slackness, we have A. G 
= 0. This cannot be consistent with (8) and G > 0, 
unless either 
(i) T - -  and lim U'(T-G)  = 0 as T-G - -  ,  or 
(ii) F - - and D/F - 0, and p(0)  = 0 and pf(0) 
--. 
Hence,  under  realistic  assumptions,  the 
government does not give any positive G to B in 
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, as (8) implies that A  >o. 
This  "No Gift" equilibrium is  not generally 
Pareto-efficient. In order to analyze its properties, 
let  us  draw  the  reaction  functions  of  the  two 
agents.  We  already  know  from  the  previous 
section the main  properties of the function F(-) 
describing B's  reactions. It is represented as the 
line FF in figure 4.1. The government behavior can 
be  derived from  (7), by  putting G  = 0. It thus 
reads: 
It is straightforward to find that the chosen  D 
(-) is an increasing function of T.  This is  like  an 
income  effect:  as  the  budget  increases,  the 
government  will  consume  more,  and  spend 
more  on  defense.  This  may  be  checked  by 
differentiating (7')  to  find a D/a  T = U'()  p
r(D/F) 
D/Fp  > 0.  Asp
r(-) is a decreasing function of D/F, 
we  find  easily  that  the  chosen  D(-)  is  an 
ambiguous function of F,  with a log D/a log F < 1. 
For if D and F are increased proportionately, so 
that D/F does not change, then the right-hand side 
of  (7')  does not  move while the  left-hand side 
increases. Asp
r(-) is a decreasing function of D/F, 
D must grow in  fact less than proportionately to 
the increase in F, or even decrease, in order for (7') 
to  hold  while F increases.  Using  the  notation 
previously  introduced, it can  be  shown that A's 
chosen function D(F, g  is such that d log D/a log F 
= (x  -  I)/x  < I.  Comparing this to the results 
found when discussing (6) above, we find that the 
slopes of the reaction functions of A and B must be 
of opposite signs when they intersect (for x  < 2). 
The function DfF, g  is represented in figure 4.1 as 
the DD line. 
In  figure 4.1,  we restrict the analysis to the 
case where the equilibrium point lies above the F 
=  (I/b)  D  locus,  i.e.  where  the  DD  and  FF 
intersect in the zone where x < I. The other case 
can  be  analyzed  analogously,  with  no  special 
difficulty. 
Now, if for some reason, like an increase in 
foreign aid or any other financial support,  T is 
increased. then the  DD curve shifts rightwards, 
while the FF curve shifts upwards. It follows that 
the intersection between the nvo will necessarily 
move upwards. Hence, in this case, an increase in 
the  government  budget  necessarily  entails  an 
increase in the opponent's forces. It will plausibly 
entail  as  well  an  increase  in  the  government 
defense expenditures. But this is not necessarily 
the  case,  as  the  new  equilibrium  point  can 
graphically be located to the north-west of point E. 
But this will only occur in the unlikely case where 
the  marginal utility  of  S  is  very small  for the 
government, at S = T,  so that the DD curve shifts 
very little. It can be shown that the equilibrium 
response  of  D to  an  increase  in  T is  positive 
provided x > o/fo+3 , where  o  is the elasticity 
of  V(-)  with respect to Tor G (assumed constant), 
and  E is the elasticity of  U(-)  with  respect to S. 
Similarly, it  can  be shown that the equilibrium 
response  of F to  an  increase  in  T is  positive 
provided x  < (~+o)/o  , which  is automatically 
satisfied in the case of figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 
Hence, in the most plausible case, the "no gift" 
equilibrium  is  such  that  an  increase  in  the 
government budget, brought about for example by 
foreign aid, will in fact result in  the  build  up of 
forces,  F  for  the  opponent,  and  D  for  the 
government. This equilibrium thus supports the 
view expressed by Deger and Sen (1992) that aid 
may well end up funding indirectly some increase 
in useless military expenditures.' 
The  Pareto-inefficiency  of  this  Nash 
equilibrium can be seen graphically by drawing a ray  through  the  origin  and  E.  Then,  moving 
inwards along this ray, by reducing proportionately 
D and F, would leave the political equilibrium un- 
changed, with p(-) constant, while  leaving more 
resources  to  be  shared  by  the  hvo  players  for 
consumption  purposes.  The  following  section 
shows that a government which adopts the role of 
a Stackelberg leader may improve on the "no gift" 
equilibrium, by pursuing a more peaceful policy, 
using the instrument of the gift to the opponent, in 
addition  to the tool  of defense expenditures, in 
order to try and remain in power. 
As a step in  this direction, let us  look at the 
impact  on  the  "no  gift"  equilibrium  of  an 
exogenous increase in G. We know from (6) that 
the FF curve shifts downwards. Regarding the DD 
curve, its impact is like that of a cut in the budget 
T.  Hence, DD  shifts to the left. Consequently, an 
exogenous increase in G leads normally to a cut in 
military spending by both the government and its 
~pponent.~  But it will in general entail a change in 
D/F, and hence inp(-),  so that we cannot conclude 
that it implies necessarily a Pareto-improvement. 
4. The Stackelberg-Leader Government 
It is intuitively obvious that a Stackelberg-leader 
government is more likely than a Cournot-Nash (or 
Stackelberg-follower) government to use the "gift" 
as a tool in a peace-keeping policy. By taking into 
account the negative impact of a gift on the level 
of  the  opponent's  forces,  the  government  now 
realizes  that  it  can  increase  the  probability  of 
remaining  in  power  not  only  by  increasing  its 
defense expenditures, but by giving something to 
its challenger. It is thus in a position to trade off 
more gift for less defense expenditures. From a 
social point of view, it is clear that the former is 
preferable to the latter, as it  is an argument in B's 
utility  function,  whereas  D  only  affects  the 
probability  of  staying  in  power,  which  can  be 
regarded,  roughly  speaking,  as  a  distributional 
issue. The aim of the present section is to give 
some precise analysis of this intuitive argument.' 
First,  one  can  check  that  the  marginal 
contribution of G to the government welfare W is 
enhanced  when  the  impact  on F is  taken  into 
account. In this case. using (2) and (6), one finds: 
Therefore, a positive term has been added to - 
p(-) U'(-)  < 0, which is only taken into account in 
the Cournot-Nash case. The term between square 
brackets  is  negative,  and  makes  a  positive 
contribution to a  W/a  G as it  has a tilinus sign 
before  it.  Hence,  the  Stackelberg-leader 
government  values  more  the  "gift"  than  the 
Cournot-Nash  one.  Conversely,  it  discounts  the 
marginal contribution of defense expenditures to 
its welfare  by  taking into account their positive 
impact on the opponent's forces. Using again (2) 
and (6) we thus find: 
Now, the term in square brackets is normally 
positive, at least in the case of figure 4.1, and it is 
subtracted from the term pf(-) I;(-)/F  - I, which is 
only taken into account in the Cournot-Nash case. 
Therefore, the fact of taking account of the 
opponent's  reactions  to the  government  policy 
tools entails a reduction in  the value attached by 
the latter to defense expenditures, and an increase 
in the value of the gift. However, although this fact 
opens the way to the existence of a Stackelberg 
equilibrium with a positive level of the gift, this 
does not necessarily  lead to it.  We need a new 
condition to be fulfilled, in order to guarantee that 
the  change  in  weights  given  to  D  and  G,  as 
embodied in (9) and (lo),  results in an actual move 
away from the "no gift" equilibrium. For this to 
happen, there must exist a value of G > 0  such 
that a W/a  G as given in (9) is 2  0. Intuitively, this 
requires that the negative impact on F must  be 
strongenough, and with a strong enough impact on 
the probability of staying in  power,  to  offset  the 
utility  loss of  giving  away G  to the opponent 
instead  of  consuming  it.  Some  tedious 
calculations  show  that  this  occurs if  0  2c(2- 
3,  where  0=  pf(D/F)  D/Fp(-),  and c = (T-G) 
U'(-)/U(-) > 0. In other words, the existence of a "positive- 
gift" Stackelberg equilibrium is more  likely, the 
more responsive to the gift is the opponent's level 
of forces, the more sensitive is the probability of 
remaining in power to a change in the balance of 
forces.  and  the less elastic  is  the  government's 
utility function to a cut in consumption. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates such an equilibrium. The 
DD and FF curves are drawn as in figure 4.1, and 
represent the Cournot-Nash reaction curves of the 
two  players.  The  YFV curve  is  an  indifference 
curve of the government; it is horizontal when it 
cuts the DD curve, by definition of the latter. Then, 
as the FF curve has a positive slope at E, it follows 
that a Stackelberg government gets more welfare 
than it would get in the "no gift" equilibrium E. 
Then, provided the condition spelt out above for 
the existence of a "positive-gift" equilibrium  is 
satisfied, then it should look like point S in figure 
4.2.  W
rW'  is  a  government  indifference curve, 
corresponding to a higher welfare level than E, and 
it is tangent to the curve FrF',  a reaction function 
of B
rs, corresponding to a higher level of G than 
FF. Provided that E and S are located above the F 
=(I/b)D locus (i.e.x < I), this entails a lower level 
of D. 
Figure 4.2 
yLf3  D 
Now, if for some reason. like an increase in 
aid.  T is  increased,  we cannot  be sure that this 
results in  an increase in D and F like in the "no 
gift"  equilibrium.  Now,  the  FF  curves  shift 
upwards, and the WW curves shift upwards and to 
the right. The result on point S is thus ambiguous. 
Hence  dealing  with  a  Stackelberg-leader 
government rather than with a Cournot-Nash one 
is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for 
aid to be used in a peaceful way. The appendix 
gives a more precise discussion. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analyzed a simple game- 
theoretic  model  to  highlight  the choice  of the 
government  between  raising  its  defense 
expenditures or giving away some "gifts" to his 
opponents, as a means to defend his position in 
power.  If  the  government  is  a  Cournot-Nash 
player, then there is no gift in equilibrium. This 
"no gift" equilibrium is quite inefficient,  as it is 
possible  to  reduce  proportionately  the  military 
expenditures of the two players without changing 
the political balance, while leaving more resources 
to be shared between the players for consumption 
purposes.  This  equilibrium  has  as  well  the 
unpleasant  property  that  any  increase  in  the 
budget, brought about for example by an increase 
in  aid,  will  lead  to  more  inefficient  defense 
expenditures by both players. 
However, if the government is a Stackelberg- 
leader, then he will use the "gift" as a tool in  his 
policy for staying  in  power.  Hence this  model 
illustrates how the use of redistribution as a tool in 
a  peace-keeping  policy can  be  related to  some 
behavioral characteristics, or some attitudes, of the 
government.  It  is  certainly the  mark  of a  more 
sophisticated government than a fairly primitive 
Cournot-Nash one. As in Azam (1993), it is thus 
shown here that some expenditures without any 
apparent  economic  value,  or  some  forgone 
consumption  opportunities.  can  in  fact  play  a 
positive part in a politico-economic equilibrium, 
and hence have a positive economic return after 
all. Therefore,  it  can  reasonably  be  said  that a 
government may invest in s  redistribution policy, 
whose returns are made of some enhanced chances of  peace  being  maintained  in  the  country.  of redistribution on military expenditures depends 
However,  it  is  not  claimed  that  redistributive  on various parameters, nor in the real world, where 
policies are able to ensure peace in  all cases. This  ideological or ethnical opposition are sometimes 
is not so in the model presented, where the impact  too strong to result in anything but the outbreak of 
violence. Appendix 
We  give here a more formal analysis of the 
Stackelberg  equilibrium  than  in  section 4. The 
government seeks to solve the following problem: 
From the first-order conditions we can write 
the following equations: 
Comparing  the  "pseudo-reduced-form" 
equations (A.3) and (A.4) to (7) or (T),  one can see 
that the former may be derived fro~~i  the latter by 
subtracting the term in square brackets. The latter 
is positive provided  x  < I. Therefore, except in 
pathological  cases,  we should  get  lower F and 
lower D in the Stackelberg equilibrium than in the 
"no-gift" equilibrium. But, from (A.2) and (AS) 
we can see that G depends only on T and D/F, so 
that a cut in D and F  does not entail ~lecessarily  an 
increase in G. 
F = p  'U - [(I -  x)p U'/VID/F],  (A.3) 
D = Up  'D/F - [(I -x)p  U'/V'],  (A-4) 
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Demobilization and Insecurity 
A Study in the Economics of the Transition from 
War to Peace 
Paul Collier 
I  1.  Introduction  2, Demobilization and Micro-insecurity 
Demobilization is an integral part of the transition 
I 
from war to peace in Africa's civil wars. Ethiopia 
l 
and Uganda have both recently undertaken large 
I 
scale demobilizations. In Ethiopia some 400,000 
I 
I  soldiers of the former government were demobi- 
I 
I  lized  during  late  1991  and  early  1992 and  the 
I  demobilization of part of the victorious army is 
I 
currently being planned. In Uganda 20,000 soldiers 
I  were demobilized at the end of 1992, and there are 
plans to demobilize a further 30,000 shortly. This 
paper  does not provide a general review of the 
I 
demobilization  process,  but  focuses  upon  one 
aspect, the relationship  between  demobilization 
and security. 
The  hypothesis  to  be  investigated  is  that 
demobilization  constitutes  a  potential  threat  to 
security.  The  motivation  for  the  study  is  that 
insecurity is likely to have substantial economic 
consequences. Two types of insecurity are distin- 
guished.  Micro-insecurity  is  the  fear  that  the 
individual  will  be the  victim  of crime.  Macro- 
insecurity  is the fear that the state will be over- 
thrown  by  insurrection.  Micro-insecurity,  it  is 
hypothesized, does  not  just  constitute  a  set of 
involuntary transfer payments. but inhibits asset 
formation and disrupts transactions. Macro-insecu- 
rity  may  reduce  the  credibility of  government 
commitments and the propensity to make irrevers- 
ible investments. If demobilization reduces secu- 
rity,  there  is  therefore  a  trade-off  between  the 
direct economic gains from reducing a component 
of government expenditure and the indirect eco- 
nomic  costs.  Potentially,  demobilization  affects 
both micro-insecurity and macro-insecurity and the 
paper considers them in turn. 
There are two reasons to expect that demobiliza- 
tion might increase crime. Demobilized soldiers 
are not placed into employment and so start their 
civilian life as unemployed.  It is likely  that the 
lack of an income source increases the propensity 
to commit crimes. Additionally, soldiers tend to be 
unskilled  except  in  the use of weapons and so 
might have a comparative advantage in criminal 
activities. 
The skill  composition  of the  Ugandan  and 
Ethiopian  demobilized  armies  was  somewhat 
different, reflecting their different origins. Of the 
two, the composition of the Ethiopian army was 
better  suited  for  demobilization.  The  Ugandan 
army was largely composed of those recruited as 
guerillas  in  rural areas during the war. Recruits 
were typically very young at the time of recruit- 
ment, and had little education. The Ethiopian army 
of 400,000 which was demobilized during 1992, 
was recruited by the former government, largely 
by conscription, and so was closer to being a cross- 
section of the male  population.  A survey of the 
characteristics of the Ugandan army just prior to 
demobilization (MSEC, 1993a) found that over a 
third had no education, while a majority had had 
no economic activity prior to recruitment, and so 
had no work experience either as wage earners or 
in self-employment. Nor had the army proved to be 
a training ground for non-military slcills: only 3% 
had  acquired  such  skills  during  their  time  as 
soldiers. In both countries most soldliers had been 
in the army for several years and so their connec- 
tions with their original areas had weakened. This 
reduced their access to land and possibly also their 
interest  in  farming as a career.  However, most soldiers  had  acquired  dependents,  two  thirds 
having families. Hence, the need for an  income 
was that for a substantial household rather than just 
an  individual.  In  both  countries  demobilized 
soldiers were not allowed to keep their weapons, 
but  guns were widely available. A demobilized 
soldier who chose to become a criminal would 
have  had  little difficulty  in  gaining access to a 
weapon. 
In assessing the link between demobilization 
and  crime  three  approaches  were  used.  First, 
interviews  were  conducted  with  senior  police 
officials  and  private  security  services  in  both 
countries. Second, data was gathered on the district 
level pattern of crime as reported to police stations 
before and after demobilization, and matched with 
the  district-level  incidence  of  demobilization. 
Third, a follow-up survey of demobilized soldiers 
and  community leaders was analyzed. The two 
latter approaches were only feasible for Uganda. 
In Ethiopia the police considered that demobi- 
lization had initially caused an increase in  crime, 
particularly rural banditry. However, by early 1993 
the incidence of crime was quite modest in almest 
all areas, comparing favorably with Kenya accord- 
ing  to the Police Commissioner. In Uganda the 
police perception was that crime had  risen as a 
consequence of demobilization, and this was more 
emphatically  the  perception  of  the  expatriate 
security services. 
We  now  turn  to  the  analysis  of  Ugandan 
statistics  on  crime  and  demobilization.  Crime 
statistics in Uganda are not computerized and can 
only be collated with reliability back to the begin- 
ning of 199  1. The CID kindly collated data on the 
total number of reported crimes for 199  1,1992 and 
1993,  the  last  distinguishing  between  the  first 
quarter and the rest of the year, for each of the 38 
districts of Uganda. The demobilization took place 
in  late December 1992 and  January 1993.  The 
national data on  reported crime  show  that  the 
demobilization coincided with a decrease in  the 
crime rate.  During 1992 there were 20% more 
reported crimes than in 1991 (which may simply 
reflect a higher rate of reporting as the country 
grows more accustomed to civilian government). 
Yet during the first quarter of 1993, immediately 
following the demobilization, crime fell by 7% 
compared with the fourth quarter of 1992. While 
this is suggestive, the lack of adequate time series 
on crime and the synchronized nature of the de 
mobilization precluded time series econometric 
analysis. However, the spatial pattern of the demo- 
bilization provided the basis for a cross-section 
approach. 
Soldiers were demobilized to their districts of 
origin and the Veterans Assistance Board kindly 
provided data on the numbers of demobilized sent 
to each district. We therefore compare the district 
crime rates before and after the event using demo- 
bilization as an explanatory variable. Normally, 
this would not be valid since demobilized soldiers 
might choose not to return to their districts,  or 
subsequently  migrate from  the  initial  place  of 
demobilization.  However,  the  government  of 
Uganda went to considerable efforts to get soldiers 
to return to and to stay in their original home areas. 
All demobilized soldiers were transported to their 
home  areas  and  received  there.  Further,  three 
installments  of  payments  were  made  to  bank 
accounts which soldiers were required to open in 
their home areas: payments could only be made 
into these accounts. Migration therefore incurred 
the need to return to the home area to claim these 
payments. Finally, we have evidence on the extent 
of subsequent migration from the follow-up sam- 
ple survey of 300 demobilized soldiers conducted 
during April and May 1993 (MSEC, 1993 b). This 
found that less than 2% of the demobilized had at 
that stage migrated from the district to which they 
had been transported. 
Immediately prior to demobilization, a census 
was conducted of those to be demobilized, estab- 
lishing  their skills and  prospects. As discussed 
above, skill levels outside the military sphere were 
very low. However, a potentially differentiating 
characteristic concerning prospects was access to 
land. Although most of those to be demobilized 
reported that they had access to land, some 12% 
claimed to be landless. Because this was a census 
rather than a sample, the data can reliably be used 
when disaggregated to the district level. Further, 
landlessness is concentrated: nine of the 38 dis- 
tricts  account  for  virtually  all  of  the  landless 
demobilized, so that the district-level incidence of 
the demobilization of the landless is very different 
from that ofthose with land. Hence, we distinguish 
in  the subsequent analysis between the landless 
demobilized and other demobilized. Both crime and demobilization by district were 
expressed as rates relative to the district population 
as given in the 1991 population census.'There is 
substantial variation in both the crime rate and the 
demobilization rate. On average, during the first 
quarter of 1993 there were 0.56 reported crimes 
per thousand  inhabitants,  with a range  between 
districts from 1.20 to 0.1 1 and a standard deviation 
of 0.3  1. The incidence of demobilization was on 
average  1.30 soldiers  per  thousand  inhabitants, 
with a range between 3.59 and 0.05 and a standard 
deviation of 1  .OO  (reflecting the previous regional 
skew  in  recruitment).  Hence, there is sufficient 
variation in  both rates for a test of the relationship 
between demobilization  and crime  by means of 
cross-section data to have some credence. If one 
tenth of the soldiers were involved in crime then 
its incidence would rise  by around a quarter on 
average, more than doubling in the district with the 
highest incidence of demobilization and  barely 
changing in the region with the lowest incidence. 
We distinguish between the impact effect of 
demobilization  and  its  longer-term  effect.  The 
impact effect is that in the first quarter of 1993, 
immediately after the demobilization. During this 
period the demobilized were in receipt of modest 
lump  sum  pay-offs.  The  longer  term  effect  is 
gauged  by the remaining three quarters of 1993 
(the most recent data point). During this period 
pay-offs had ceased, but the demobilized had  by 
then had greater opportunity to generate incomes 
from agricultural self-employment or from finding 
other non-criminal sources. 
The dependent variables were therefore  the 
crime rates during the first quarter of 1993 and the 
remaining  three  quarters of  1993.  These  were 
regressed on the crime rates for 1991 and 1992, 
thereby controlling for fixed effects and  trends, 
and the incidence of demobilization, distinguishing 
between the landless and others. The results are 
reported in Table 5.1. Table 5.1. Regression Results for Crime and Demobilization 
Dependent variables 
Crime93(1)  Crime93(2,3,4) 






Crime91  =  number of crimes in district during 199l/population of district in 199  1 ; 
sources: CID and 199  1 Population Census. 
Crime92  =  number of crimes in district during 1992/population of district in 199  1 ; 
sources as above. 
Crime93(1) =  number of crimes in district during the first quarter of 1993lpopulation in 
199  1; sources as above. 
Crime93(2,3,4) =  number of crimes in district during the second, third and fourth quarters 
of 1993lpopulation of district in 1991; sources as above. 
Landless  =  number of those demobilized into the district in December 1992 who 
reported no access to landlpopulation of the district in 199  1; sources: 
MSEC (1993b) Table 12, and population census. 
Others  =  number of those demobilized into the district in December 1992 who 
reported access to land/population of the district in 199  1 ;  sources: MSEC 
(1993b) Table 12, and population census. 
The results reveal that in the short term there 
is a significant relationship between demobiliza- 
tion and the crime rate. The demobilization of the 
landless significantly increases  crime. Applying 
the coefficient  in  the Table, the  2,346  landless 
demobilized  accounted for 140 crimes, an  inci- 
dence of criminality of 6%. This incidence is one 
hundred times higher than that for the Ugandan 
population as a whole during the period. However, 
the short term effect of the Ugandan demobiliza- 
tion was not to increase crime but to reduce it. This 
was  because  the  demobilization  of  those  with 
access to land, who were the large majority, signif- 
icantly  reduced  crime.  Our  discussion  of  the 
sample survey of community leaders, below, will 
shed some light on why this might be the case. 
Applying the coefficient reported in the Table, the 
17,668 demobilized  with access to land reduced 
the number of crimes by  1,060. Hence, the net 
effect of demobilization is predicted to have been 
a short run reduction  in  crime of 920. Between 
1991 and 1993 (the only period for which there are data)  there  was  an  increase  in  reported  crime 
averaging 2.8% per quarter, implying an expected 
increase between the fourth quarter of 1992 and 
the first quarter of 1993 of 303 crimes. Instead, 
there was a reduction in crime of 757. The shortfall 
of  actual  crime  on  expected  crime  of 1060  is 
remarkably close to the predicted reduction due to 
demobilization  of  920.  Hence,  the  coefficients 
derived from cross-section  data on district-level 
variations in crime cohere well with the observed 
coincidence of demobilization a sharp drop in the 
aggregate crime rate. 
During the first quarter of 1993, the consensus 
in  the  expatriate  security  community  was  that 
demobilization had already increased crime and 
that this would get much worse once the demobi- 
lized  had  exhausted  their  pay-offs.'  However, 
according to our data, both of the above effects of 
demobilization proved to be ephemeral. The crime 
rate for the remainder of 1993 was unrelated to 
either type of demobilization, both the coefficients 
and the t-statistics being negligible. Hence, what 
appears to have happened is that the landless, after 
some initial desperation, settled into their commu- 
nities, while the landed majority rapidly lost the 
military attributes which had provided a deterrence 
to  crime  in  their  localities.  Both  groups  soon 
became normal civilians. 
We now turn from the regression analysis to a 
third data source, a sample survey of demobilized 
soldiers and community leaders conducted in  May 
1993 by a consultancy company (MSEC, 1993b). 
Through interviews with a sample of 300 demobi- 
lized soldiers this survey investigated the initial 
economic activities of the demobilized. Addition- 
ally, through interviews with community leaders, 
the  survey  established  the  number  of  cases  of 
crimes  in  which demobilized  soldiers had  been 
convicted and the perceptions of the community 
leaders  as  to the  impact  of  demobilization  on 
security. The survey found that the rate of crime 
identified with convictions of demobilized soldiers 
was very  low,  only  0.2%  of soldiers  being  in- 
volved. Further. this was the perception of commu- 
nity leaders. Community leaders reported either 
that demobilization  had not affected the security 
situation or that it had been beneficial as a result of 
the  presence  of those  with  military  experience 
acting as a deterrent, this being consistent with our 
regression results. The low involvement in crime 
was corroborated by the evidence of the survey on 
the economic reintegration of the demobilized. A 
substantial  majority  had  been  taken  up  peasant 
agriculture, with a further 20% engaged in small 
non-agricultural  enterprises.  Virtuaiiy  none  had 
entered the labor market, reflecting both the small 
size of that market in  Uganda, and the very low 
skill and education levels of most of the demobi- 
lized.  Because  the survey  was conducted  only 
some four months after demobilization,  it  bears 
most directly upon the regression results for the 
first quarter of 1993. Interestingly, the consultants 
concluded  from  their  experience  that  whereas 
overall the demobilization had progressed success- 
fully, assistance should have been targeted upon 
the landless. This is consistent with our short-run 
results which suggest that a minority of the land- 
less faced unusual pressures which through crime 
inflicted  social costs upon the local  population. 
However, these negative effects appear to have 
been temporary so that the impact upon criminality 
would not justify major public expenditure.  The 
costs of crime in Uganda are not known. However, 
to give an illustrative calculation, were crime to 
cost 5% of GDP then a reduction of one reported 
crime would be worth around $6,000. Hence, were 
it possible to prevent the excess criminality of the 
demobilized landless, the reduction of 140 crimes 
would  be  worth $840,000,  justifying  per  capita 
expenditure targeted  on  the  landless of around 
$3 60. 
The conclusion from the above evidence is that 
the Ugandan demobilization has not to date given 
rise to significant micro-insecurity. The Ugandan 
demobilization was still in its early stages, but the 
absence of any relationship between demobiliza- 
tion  and the  crime  rate  in  the subsequent 4-12 
months is certainly encouraging. By early in this 
period  the  modest  pay-offs  would  have  been 
exhausted, and if the demobilized were at even this 
stage sufficiently established  to maintain  them- 
selves  without  atypical  resort  to criminality,  it 
would seem unlikely that there would be a later 
deterioration. Recall that in Ethiopia, where there 
is  a  longer  post-demobilization  experience,  the 
police perception was that although the security 
situation initially deteriorated it then improved. 3. Demobilization and Macro-insecurity 
The consequences of demobilization for macro- 
insecurity  are  more  difficult  to  observe.  The 
possibility  that  the  state  will  be  overthrown 
through insurrection is a genuine concern in  both 
countries. The fear is not fanciful because in both 
such an  event has recently happened, indeed, in 
Uganda it has happened repeatedly. Rather like the 
Peso effect, this type of fear is unobserved and it is 
hard to find evidence for it, let alone quantify it. 
An  example  which  demonstrates the  pervasive 
presence of a sense of macro-insecurity is there- 
fore  appropriate.  Recently, a  Ugandan  District 
Commissioner was  observed  to  be  leaving  his 
home  in  a  hasty manner. The response among 
observers  was  panic  and  flight,  because  they 
interpreted the behavior as indicating the approach 
of rebels. In fact, the Commissioner had just heard 
that the President was paying a surprise visit.3 If 
private agents attach non-negligible probabilities 
to the overthrow of the state then this is likely to 
reduce the propensity to make irreversible invest- 
ments, and the credibility of government commit- 
ments.  It  is  therefore not a phenomenon  to  be 
dismissed. 
Demobilization might affect macro-insecurity 
through  two routes.  First, demobilized soldiers 
poorly integrated into the economy and therefore 
disaffected, constitute a pool of potential recruits 
for a subsequent military challenge to the state. In 
both countries there is evidence for a link between 
demobilization and insurrection. In Ethiopia, the 
demobilization is  believed  by  the authorities to 
have contributed to the insurrection by the Oromo 
Liberation Front during mid-1992, which at one 
point  involved  a  substantial  pitched  battle.  In 
Uganda, insurrections from the North are known to 
involve  former  soldiers  of  Amin's  army.  The 
second route by which demobilization may weaken 
macro-security is that beyond a point, the smaller 
is the army the more prone is the state to be chal- 
lenged. Although there is clearly some size below 
which the army cannot be reduced without encoun- 
tering this danger, the size of army needed for the 
victorious insurrections which  both  achieved is 
evidently considerably larger than that needed for 
deterrence, hence, this should not be a significant 
consideration in the planned demobilizations. 
To conclude, the concern about demobilization 
weakening the security of the state must be taken 
seriously. The relationship between disaffection of 
the demobilized and  the scope for  insurrection 
points to the importance of successful reintegration 
into  the  economy.  Policy  should  therefore  be 
designed so as to achieve a cost-effective reduction 
in disaffection. In  Uganda this was part of the 
rationale for the establishment of  the  Veterans 
Assistance Board. We now turn to the design of a 
policy with this objective. 
To date, in  both countries poIicies designed to 
assist  the  demobilized  have  combined  thinly 
spread financial and material assistance to all the 
demobilized with small job creation schemes from 
which a few have benefited substantially. Experi- 
ence with the latter in both Uganda and Ethiopia 
has  been  very poor. Generally, the jobs created 
have been at high cost, newly established enter- 
prises  have  not  been  viable  without  continued 
subsidy, and only a trivial number of jobs have 
been generated. A hypothesis of the study was that 
the activity with the most scope for employing the 
demobilized  was  construction.  However,  inter- 
views with construction firms and with experts on 
labor-intensive public works established that this 
was not the case. In urban areas, construction was 
fairly skill-intensive. Firms wished to recruit either 
those with experience or those with some educa- 
tion. Although rural construction could be made 
highly labor-intensive, it was not well-suited to the 
employment of the demobilized. The technique of 
rural infrastructure building using labor intensive 
methods involved the deployment of a small core 
of skilled, well-paid labor, which travelled with the 
project (for example, a road) and otherwise relied 
upon the recruitment of unskilled labor from the 
locality. The advantage of this was that the un- 
skilled  labor  had  its  own  accommodation  and 
sources of food. The  use  of demobilized  labor 
would  have  necessitated  travelling labor gangs 
which  would  have  considerably  increased  the 
expense. 
Not  only are employment-creation  projects 
high cost, they are unnecessary. As noted above, 
the follow-up survey in  Uganda found that the 
majority had successfully integrated into peasant 
agriculture  or  non-farm  self-employment.  The 
modest generalized assistance in the form of seeds. 
agricultural  implements and  roofing sheets  for housing, was appreciated. although since delivery 
mechanisms had frequently proved inadequate it 
was a source of friction. Presumably because of the 
successful  integration,  the survey  also  found  a 
largely positive attitude on the part of those demo- 
bilized to the demobilization experience. The two 
main exceptions were landlessness and the treat- 
ment  of  the disabled.  Because of  its  localized 
nature, landlessness is predictable and amenable to 
policy intervention. For example, the government 
could  have  a  lower  rate  of  demobilization  for 
soldiers from land-scarce districts, or land might 
be purchased for them. The problem of disabilityis 
substantial in the armies of Uganda and Ethiopia. 
No special provisions were made in the Ugandan 
demobilization for the disabled and this has caused 
intense resentment,  not just among the disabled, 
through  the perception  that the government has 
discarded onto communities incapable of handling 
the problem those who made the greatest sacrifices 
in  its cause.  The government  in  Ethiopia faced 
with the same problem, is planning special facili- 
ties for this group. To conclude, the design of a 
policy to minimize disaffection has some rationale 
in macro-security over-and-above its direct bene- 
fits to the recipients. Generalized assistance seems 
to be needed only on a modest scale, and promises 
beyond the competence of the government to 
deliver are liable to be counter-productive.  While 
employment-creation  schemes  are  costly  and 
ineffective,  it  is appropriate to target additional 
support to the landless in land scarce areas, and to 
arrange long term support for the severely disabled 
which is likely to mean retaining them in army-run 
facilities. 
4. Conclusion 
Contrary to the prior hypothesis of the study, we 
have found that demobilization, at least as con- 
ducted in  Uganda, does not lead to a significant 
upsurge in insecurity. Indeed, we have found that 
in  the  short  term  demobilization  significantly 
reduces crime unless the demobilized lack access 
to land.  The demobilized, if returned to their home 
areas and given some assistance, are with identifi- 
able exceptions able to find income-earning oppor- 
tunities. As this perception is transmitted from the 
first wave of demobilized, subsequent demobiliza- 
tion becomes easier as more soldiers volunteer (as 
is currently the case in Uganda). Conversely, the 
attempt to link demobilization to special employ- 
ment  schemes appears to be  ill-advised.  While 
there may be a good case for expanding the con- 
struction sector, this should be delinked from the 
demobilization exercise. 
Notes 
1. Source:  Government of Uganda (1993), Table 18. 
2. I am indebted to the UNDP for an opportunity to attend a regular meeting of the heads of expatriate 
security services and for their cooperation in answering my questions. 
3. The incident was reported in the New Vision, for June 2  1, 1993. Chapter 6 
Food Markets, Liberalization and Peace 
in Ethiopia: an econometric analysis 
Stefan Derconl 
1. Introduction 
During  the  1980s  Ethiopia  has  gone  through 
turbulent  times.  Politically,  the  government  of 
President  Mengistu  faced  persistent  armed 
secessionist activity,  especially  in  the Northern 
regions of Eritrea and Tigray. It culminated in May 
199 1 in the take-over by a Tigrayan-led coalition 
of guerrilla movements  which form  the  present 
Transitional  Government,  and  the  secession  of 
Eritrea. Economically, stringent controls on trade 
and  production  repressed  both  rural  and  urban 
areas, forcing the government to start a  reform 
program in  1990, which was continued after the 
accession to power of the rebels. In 1992, an IMF- 
sponsored  structural  adjustment  program  was 
started. 
Food production and marketing has been at the 
foreground of  both  the crisis and  the  reforms'. 
Land reform after the 1974 revolution provided for 
many rural households for the first time a hopeful 
break with centuries old feudal system. Around the 
same time, initially  with World Bank support, a 
new agency was set up in  1976 to participate in 
grain trading and sufficiently strong to influence 
grain price formation. the Agricultural Marketing 
Corporation (AMC). Traders had to obtain licenses 
and price controls were established. Pan-territorial 
pricing was used from 198018 1 onwards. From that 
marketing year onwards. farmers were required to 
deliver  between  50  to  100  percent  of  their 
production as a quota to the AMC at fixed prices. 
well  below the market  prices. In a tragic irony, 
peasants only recently freed  from  a demanding 
feudal system of fixed grain deliveries to landlords 
were subjected  to a  new exploitative system of 
forced deliveries, executed by the state. 
Before  these  reforms,  up  to  25,000  grain 
merchants had been active in rural areas and up to 
8,000  in  towns  (Holmberg  (1977)).  Regional 
markets may well have been reasonably integrated 
during that period, with food prices even during 
the 1973-74 famine period not rising by more than 
20  percent  (Holmberg  (1977))3.  With  price 
controls and licensing of trade came also the rule 
that traders would have to supply a percentage of 
their  grain turnover (usually  50 percent) to the 
AMC at the quota price plus a margin of 4 to 5 birr 
- leaving the traders' profits considerably lower 
than  for grain sold as part of arbitrage between 
districts and regions. Enforcement turned quickly 
brutal: in 1976 traders were executed for allegedly 
hoarding and evading price controls. Since then 
and  throughout  the  1980s,  numerous  cases  of 
forced requisition of produce, and execution and 
torture  of  traders  have  been  documented. 
especially in the war zones (Africa Watch (1991)). 
Licenses were randomly taken away, and all trade 
of any scale was banned from 1982183 in Gojam 
and from the beginning of the harvest in  1985 in 
Arssi. Movement of grain up 100 kg was usually 
allowed  in  principle, but  grain could always be 
requisitioned  if  a  specific  trading  purpose  was 
suspected. In 1988 it was announced that as long as 
50 percent of the grain would be delivered to the 
AMC, traders would be issued with licenses in all 
areas. but the implementation bf this ruling was 
reportedly quite different across regions (Franzel 
et al., 1989). 
No estimates of the number of traders which 
remained active are available, but their number is 
likely  to  have  diminished  considerably  in  the 
1980s. At the same time,  beyond  the  measures 
specifically aimed against traders, the war resulted 
in  a  substantial  destruction  of  infrastructure, 
especially in the North. The intensification of the fighting  from  around  1988  limited  further  the 
ability  to  move  grain,  whether  legitimately  or 
smuggled.  The  controlled  distribution  system 
could however increasingly less supply sufficient 
grain to consumers at the controlled prices, partly 
due to a large diversion of grain to the military 
operations,  and  urban  areas  became  more 
dependent on the free market supplies. With the 
increased political and military pressures placed on 
the government to salvage  the regime after the 
gradual demise of its main sponsors, the Soviet 
Union,  a  liberalization  of  grain  markets  was 
commenced in March 1990, which established the 
freedom  to  move  grain,  and  quota's  were 
abolished. With the demise of the Mengistu regime 
in  May  1991,  the  main  remaining  monopoly 
sources of grain for the AMC, the producer co- 
operatives and state fms,  began to be dismantled. 
The  AMC  is  now  supposed  to  compete  with 
private traders in the free market. 
This paper deals with the consequences for 
food  markets and  prices of the changes from a 
controlled system to free trade, from war to peace. 
In particular, we want to establish, first, what were 
the consequences for the level of consumer and 
producer prices and for the marketing margin 
between surplus and deficit prices and secondly, 
can we conclude anything about the functioning of 
food markets, ie. has there been any change in the 
extent of market integration before and after the 
changes? 
Methodologically,  the first question will be 
addressed  using  a  theoretical  arbitrage  model 
(section 2), after which data on the main staple, 
teff, will be used to infer whether the predictions 
of the model can be observed (section 3). These 
results  will  be  further  checked  using  an 
econometric approach which will also be used to 
address  the issue of the functioning of markets 
(section 5). Before that, in section 4, a specific 
econometric methodology is developed to analyze 
market liberalization, using cointegration and error 
correction mechanisms. This methodology tries to 
improve upon the classic Ravallion (1986) model 
for market integration. 
2.  The effects of the quota  system, trade 
controls and the war on grain prices 
First, the effect on grain producers of the forced 
delivery of a fixed quota will be discussed. Since 
it has been dealt with by others (e.g. Lemma Merid 
(1986), Alemayehu Lirenso (1987), Franzel et al. 
(1989), Legesse Dadi et al. (1992), Azam (1992)), 
we can be brief about this. Azam has shown that if 
the household consumes both manufacturing goods 
and an own-produced cereal, then under general 
conditions a forced delivery of cereals at a price, 
lower than the market price, can be viewed as a 
lump-sum tax equal to the margin between market 
and quota prices times the quota, so that the impact 
of the quota system on the net sale by the farmer 
works  only  through  an  income  effect. 
Consequently,  the  net  supply  of  grain  is  an 
increasing function of the level of the quota and a 
decreasing  function  of  the  quota  price. 
Liberalization should then have reduced the net 
supply  of  grain  to  the  market,  since  on-farm 
consumption will have increased,  provided both 
cereals and other goods are normal. 
Azam (1992)'s  analysis deals only with the 
total  net  supply  by  the farmer,  irrespective  of 
whether it went to the open market or the AMC. 
To derive the supply to the open grain markets, we 
should focus on the supply, net of the quota. Let H 
be the quantity of grain harvested and S, the net 
sale of grain. is equal to H minus C, with C the on- 
farm consumption. The quota Q has to be delivered 
at a price Po, which is below the market price P. 
With other goods consumed denoted by M, we can 
write the budget constraint faced as 
in which the right hand side is total income Y and 
(P-PQ).Q  = T(P,PQ,Q),  the lump-sum tax T. The net 
sale to the open market, F, equals S minus Q. The 
effect of a marginal increase in Q on F is positive 
if 
Using (I), this will be the case if 
in which E,  and b,  is the income elasticity of grain and tlie budget share of grain in total expenditure. 
Since  b,  is smaller than one and since the right 
hand side of the inequality is larger than one, the 
income elasticity of grain  has to be'sufficiently 
larger  than  one for  an  increase  in  the quota to 
result in an increase the supply to the free market. 
In  other words,  under usual  circumstances, the 
quota system will  have repressed  the supply of 
grain to the open  market.  Liberalization  should 
have resulted in larger supplies reaching the open 
market,  despite the  reduction  in  total  marketed 
production. 
The  second  issue  has  to  do  with  urban 
consumer demand.  During the 1980s  the AMC 
sold substantial amounts of cereals in Addis Ababa 
at low, controlled prices via Kebele shops, even 
though  most  people  had  to  supplement  the 
quantities obtained  with  purchases  in  the  open 
market. After liberalization, the quantities sold by 
the AMC in this way barely reached 10 percent of 
the previous quantities.  In a simplified way, the 
effect of the change in this 'ration' can be seen in 
figure 1. Suppose the household consumes cereals, 
denoted C, and other goods, denoted NC. A ration 
R, of cereals is supplied at a lower price than the 
market cereals price, so that the budget curve is 
kinked. If this ration is not sufficient, then some 
extra  cereals  will  be  purchased  to  reach  the 
optimum at A, where total cereal consumption is 
C, and other consumption is NC,. A reduction of 
the ration to R? will result in an inward movement 
of the budget curve. This is a pure income effect, 
so that as  long  as the other  goods.  NC,  are a 
composite  normal  good,  consumption  of  both 
cereals and other goods will decline, to C2 and 
NC,,  at the optimum B. The important point is that 
the reduction in cereal consumption is smaller than 
the  reduction  in  the ration,  in  other words,  the 
reduction  in  the  ration  will  have  increased  the 
demand for cereals in  the open market. The net 
effect from the liberalization on market prices is 
consequently not very clear: increased open market 
supply,  but  increased  demand  as  well.  This 
conclusion ignores however the effects on trade of 
the  liberalization  and the spatial  distribution of 
these effects. The basic spatial arbitrage model as 
in  Takayama and Judge (1974)  can  be  used to 
discuss this further. 
Let  us  consider two regions  i  and j  with 
differing demand and supply and assume that in 
regional autarky the market price p, is srnaller than 
p,,  in other words there is a larger demand relative 
to supply in j than in i. For simplicity, let us call i 
a 'surplus' region and j a 'deficit' area, even though 
this  may misleadingly and wrongly suggest the 
presence of rationing. If the transport cost to move 
one  unit  from  i  to  j  is  t,  and  constant,  then 
arbitrage with competitive markets suggests that 
the margin between p, and p,  will be reduced to tij 
via exports from i to j. As discussed before, under 
quite acceptable circumstances, the quota system 
will have reduced the net supply to the free market 
moving  both  p,  and  p,  up  while  the  supply  of 
rations in  the main consumer markets will have 
reduced  prices  both  in  i  and j.  Because of the 
possibility of arbitrage, this effect is independent 
of whether rations where distributed in all regions 
or only in  particular areas such as Addis Ababa, 
although this would have affected tlie actual levels 
of prices relative to the free market situation. 
The introduction of restrictions on traders will 
affect  the margins  between  i and  j. Suppose a 
trader can only obtain a license if a fraction q of all 
purchases are delivered to the AMC at a price p,, 
which is considerably less than the price in j. If the 
transport costs related to the delivery to the AMC 
are ti,  then arbitrage between i and j will take place 
as long as 
Reworking this expression, we find that the margin 
between prices in i and j will reduce after arbitrage 
to 
It implies that, under the obvious circumstance that 
the difference between the price in j  and the price 
paid  by  the AMC to traders  is larger  than  the 
difference in transport costs related to delivery in 
j and to the AMC, the margin betwken prices in the 
region i and j will have increased after the traders' 
restrictions.  Prices in  'surplus'  regions will have 
experienced a downward pressure and prices in 
'deficit' areas are likely to have become higher as 
a  consequence.  Trade  will  be  discouraged  and 
margins will  not  be  brought  down to transport 
costs. 
Liberalization could have a further effect on 
marketing margins if licensing limited the number 
of traders participating in moving grain before the reforms. Costs of licenses were reportedly high  prices in 'surplus' areas and results in an upward 
before the reforms. Some routes may have been 
controlled by very few traders, who could pay the 
licensing costs andlor the necessary bribes. To the 
extent that  new traders enter food  trading after 
liberalization, the rents to these traders in the form 
of supernormal profits could  be eroded through 
increased competition. The result would be that 
marketing  margins  move  close  to  the  actual 
marketing  costs.  Observing  reduced  marketing 
margins could  therefore  both  be  related  to the 
removal of trade taxes via quota's and to increased 
competition after liberalization. 
Finally, it is possible to discuss the effects of 
war and insecurity on cereal markets. Besides the 
physical losses of cereal production in war zones, 
the inability to move grain because the breakdown 
of  infrastructure  and  security  risks  will  affect 
prices considerably. Introducing these constraints 
on movement we can rewrite the arbitrage model 
under trader quota's as the maximization by traders 
of all profits x  on moving quantities x from i to j 
subject to a movement constraint, or 
s.2.  x..  = AT.. ) 
rl  !I 
T.. i T,;. 
!I 
in which n is total number of markets and T is the 
transport available and T'  denotes the constraint on 
moving grain because of the insecurity  and the 
breakdown of infrastructure. Traded quantities x,j 
have to be a function f of the available transport. 
Denoting ltij  as the shadow price of the transport 
infrastructure we can find that traders will move 
grain between i and j until 
If the transport constraint is binding, this implies 
that  the  margin  after  arbitrage  trading  will  be 
larger than simply transport costs corrected for the 
government restrictions on traders. If insecurity is 
a strong element then this shadow price can be 
very large. War has therefore a negative effect on 
movement of prices in the main demand arias. If 
the return to peace also means that both security 
and the basic transport infrastructure is restored 
then peace can have further beneficial effects on 
producers in the main surplus areas as well as on 
consumer prices in urban areas. 
3. Teff Prices and Margins in Ethiopia 
In  this section a discussion  is  presented of the 
evolution of price and marketing margins since the 
1980s.  The analysis  focuses  on  teff,  the  main 
staple in the Ethiopian  highlands.  This valuable 
and  relatively drought  resistant  but  very  labor 
intensive  cereal crop forms the  basis  for  most 
meals in rural and urban Ethiopia. Monthly data on 
open  market  prices  in  urban  areas  have  been 
collected  systematically  by  the  Agricultural 
Marketing Corporation  for a few dozen markets 
starting  in  the  mid-1980s.  The  Relief  and 
Rehabilitation  Commission  (RRC)  has  also 
collected data  in  up to 80 towns as part of its 
famine early warning system since the early 1980s. 
Both data sources are used  in  this section. The 
Central Statistical Authority (CSA) has published 
data on rural and urban prices, but important gaps 
exist in the published data, so this source was not 
used in the analysis. Some discrepancies existed 
between the RRC and the AMC data, but since the 
AMC  data contained systematically fewer gaps, 
the latter source was more relied upon. All the data 
were deflated by a non-food Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) obtained  by reweighing the Addis Ababa 
CPI excluding all food  using CSA data.  By no 
means is this a correct deflator for all the different 
towns, at least it will give us some indication of 
the  evolution  of  food  prices  relative  to  other 
commodities. Unless othenvise stated, prices are in 
real January 1988 prices per quintal, and data were 
available  for  some  of the  main  markets  until 
September 1993. 
First, figure 2 shows the evolution of prices for 
white  teff  in  Addis  Ababa  in  real terms since 
August 1979. No clear trend can be observed for 
the entire period. The most striking relative price 
change occurred during the famine period 1984-85. 
Starting in February 1984 after the Meher harvest, 
peaking in the middle of 1985, after which prices 
only slowly declined to reach pre-1984 prices after the Belg harvest of 1986. The effects of the famine 
in  Wollo and Tigray must clearly have been felt in 
Addis  Ababa  as  well.  Low  prices  were  then 
observed during 1987 to 1989, with the post-Meher 
harvest prices in  1989190 close to the lowest in the 
entire  period. Liberalization  occurred  in  March 
1990, but no clear effect can be observed. except 
for  an  apparent  seasonal  effect.  The  last  few 
months of the  war  showed  a  rapid  increase of 
prices in  the beginning  of 1991, despite a post- 
harvest period. Insecurity must have affected the 
distribution  of  the  1990191  Meher  harvest 
considerably.  Since  then,  prices  have  declined 
gradually,  even  though  prices  were  around  the 
beginning  of  the  1992193  Meher  harvest  still 
higher  than  during the  period  1987-90,  but  not 
higher than in  the pre-  1984 period. During 1993 
prices declined however further, to levels lower 
than  at  any  point  in  the  last  14  years,  after  a 
successful Belg harvest. Even the official data are 
not  yet  available,  prices  are  said  to  have 
marginally  declined  further,  but  are at  present 
(February  1994)  increasing  again,  after  a  poor 
Meher  harvest and  expectations of a  poor  Belg 
with rains being too late. From these data, it is not 
possible to find therefore a clear result from the 
liberalization. In  any case, some time after the 
EPRDF  take-over,  prices  have  declined  to 
historically  low  levels.  Open  market  supply 
increases seem  to have  been able to more than 
compensate  the  demand  increases  in  the open 
market in  Addis Ababa. Filtering the effects of a 
(delayed)  response  to  liberalization.  a  genuine 
response to peace and security or the effect of very 
good Meher and Belg harvest, is quite impossible. 
The fact that a good harvest can flood the Addis 
Ababa  market  and  does  not  get  wasted  in  the 
feeding of several  large  armies  is  likely  to  be 
another factor. 
Consistent  data  for  most  other  towns  in 
Ethiopia are not available for the first part of the 
1980s. Figure 3 and 4 show data since September 
1987. which allow us to build up a more complete 
picture of the consequences of liberalization and 
peace. First. it can be seen that the price in Addis 
Ababa has consistently remained  higher than in 
most  of  the  other  towns  before  and  after 
liberalization:  Addis  Ababa clearly  exercises  a 
considerable demand-pull to grain supplies from 
virtually  all  directions.  Only  in  Dire Dawa are 
price higher. a town which is quite far removed 
from  any  supplying  regions.  In  fact,  from  the 
middle  of 1993,  prices in  some towns East and 
Southeast of Addis Ababa (Debre Zeit, Nazreth, 
Shashemene)  became  (probably  temporarily) 
higher than in Addis Ababa, suggesting even a teff 
flow, away from Addis Ababa towards Dire Dawa. 
In general however, margins between Addis Ababa 
and the rest of these important urban centers are 
positive.  Secondly,  a  clear  effect  of  the 
liberalization  can  be seen:  margins between the 
most important demand center, Addis Ababa and 
all the other towns decreased after liberalization, as 
was predicted by the model. A clear increase in the 
grain flows as part of arbitrage must have taken 
place. By the end of the period,  prices in some 
towns were higher than before liberalization: e.g. 
Debre Markos, Ambo, Hosaenna, Shashemene - in 
fact these are close to surplus teff producing areas; 
in others, such as Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa - 
important deficit and demand centers, prices were 
lower.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the 
predictions  of  increased  arbitrage  after 
liberalization in the previous section:  more grain 
will shipped from surplus regions to deficit regions 
after liberalization, since incentives for arbitrage 
have increased. Table 6.1:  Margins between Addis Ababa Real Teff Prices and specific markets1 
mid-86lend-89  mid-901Sep.93  mid-9  1 lSep.93  result post-liberalization 
Shoa 
Nazreth  18  10  10 
Debre Zeit  12  3  2 




Shashemene  3  1  12  10 
Kefa 
Jimma  32  3  1  2  8 
Gojjam 
Bahar Dar*  45  3  2  30 
Debre Markos  59  26  26 
A rssi 
Assela*  37  17  17 
Dessie 

















Harar  -33  -26  -28 




Mettu*  35  36  3  9  equal? 
Weffega 
Nekempte*  42  32  32  down 
Source: calculated from AMC data. 
'towns are ordered according to regions as they were in use until the end of the 1980s. 
*data up to the December 1992 only. To  interpret these results better. the margins 
were calculated and filtered for temporary erratic 
movements using  six-months averages.  These 
averages were used to obtain an average margin 
before  and  after  liberalization,  and  after  the 
EPRDF  take-over.  Some  of  the  results  were 
sensitive  to  which  data  source  was  used.  but 
overall the picture was consistent. Table 1 gives 
the difference between real teff prices in  Addis 
Ababa and in some of the main urban centers in 
Ethiopia for which data were available. Margins 
declined in Shoa in six out of seven markets by 30 
percent or more. In other regions, margins declined 
in  7 out of  11 markets mentioned, and increased 
only  in  Dessie  and  Gonder.  The  decline  is 
especially notable in Arssi and in  Gojjam. the two 
big producing areas which faced banned private 
trade before liberalization. The result for Dessie is 
mainly the consequence of the (erratic) effects of 
food aid distribution in that area during the period 
since the famine, depressing prices considerably in 
some periods. For the interpretation of these results 
one also ought to keep in  mind the flows of teff 
within the country as depicted in figure 16, which 
means  that  some  of  the  markets  for  which 
differences with Addis Ababa prices are given are 
only very indirectly linked with Addis Ababa. Still, 
the result is striking: liberalization clearly reduced 
price differentials in the country, moving all prices 
closer  to  Addis  Ababa  levels.  This  result  is 
confirmed by  using data on  44 more peripheral 
markets for which the RRC  collected data, with 38 
showing declines after liberalization. No effect can 
however be  observed from  the cessation of  the 
war: in table 1 is no significant difference between 
the  post-take-over  period  and  the  rest  of  the 
liberalization  period.  Relative  security  in  the 
country has failed to deliver its dividend  in the 
form reduced price differentials in the country. 
Table 6.2 gives data on the price differentials 
between some towns which may potentially trade 
with  each  other  due  to  proximity.  Of  the  21 
presented, the price differential went down in  10 of 
the comparisons and remained roughly the same in 
6 others before and after liberalization. In 5 cases 
did the differential go up. A comparable result was 
obtained using the (longer) RRC data on 5 1 market 
relations. Liberalization has had somewhat more 
mixed  effects within  the  regions. even  though 
mainly reducing the differentials. The take-over 
did not affect the patterns set by  liberalization. 
To  summarize  the  main  effects  of  the 
liberalization, it was shown that the level of prices 
after  liberalization  in  main  'deficit' areas  -  big 
urban centers such as Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa 
- was, if anything, lower than before. Producers (or 
at least traders) in the main surplus areas are likely 
to have  benefited  considerably, since generally 
price  differentials  between  trading  areas  were 
brought down  by  arbitrage to  lower levels than 
before  in  a  majority  of  instances.  Increased 
reliance  on  open  market  supplies  by  urban 
consumers has  been  more than compensated by 
increased open market supplies, and especially by 
better incentives to trade. We  cannot find clear 
evidence on  the existence of a  peace dividend: 
lately, prices have declined in the major consumer 
areas, but only after a strong price increase around 
the ascent of the new government. No evidence 
can  be  found  of  increased  arbitrage  in  food 
markets: increased security should have meant that 
the  constraints on  moving commodities should 
have  been  reduced, and  margins to have come 
further down due to the reduction of the shadow 
premium  on  transporting. One  should  however 
note that most data presented in the tables are from 
southern or central regions: data from the most 
affected  war-zones,  such  as  Tigray,  Northern 
Gonder  and  Eritrea,  are  not  available for  the 
obvious reason that a war was going on. 
4.  Analyzing market integration and the 
effects of liberalization and peace 
Thus  far  we  have  analyzed  the  effects  of 
liberalization and peace on the levels of prices, but 
one of the implicit aims of liberalization has to do 
with the improvedjirncrioning  of markets. In some 
respects,  without  sliding  into  a  semantic 
discussion, the analysis of the changes in  margins 
across towns has to do with increased arbitrage. Table 6.2. Price differential among regional towns in Ethiopia 
mid-86lend-  mid-90lend-  mid-  result post- 
89  92  91  lend-92  liberalization 
Shashemene - Hoseanna 
Arba Minch - Hosaenna 
Nazret - Asela 
Dire Dawa - Nazret 
Nazret - Harar 
Debre Zeit - Navet 
Debre Zeit - Ziway 
Debre Markos - Dangila 
Addis Zemen - Gonder 
Gonder - Kola Diba 
Addis Zemen - Nefas Mechwa 
Bahar Dar - Mekane Selam 
Kombolcha - Dessie 
Dessie - Haik 
Dessie - Woldiya 
Dessie - Korem 
Harar - Dire Dawa 
Bahar Dar - Gonder 
Bahar Dar - Debre Markos 
Assela - Robe 






















However,  the effect  was predicted  from  a 
static  model of removal of implicit  taxation  on 
traders, and not from any effect of the increased 
competitive forces within the market or a faster 
transmission  of  information  and  response  to 
trading  opportunities.  It  is  unlikely  that 
competitiveness of a market can be analyzed with 
anything but detailed microeconomic information 
of traders and their cost structure and constraints
4. 
Standard market integration analysis such as in 
Ravallion  (1986),  using  only  information  on 
prices,  cannot  conclude  anything  about 
competitiveness. Indeed, as Faminow and Benson 
(1991)  have  shown,  Ravallion-type  of  market 
integration  can  just  as  well  be  interpreted  as 
evidence  for  a  competitive  model  as  for  an 
oligopolistic  model  with  base-point  pricing. 
Market integration analysis provides however an 
interesting indication of the extent to which and 
the speed with which price signals in one market 
are  transmitted  to  another  market.  If  market 
liberalizing measures result in an improvement of 
this transmission and therefore increasing market 
integration,  then  a  positive  effect  on  the 
functioning of markets from liberalization has been 
detected. Somewhat surprisingly, the methodology 
of market integration has thus far (as far as I know) 
not been applied to liberalization even though its applicability would seem obvious. 
In  this  section  we  will  first  explain  the 
methodology for such analysis. Given the progress 
in  econometric  methodology  since  Ravallion's 
classic  (1986)  paper.  we  will  first  restate  the 
central elements of his approach in the context of 
the more recent theory of cointegration and error- 
correction
5.  Some  parts  of  this  approach  have 
appeared in the literature. notably by Goodwin and 
Schroeder (1991 ) and  by  Palaskas  and  Harriss 
(1993)6. As will be seen, the present paper can be 
seen as an extension of their approach. First, the 
methodology  is  explained  as  if  there  is  no 
structural change  (such  as  liberalization)  to  be 
considered. 
If two markets are integrated one states in fact 
that  some  long  run  relationship exists.  in  that 
changes in one market will transpire in  the prices 
of  the other  markets  in  due  course.  Short  run 
market integration implies then that this long run 
relationship  is very quickly obtained  - virtually 
immediately.  Commodity  prices  are often  non- 
stationary,  and  if  so,  standard  inference  is  not 
valid. Cointegration analysis allows researchers to 
make from this failure a strength.  Simple tests 
exist to establish whether there is a stable long run 
relationship  between  different  non-stationary 
series,  and the  Granger  representation  theorem 
allows the dynamics of cointegrated series to be 
specified as an error-correction mechanism (Engle 
and  Granger  (1987)).  The  existence  of  a 
cointegrating  relationship  between  prices  from 
regionally different markets can then  be seen as 
evidence  of  long-run  market  integration  (as  in 
Goodwin  and  Schroeder  (1991)),  while  the 
dynamic specification can be used to establish the 
extent  of short-run  integration  (as in  Ravallion 
(1986), Palaskas and Harriss (1993)). 
This analysis needs to be distinguished from 
the 'efficient market hypothesis' literature, with its 
emphasis  of  informationally  efficient  markets 
(Malkiel (1987)). The  latter will  state  that two 
markets are informationally efficient if past prices 
from one market do not  help to predict present 
prices from the other market, beyond information 
contained in past prices from the latter market. In 
fact,  statistically  this  means  the  absence  of 
Granger-causality in any direction (Granger and 
Escribano (1987)). But this implies that the price 
series will not be cointegrated, since cointegration 
implies Granger-causality in at least one direction. 
This result has to be put in  context properly. 
One  could  think  of  market  relationships 
developing as some continuum. Markets which are 
not  at  all  related  -  no  trading  takes  place  for 
example - will show no cointegration at all. When 
market functioning improves,  a point will come 
when markets will reflect all shocks which occur 
to the other: markets are integrated in the long-run 
and  showing  statistical  cointegration.  Market 
operations  are observed as part of a  process of 
capturing profits from arbitrage. At some point. 
markets are processing information so fast that all 
information  is  immediately  absorbed  into  the 
prices,  and  become  'informationally  efficient'. 
showing no cointegration at all. CIearly, common 
sense and economic observation has to guide what 
interpretation should  be given to the absence of 
cointegration. Since many markets in developed 
countries. including stock markets, are found to be 
informationally inefficient (e.g Taylor and Tonks 
(1989)), finding non-cointegration is unlikely to be 
a reflection of informational efficiency. 
The various steps of the analysis are described 
below and expanded upon only in case they have 
not  been dealt  with  in  the  literature  on market 
integration. TheJirst step is to establish the order 
of integration of the different  price series, using 
unit  root  tests.  If  the  series  are  I(0)  then  the 
standard Ravallion approach can be followed. If 
not, as is often the case. then one should proceed. 
as  the  second step,  with  the  estimation  of the 
cointegrating  regression. For two non-stationary 
prices R and P for the same commodity in different 
locations, the long-run relationship to be tested can 
be represented as: 
Following  the  spatial  equilibrium  literature 
(Takayama  and  Judge,  (1  97  I)),  equation  (9) 
assumes  the  existence  of  a  marketing  margin, 
specified  as a linear function of the price R, in 
particular: 
This  specification  nests  more  common 
specifications,  such  as constant or proportional 
marketing  margins  (ie.  a  =  0  and  B  =  0, 
respectively),  while  contrary  to  e.g.  Ravallion 
(1986) a is not required to be equal to 1'.  Testing can  be  done  using  the  Cointegrating  Durbin 
Watson  (CRDW),  the  Dickey-Fuller  test,  the 
adjusted  Dickey-Fuller test.  Engle and  Granger 
(1987) proposed several more potential tests, while 
the  Johansen  maximum-likelihood  procedure 
allows the testing of multiple cointegrating vectors 
(Johansen,  1988).  Evidence  of  cointegration 
provides evidence of long-run market integration, 
and the estimated values of u and 6 would provide 
an  indication  of  the  nature  of  the  marketing 
margins.  Providing  there  exists  additional 
information on the nature of marginal marketing 
costs, it is possible to interpret the estimated values 
in  the light of efficiency or competitiveness of the 
market.  Otherwise,  no  welfare  economic 
interpretation can be attached to these results. 
The  interpretation  of  the  cointegrating 
regression is complicated because of the small 
sample  properties  of  the  estimators  involved. 
While the OLS estimators of the parameters of a 
cointegrating relationship are superconsistent, they 
are biased in small samples, and this bias may be 
quite large (Stock (1 987)), it is a biased estimate. 
In  small  samples, this bias may  be  quite  large 
(Banerjee, et  al.  (1986)). Inference within  the 
cointegrating regression is also not possible with 
the  usual  tables (Banerjee, et  a1.(1986),  Stock 
(1987).  In  applied  work,  a  procedure  can  be 
proposed which in practice could establish whether 
one should suspect the bias to be very large. The 
procedure  to  use  is  to  estimate  besides  the 
cointegrating  vector  also  an  Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag model (i.e. regress P, on lagged P 
and on present and past R). As the third step in the 
analysis,  one  ought  to  calculate  the  long-run 
solution of the coefficient on R in  the ADL and 
check whether this value is significantly different 
from  the estimate of the coefficient on R, in  the 
cointegrating regression (see Doornik and Hendry 
(1993) and Adam (1993)). This is not a formal test 
procedure,  but  it  is  very  useful  to  warn  the 
researcher  against  wrong  conclusions  on  the 
existence of  a  particular  long-run  relationship 
between prices. 
The existence of a cointegrating relationship 
between two variables has been shown to imply 
that  Granger-causality  exist  in  at  least  one 
direction (Engle and Granger (1  987)). Knowledge 
about Granger-causality allows the determination 
of the direction of the flows of price information, 
and therefore helps with the dynamic specification. 
It is therefore included as the fourth step in  the 
procedure. The test implemented here will use the 
dynamic specification, and therefore the test will 
be for dynamic Granger-causality, and not simply 
in the long-run relationship. Misspecificat:on can 
however  bias  Granger-causality tests,  so  it  is 
appropriate  to  use  a  dynamic  error-correction 
formulation to implement this test. The point is 
that the Granger-representation theorem  allows 
every cointegrating relationship to be represented 
as a vector-autoregression with an error-correction 
term. The dynamic error correction model (ECM) 
related to equation (9) for the testing of Granger- 
causality can be specified as 
AP,  =  B,,AP,,  ...  +  O,,AP,, 
The error correction term (P,, - ah-,  - 6) is equal 
to the lagged error term from the cointegrating 
relationship  and  the  estimated  residual  of  the 
cointegrating regression can be  used to estimate 
(1 1) according to the 'two-step' procedure (Engle 
and Granger (1987)). An  appropriate alternative 
ECM  specification with  AR, as the dependent 
variable can  be  derived in  the same  way.  The 
number of lags, n, has to be chosen to make sure 
that the residuals behave according to the usual 
conditions for correct inference. If P and R are I(1) 
but cointegrated then all terms in  equation (1 1) are 
stationary.  As  a  consequence,  inference  using 
standard t and  F-tables is  possible. A Granger- 
causality test for market integration to establish the 
relevant direction of the flow of price information 
can then be considered. Granger-causality from R 
to P can be implied from the rejection of the joint 
hypothesis: 
and  a similar test can  be  derived for Granger- 
causality from  P to R. Failure to establish any 
Granger-causality should alert the researcher that 
there  may  be  problems with  the  cointegrating 
relationship even if the tests under the second step 
suggested cointegration. Granger-causality can be 
interpreted as  providing evidence on  the  main direction of flows of information between markets. 
Equation (1 1) is in the market integration literature 
referred to as the (dynamic) reduced form equation 
of  the  structural  model  in  which  the  present 
difference of reference market prices ,Ah,  at the 
right hand side of the equation has been solved for. 
To do tests of short-run  market integration  one 
ought to be able to estimate a 'structural' version of 
the  model,  with  AR, at the  right  hand  side.  In 
particular, one would like to estimate the model: 
To  use  OLS,  this  requires  however  weak- 
exogeneity  of  AR,  relative  to  inference  on  its 
coefficient in the model, which may not be true in 
interdependent  markets.  Under  the  absence  of 
exogeneity, alternative estimation methods such as 
instrumental variables estimation ought to be used 
instead. These methods involve however a loss of 
efficiency if the bias caused by using OLS in the 
presence  of  endogeneity  is  relatively  limited 
(Nakamura et al., 1981).  The Wu-test based on 
Hausman (1978), as discussed in Nakumura et al. 
(1981), tests whether the explanatory variables are 
statistically independent of the errors of the model. 
For  example,  to  test  whether  in  (13)  this 
independence is violated through the inclusion of 
AR,  one would estimate an auxiliary regression of 
the process generating  AR, and enter the fitted 
values  of  this  regression  in  (13).  The  OLS 
estimator on this fitted value in (13) would under 
the null of independence tend to zero in probability 
and standard t-tables can  be  used. If the null is 
rejected,  OLS  is  not  appropriate.  It  should  be 
stressed  that  this  not  a  direct  test  of  weak- 
exogeneity, but rather of the bias involved if OLS 
would  be  used  despite  the  absence  of  weak- 
exogeneity (Maddala (1  993)). Following Urbain 
(1992),  we  introduce  the error-correction terms 
into  the  auxiliary  regression,  since  their 
significance suggests that exogeneity is unlikely to 
hold
8. 
TheJifth step in the analysis is to implement 
this  test.  The  auxiliary  regression  for  the 
explanatory variable (AR,) needs to be specified 
using  weakly  exogenous  variables.  In  practice. 
lagged values of aR  and lagged values from all 
markets which can be thought of to influence AR 
can be used. If the null of independence is rejected, 
instrumental  variables  or  equivalent  estimation 
techniques ought to be used: otherwise OLS would 
seem  appropriate  to  estimate  the  dynamic 
structural model. 
The sixth step involves the estimation of this 
dynamic structural ECM model. The estimates can 
be used for further testing and interpretation. First, 
it  is  possible to test the hypothesis of short run 
market  integration,  which  means  that  a  price 
increase  in  the  reference  market  will  be 
immediately passed on to the dependent market. 
The null of short-run integration implies testing of 
the joint hypothesis: 
In  particular,  under the null, none of the lagged 
variables are significant while any change in R is 
transmitted according to the long-run relationship, 
and any deviation in the last period is immediately 
corrected. In fact, under this null, the correct short- 
run model is simply a stochastic re-specification of 
the  cointegrating  relationship  in  (9).  All  the 
variables in equation (13) are stationary if P and R 
are cointegrated, so the standard F-tables can be 
used for the test in (14). 
A  problem  exists with  this test. The  null- 
hypothesis under (14) includes testing whether 
is equal to a, in which a is the coefficient on R, in 
the cointegrating relationship. As wa:j mentioned 
before, this coefficient is biased in small samples. 
If we have good (economic) reasons to believe that 
the 'true' a is a particular value, then we could use 
it, both in the error correction term in (9) as in the 
test under (1  0). For example, Palaskas and Harriss 
(1993), who propose a short-run market integration 
test not dissimilar to the present approach, suggest 
a model that only deals with constant marketing 
margins. so that a equals one. Alternatively, and 
consistent with the two-step procedure, one could 
use  -  at  least  in  a  large  enough  sLmple  -  the 
estimated value for a. and proceed with the test. 
Some loss of power of the test will be involved, 
but no clear alternative exists. Additional tests of long-run  integration  are 
possible as well at this stage. The non-significance 
of the coefficient of the error correction term, y, 
should make the researcher wary of the correctness 
of the specification and/or the presence of a long- 
run  relationship,  since  the  error-correction 
formulation  is  following  the  Granger 
Representation theorem a correct representation of 
the cointegrating relationship. A more formal test 
of long-run market integration involves testing the 
presence of the same long-run relationship in the 
short-run  specification.  If  the  markets  are 
cointegrated then the following restriction should 
not be rejected in equation (13) 
since the long-run solution to (13) is 
so that the test under (15) simply an alternative 
form is of testing whether the coefficient on AR is 
in the long-run equal to the estimated value of a in 
the cointegrating regression - which it ought to be 
if the earlier tests were passed. 
These tests are equivalent to the tests proposed 
by Ravallion (1986) on market segmentation (the 
significance of y), short-run and long-run market 
integration (see (1  4) and (1  5)). Similarly, the index 
of market connection (IMC) proposed by Timmer 
(1987) can  also  be  calculated  in  this  equation. 
Without  loss  of generality  these  tests  are  now 
proposed  to  be  implemented  in  a  dynamic 
(differences)  model,  while  the  long-run 
relationship is tested in this analysis in levels in a 
statistically  more  acceptable  way  using 
cointegration.  Also,  the  tests  above  are  more 
general than those proposed  by  Ravallion since 
they allow for market  integration  under a more 
general  structure  of the marketing  margins,  as 
described in (5) and does not require for a to be 
equal to one. 
The seventh step is model evaluation - equally 
important  to  estimation  of  the  dynamic 
relationship,  but easily ignored in applied work. 
Besides evaluating diagnostics on the residuals - to 
check for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, non- 
normality,  misspecification, etc.,  it  is  crucially 
important to evaluate the stability of the estimates 
over the sample. In particular, the type of market 
integration  models  considered  here  assume  a 
constant degree of market integration  over the 
entire sample period. In particular, they ignore the 
consequences  of  structural  changes  in  the 
economy, such as new infrastructure, changes in 
market  intervention,  liberalization,  relative 
marketing cost changes,  etc. Parameter stability 
tests (e.g. using different Chow tests or recursive 
least squares) are required to check whether there 
is any evidence of such structural changes, and if 
there is evidence of instability, the model and its 
conclusion on market integration are invalidated. 
This last step provides a  way  to adapt this 
approach for the study of the effects for example 
improved security or liberalization. One way to go 
about it would be to check whether over the entire 
period and check for structural breaks, and if they 
are absent it could be concluded that the policy or 
other changes did not significantly affect the long- 
run relationship nor the dynamic adjustment path. 
The alternative is to implement the above analysis 
for the  relevant  sub-samples  and  compare the 
estimated results before and after the change. The 
latter approach will be taken here, even though, 
given data availability, some problems with small 
sub-samples arise, reducing the power of the tests 
implemented. In particular, emphasis will be on 
the period before liberalization (pre-March 1990), 
the period since liberalization  until the take-over 
(May 199  1) and the aftermath of the take-over. 
First,  we  will  focus  on  the  cointegrating 
regressions, which give an indication of changes in 
the marketing margins. 
As was described in section 2, liberalization 
and peace are likely to have affected the long-run 
relationship between prices through an  increase in 
arbitrage. This implies that equation (9) will give 
different estimated values in the period before and 
after these occurrences. In particular,  if there are 
three states during the period under consideration, 
and assuming that any change in the marketing 
margin is proportional to the prices in the reference 
market, then the long-run relationship to be tested 
can be written as
9: with  dummy,  is  1  in  the  period  before 
liberalization  and  0  afterwards,  dummyz is  1 
throughout  and  dummy,  is  0  until  'peace'  was 
achieved  and  1  afterwardslo. This  specification 
implies  that  the  'long-run'  coefficient  on  the 
reference market price before liberalization equals 
(a,+az),  between liberalization and peace az,  and 
after peace (az+as). 
Equation  (17)  reflects  differences  in  the 
marketing margins between different periods, and 
results consistent with the 'static' theoretical results 
from section 2 can be expected. Given the results 
in section 3, it is likely that for most markets the 
estimated coefficients will results in larger margins 
before than after liberalization, but little difference 
after  the  take-over.  Direct  inference  on  these 
values is however not possible, so we will have to 
employ both our judgement and the other tests on 
long-run integration mentioned above to check the 
validity  of  any  conclusions,  including  by 
estimating the ADL for the model. 
The dynamic analysis will form the basis of 
testing for any change in the functioning of the 
markets. The relevant equation for the Granger- 
causality tests becomes 
in  which EC,., are the lagged residuals from the 
estimated long-run relationship in (17)". A test for 
Granger-causality over the entire period involves 
the rejection of the joint hypothesis (see (12)): 
If appropriate. testing over sub-periods separately 
is possible as well. The structural equation, to be 
used for the testing short-run integration, can be 
written as: 
which includes the present difference in prices in 
the reference market. appropriately interacted with 
the  different  dummies.  To  establish  the  bias 
involved in using OLS, it is again appropriate to 
run a Wu-test as described before with respect to 
the  present  difference  in  the  reference  market 
prices. 
After  estimating  equation  (20),  it  will  be 
possible to implement tests to establish any change 
in short-run integration. For each sub-period, it can 
be tested whether short-run integration  holds. In 
particular, adjusting (14), this test becomes for the 
first sub-period: 
while for the next two periods this becomes: 
and 
If stronger or new evidence can be found for short- 
run integration, this can be interpreted as statistical 
evidence for improved functioning of the markets, 
since the information will be transmitted faster. A 
further indicator of changed functioning of markets 
will be to look at any change in adjustment speed 
to errors,  as reflected  in  the parameters on the relevant error-correction terms. The closer to one, 
the faster errors relative to the long-run solution 
will be corrected, suggesting an improvement in 
arbitrage relative to periods of slower adjustment. 
Finally,  it  is  possible  to  test  in  this  short-run 
dynamic equation whether the long-run solutions 
implied by the cointegrating relationship are at all 
consistent with the evidence from  the short-run 
equation. The relevant restrictions to be tested for 
each sub-period are 
5. Results 
The methodology described above was applied to 
some of the most important grain  routes in  the 
country. The most important markets, in some way 
connected with the main consumer deficit area, 
Addis Ababa, have been considered. In all possible 
directions, some of the main towns along the roads 
going  to  Addis  Ababa  have  been  considered, 
corresponding directly to the radial structure of the 
market  as is often considered  in  the literature. 
Given the size of the Addis Ababa market, it would 
seem fully appropriate to use it as the reference 
market. In particular, the ten towns considered are 
Debre  Markos  (Gojam),  Kombolcha  (Wollo), 
Nazret, Ambo,  Wolliso, Hosaenna, Shashemene 
and  Debre Zeit (Shoa), Jimma (Keffa) and Dire 
Dawa  (Hararghe).  Debre  Zeit,  Debre  Markos, 
Shashemene and  Hosaenna are in  main surplus 
areas, Nazret is along the road from Arssi, another 
main surplus area. 
In the appendix all the econometric results are 
given. First, the order of integration of each series 
(data between July 1987 until September 1 99312). 
All level series are I(1) so that their differences are 
stationary (appendix table 1).  This allows us to 
proceed to the second step, the estimation and 
testing of cointegration between markets. Since we 
want to  be  able to distinguish  changes  both  in 
long-run and short-run relationships in the period 
up to liberalization, compared to the aftermath and 
also the  period  after the  take-over, a (general) 
cointegrating  regression  was  estimated  as 
described  in  equation  (17),  with  the  pre- 
liberalization period defined as between July 1987 
and February 1990, and the post-'peace' period as 
starting  in  June  1991.  Consequently,  the 
parameters a,  and a,  give the additional proportion 
of the Addis Ababa price being reflected in the 
particular market price. 
Table  6.3  shows  the  results.  Most  market 
prices are clearly cointegrated with Addis Ababa 
prices, rejecting the absence of cointegration at, at 
least, 5 percent. Three markets are problematic. 
For  Kombolcha,  the  absence  of  cointegration 
cannot be rejected at 5 percent using an Adjusted 
Dickey-Fuller test with four lags. Closer inspection 
of the result suggested that one lag was sufficient 
to avoid autocorrelation in the test-regression. An 
ADF-test with one lag implied that the absence of 
cointegration  could  be  rejected  at  5  percent. 
Kombolcha  was  therefore  retained  for  further 
analy~is'~.  Cointegration is more clearly rejected 
for Debre Markos, despite its location in a big 
surplus region, Gojam. Recall however that in this 
region  traders'  activity  until  the  liberalization 
period.  This  does  not  mean  that  long-run 
integration  was  restored  after  liberalization: 
cointegration tests on the sub-period starting from 
the date of liberalization did still not reject the 
absence  of  cointegration  at  5  percent.  Debre 
Markos was therefor? excluded from the rest of the 
analysis. Even in  the long-run, Debre Markos is 
not integrated with the Addis Ababa market14. The 
Jimma results suggest also no  integration at all, 
and was further excluded. Table 6.3.  Cointegrating Relationships 
Price, = CONSTANT + a ,.dummy,.R,  + az.dummyl.R,  + a,.dummy,.R, + e, 
with R, = price in reference market (Addis Ababa) 
dummy, = 1 from 7/87 until 2/90, then 0 
dummy, = 1 from 7/87 until 9/93 
dummy, = 1 from 6/91 until 9/93, before 0 
............ ADDIS ABABA ...........  cointegration test-statistics 
CONSTANT  ADDIS ABABA  Cointegration 1:est-statistics 
a1  a2  a3  DW  DF  ADF 
(4 lags) 
WOLLISO  7.54  0.0 1  0.68  0.05  ].I]**  -5.12**  -3.50* 
(0.76)  (0.33)  (8.09)  (1.98) 
DEBRE ZEIT  26.14  -0.03  0.7  0.05  1.50**  -6.34**  -3.54* 
(3.43)  (-1.80)  (11.31)  (2.63) 
NAZRET  37.52  -0.05  0.62  -0.00 1  1.14**  -  -3.65* 
(4.68)  (-2.97)  (9.09)  (-0.06)  5.09** 
JIMMA  69.3 1  0.03  0.12  0.1 1  0.44  -3.01  -2.27 
(5.39)  (0.9 1)  (1.07)  (3.60) 
AMBO  19.67  -0.07  0.65  0.05  1.12**  -5.17**  -3.21* 
(  1.82)  (-2.89)  (7.02)  (2.07) 
DEBRE MARKOS  40.16  -0.2 1  0.40  0.07  0.45  -3.08 -  3.44* 
(3.68)  (-8.46)  (4.3 1)  (2.63) 
DIRE DAWA  27.49  0.02  0.97  -0.0 1  1.13**  -5.18**  -3.65* 
(2.16)  (0.55)  (8.91)  (-0.34) 
KOMBOLCHA  17.58  -0.14  0.78  0.02  0.80*  -3.91*  -2.86 
(  1.92)  (-6.72)  (10.07)  (0.84) 
HOSEANNA  33.85  -0.12  0.43  0.07  1.60**  -5.42**  -5.83** 
(3.58)  (-5.45)  (5.39)  (3.18) 
SHASHEMENE  45.44  -0.10  0.48  0.08  1.21**  -5..34**  -5.00** 
(4.64  (-4.65)  (5.77)  (3.46) 
ZIWAY  24.09  -0.13  0.72  0.05  1.35**  -5..90**  -3.45* 
(2.49)  (-5.91)  (8.77)  (2.13) 
t-value in brackets 
** = absence of cointegration rejected at 1 % (DF and ADF only) 
Source for critical values cointegration tests: Engle and Yoo (1987) Even though no correct inference can be made 
in  the  cointegrating  regression,  a  further 
interpretation of the results can still be attempted. 
The estimates for a, and for the constant term have 
large  t-values,  lending  some  support  to  the 
constant-cum-proportional  marketing  margin 
specification.  The  estimates  for  a, and  a,  are 
broadly  consistent  with  expectationsL5.  Before 
liberalization, prices in 8 out of the 11 towns were 
a smaller  proportion  of the Addis Ababa price. 
implying in each case higher marketing margins. 
For some,  such  as Debre Markos,  Kombolcha, 
Ziway, Hosaenna and Shashemene, a, is -0.10 or 
more.  Liberalization  allowed  prices  in,  for 
example, Debre Markos and Hosaenna to increase 
by 37 percent and 17 percent respectively. After 
the  EPRDF take-over,  the  proportion  of  Addis 
Ababa prices passed on to each market price was 
roughly the same or less than 5 percent higher in 8 
out of 11 cases, suggesting no or little effect from 
the  peacei6. In  four  cases,  however,  (Jimma, 
Shashemene, Hosaenna, and Debre Markos), we 
can  observe  a  clear  decline  in  the  estimated 
margin, with a, equal to 0.07 to 0.1 1. Since Debre 
Markos, Shashemene and Hosaenna are close to 
surplus areas, peace may have had a positive effect 
on  prices  in  certain  surplus  regions  through  a 
reduced marketing margin: prices in Debre Markos 
and Hosaenna for example went up by  about 13 
percent. Since it is likely that at least some part of 
this  increase  was  passed  on  to producers,  it  is 
probable  that they have  been  important  gainers 
from the liberalization and the peace". 
An  autoregressive-distributed  lag  (ADL) 
model  with  four  lags  was  estimated  to check 
whether we should suspect a bias in the estimates 
in the cointegrating regression. The results are in 
table 2 in the appendix. In general, the long-run 
solutions obtained are consistent with the results of 
the cointegrating regressions. In some cases both 
the constant and the estimate for  a2  seem  to  be 
somewhat different (e.g. Debre Markos and Debre 
Zeit),  but  without  affecting  the  conclusions 
reached thus far". 
In  preparation  for  the  dynamic  analysis, 
equation (18) was estimated. The estimates were 
used  for  testing  Granger-causality  from  Addis 
Ababa prices to the other prices. The results are 
reported  in  appendix table 3.  As expected, the 
absence of Granger-causality could be rejected in 
virtually  all  cases.  In  two  cases,  Wolliso  and 
Kombolcha, the rejection is only possible at 12 and 
19  percent  respectively.  These  markets  are, 
however.  relatively  peripheral,  so  this  weak 
evidence  seemed  not  sufficient  to  drop  these 
markets from the rest of the analysis. In general, a 
flow of information from Addis Ababa to all the 
different markets seems acceptable, and therefore 
a specification with Addis Ababa as the reference 
market will be maintained. 
Next, the Wu-(Hausman)-test for endogeneity 
was  implemented  using  a  fitted  value  for  the 
difference in Addis Ababa prices, explained by two 
lags of the dependent variable and by two lags of 
the differences in prices for all the markets used in 
the  analysis  and  including  the  error-correction 
terms for each market
Lg. The auxiliary regression 
and the Wu-test statistics are reported in appendix 
tables 4 and 5. The error-correction terms were not 
significant in the auxiliary regression. Further, it 
turned out that the null of independence could not 
be rejected at 5 percent in  any of the equations, 
suggesting  that  OLS  would  not  result  in  an 
important bias in the estimations of the structural 
equations. 
Consequently, OLS was used to estimate the 
structural  equations  for  each  market,  using 
equation (20). Differences in prices in each market 
were  regressed  on  two  lags  of  the  dependent 
variable, present and up to two lags of changes in 
Addis Ababa prices, including different terms for 
the period up to liberalization and the period from 
the change  of  regime  in  1991  to measure any 
differences  in  the  dynamic  effects  of  price 
changes.  Finally,  error-correction  terms,  the 
residuals  of  the  cointegrating  regression,  are 
included, again with additional terms for the two 
sub-periods as above. Two lags were found to be 
sufficient to exclude diagnostic problems with the 
residuals. The specification is very general, and not 
surprisingly, many terms are not significant. The 
estimated equations are shown in the appendix in 
tables 7 (a,b, and c). 
One indicator for changes in the functioning of 
the markets would be changes in the adjustment 
speed to errors relative to the long-run relationship, 
given  by the coefficient on the error correction 
term. In two markets, Hosaenna and Dire Dawa, this coefficient is significantly different for each of 
the  sub-periods.  In  the  case  of  Hosaenna,  the 
findings do not imply a change in the adjustment 
speed, since in each sub-period the coefficient is as 
close to minus one as in the others (even though at 
different sides of minus one, so that the adjustment 
path is different but not necessarily the speed). The 
Dire  Dawa  results  suggest  a  lowar  adjustment 
speed  in  the post-take-over  period.  For all other 
markets,  adjustment  to  errors  in  long-run 
equilibrium has not changed at all. 
Next, short-run market integration was tested 
in  this  equation  for  each  sub-period,  as  was 
described in (24), (25) and (26). Important short- 
run  integration  changes  were  found  (table6.4). 
First,  only  Shashemene  and  Debre  Zeit  have 
consistently remained  integrated in the short run 
with  the  Addis  Ababa  market.  Short-run 
integration in this case means that changes in  the 
monthly average price in one market are reflected 
in the average price of the same month in the other 
market. Debre Zeit is the closest market to Addis 
Ababa, while Shashemene is the most important 
and vibrant market town in the South. From all the 
other towns. only Nazret. close to Debre Zeit, was 
also integrated in the short run with Addis Ababa. 
Of the remaining towns, in five towns (Wolliso, 
Ambo, Dire Dawa, Kombolcha. Ziway) short-run 
integration  was  obtained  after  libera~lization:  it 
could not be rejected at 5 percent, even though in 
Kombolcha and Ziway it could be rejected at 10 
percent.  In  Hosaenna.  the  return  to  peace  was 
instrumental to obtain short-run integration with 
Addis Ababa, while in Ziway short-run integration 
was now not rejected, even at 10 percent. In two 
markets,  Nazret  and  Dire  Dawa,  short-run 
integration was reversed after the EPRDF take- 
over. 
In appendix table 8, long-run integration tests 
are  reported.  They  test  the consistency  of  the 
cointegrating regressions with the long-run results 
implied in the short-run dynamics. In all but three 
cases the long-run relationships  implied are not 
rejected in the short-run equation. The exceptions 
are Dire Dawa before and after liberalization, and 
Table 6.4.  Short-run integration (F(6,58)) 










-=rejected at 10 percent 
*=rejected at 5 percent 
**=rejected at 1 percent 
Hosaenna after liberalization. Some of the short-  run and long-run results are surprising, and some 
63 tests were done on the robustness of the results. 
Tests on the residuals of the dynamic equations 
revealed no problems with the specification. The 
short- and long-run tests were also repeated in a 
model with up to 4 lags (instead of 2). None of the 
short-run  results  were  changed,  but  the 
inconsistency  in  the  Hosaenna  dynamic 
specification  did  not  show  up  in  the  long-run 
integration tests,  while for Dire  Dawa long-run 
integration was only rejected at I0 percent. This 
suggests that the long-run test results may not be 
cause for too much concern. 
The  short-run  test  results  show  that 
liberalization clearly improved the functioning of 
markets: an increasing number of markets became 
in the short-run linked to the price movements in 
Addis Ababa. For some markets, such Hosaenna, 
short-run integration was only achieved after the 
EPRDF take-over, suggesting a positive influence 
from the return to peace and security. 
Finally, both Dire Dawa and Nazret (on the 
main road linking Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa) 
showed  a  decline  in  short-run  integration  with 
Addis Ababa after the take-over. The former may 
be reflection of the temporary insecurities along 
that route, following the EPRDF take-over and the 
problems with another movement, the OLF, and 
more general bandit activity, which was reported 
there. The Navet result is more striking: giving its 
location,  a  clear  integration  with  Addis  Ababa 
would be expected. A close inspection of figure 1 
shows,  however,  that the Nazret prices  became 
during 1993 higher than the Addis Ababa prices, 
which suggests  a  reversal  of flows  relative  to 
Addis Ababa. A possible explanation may be that 
given  the  relative  low  prices  in  Addis  Ababa, 
traders activity  has switched during  1993  more 
towards Dire Dawa. The model is not designed to 
allow for this possibility and this may result in an 
apparent failure of short run integration tests
z0. 
6.  Conclusion 
This  paper  presented  means  of  analyzing  the 
consequences of liberalization and peace. Standard 
analysis focuses on static results of liberalization - 
levels  of  prices  and  margins  before  and  after 
reform. In this paper we extended and adjusted 
market integration analysis to allow conclusions 
about  the  functioning  of markets as well.  The 
analysis was applied to teff markets in Ethiopia. 
The quota-system  and  repression  of private 
trade have had important consequences on both the 
level  of prices  and  the functioning of markets. 
Liberalization has been successful in correcting the 
taxation  effects  through  increasing  prices, 
especially  in  the main producing areas, without 
raising  prices  in  the  main  consuming  areas. 
Liberalization also has had a positive effect on the 
functioning  of  markets:  five  markets  became 
integrated with Addis Ababa in the period after the 
policy change. 
The  fall  of  the  Mengistu  regime  has  had 
relatively little effect oz the level of prices, except 
for a temporary effect. The return to security may 
well  have  been  important  in  some  specific 
peripheral markets or in war-zones, in most of the 
country the effect on prices has not  been  very 
large. There were some exceptions: in at least three 
markets prices moved closer to the Addis Ababa 
prices after the take-over, and in one, Hosaenna, it 
allowed  a further  increase in  the integration of 
markets with the center, Addis Ababa. 
This does not mean that after reform and the 
end of civil war, all markets are well integrated. In 
particular, Debre Markos - the capital of Gojjam, 
a main cereals growing area - was not integrated in 
the  long-run with  Addis Ababa.  Using only the 
more recent data, no evidence could be found for 
integration with Addis Ababa either, even though 
prices  in  Debre  Markos  were  able  to  rise 
considerably following liberalization and peace. 
The  lack  of  integration  is  despite  increased 
security, a direct road connection (about 12 hours 
by truck maximum) and proper communications. 
Recall, however, that in Gojjam grain trade was 
banned for considerable time. The repression  of 
trade for more than a decade can seemingly not be 
resolved in a few years. The re-emergence of an 
effective number of grain traders seems a slow 
process;  traders  need  capital  and  skills  while 
experienced traders may well  have switched  to 
other profitable activities during the repression. 
Furthermore,  the  short-run  market  integration 
found for several  markets is  based on monthly 
data,  meaning that the gains  fr~m  arbitrage are 
eroded within one month, which is far longer than 
needed to pass on information on prices and to 
move grain. More refined data, on a weekly or 
daily basis may well show the failure of short-run integration across these markets.  run arbitrage fails to be  perfect is not addressed. 
The analysis is able to pick up changes in and  To reach strong policy conclusions, it is necessary 
problems with the relationships between markets.  to supplement this analysis with microeconomic 
However,  it  can  only  notice  these changes  or  studies of market structure and traders behavior. 
problems with trade routes. Why long-run or short- Notes 
1. This paper was started while I was a Visiting Lecturer at the Economics Department, Addis Ababa 
University. I am grateful to the staff at the department for facilitating the research. 
2. For an analysis of the evolution of grain marketing in Ethiopia, see Alemayehu Lirenso (1987) 
3. This famine has been identified by Sen (198 1) as resulting from a dramatic entitlement failure by 
peasants and pastoralists, even though this view is not without controversy (see e.g. Devereux (1988)). 
4  Examples of such studies are Bryceson (1992) or Santorum et al. (1992) on Tanzania. 
5. It should be stressed that Ravallion's approach is still a valid way of approaching the problem if prices 
are stationary. If not, it could not yet use the body of literature on testing long-run relationship in non- 
stationary series (cointegration), while if the model was estimated in levels non-stationarity could 
invalidate the inference. 
6. Some aspects of the modelling methodology have appeared in Alexander and Wyeth (1994), but in 
their attempt to 'simplify' the approach, several fundamental econometric mistakes (see for a discussion, 
Dercon (  1993)). 
7. Alternatively, the relationship could be specified in logarithms if this seems a more appropriate way of 
considering transport costs. 
8. Pesaran and Smith [I9901 discuss this type of orthogonality tests. Urbain [I9921  questions however 
the power of these tests in error-correction models. In particular, the outcome seems very sensitive to the 
specification of the auxiliary model. He takes up Engle and Granger's [I9871  suggestion to introduce the 
error-correction term from the model of interest (ie. with AP, as dependent variable) into the auxiliary 
regression for A&.  The significance of this term would suggest some feedback from P to R, and is likely 
to suggest a failure of weak-exogeneity of R relative to P. This may be the justification for the test 
suggested by Alexander and Wyeth [1994],  even though it is not a standard nor formal way of testing 
exogeneity. The appropriate route would then seem to be to introduce the error-correction term into the 
auxiliary regression and to combine a check of its significance with the standard Wu-test as suggested 
above. Note however that the tests remains indirect, since no direct and formal tests for exogeneity exist 
[Banerjee,  et al., 19931. 
9. The latter assumption is in fact not necessary in general: differences could also be found in the 
constant 6 between periods, and this extension is easily dealt with. In the actual empirical analysis, it was 
however found that these extra dummy-variables did not become significant in the long-run relationship, 
so the present specification is used in this section, simplifying the exposition. Some of the main 
anomalies in the results were re-checked using the more general specification, but it turned out that none 
of the conclusions reached were affected. 
10. This equation allows tests whether over the entire period a cointegrating relationship exists between 
the different price series, but with different values of a and 6 in the different sub-periods. If 
cointegration is rejected, then it would be appropriate to check whether there has been a change, for 
example after liberalization compared to before: cointegration may only have started afterwards. This 
tests cannot be nested in an estimated equation over the entire period, but will require to take the sub- 
periods separately. 11. Note the absence of interaction terms on lagged vaiues of AP. There is no reason to expect a change 
in which lagged prices within the same market location affect present prices after liberalization of the 
flows between markets. 
12. The analysis is in real prices defined as before. In this way we avoid apparent cointegration between 
series because of a common inflationary trend without any direct interdependence between thle markets. 
13. The limited significance of the tests for Kombolcha may be related to its location, just South of some 
of the most famine-vulnerable areas in the countries. Throughout the 1980s, and even later, large 
amounts of food aid were distributed in  Wollo. Kombolcha was one of the main storage points for NGO 
food aid. It is very likely that the food aid would have found its way through to the open markets, at least 
partially. This may well have resulted in distortions in the market for teff for considerable periods of 
time, affecting its market relations with Addis Ababa. The problems were not obviously caused by the 
specification. All the tests were repeated with dummies for each sub-period to allow for changes in the 
constant in (1  6). The absence of cointegration was again only rejected at 5 percent using the different 
tests, and the short-run integration tests gave similar results as the results described below. 
14.  Cointegration tests using the Debre Markos prices were also implemented allowing for changes in 
the constant in (1 6), and for sub-periods of the sample. Even for the period since the end of civil war, the 
absence of cointegration could not satisfactorily rejected. Even though the sample period becomes very 
short for cointegration testing (25 observations), long-run integration can still not be observed in the 
more recent periods, justifying the exclusion of Debre Markos for the short-run integration tests. 
15.  The interpretation of the coefficients in the cointegrating regressions needs some care. Recall that 
the marketing margin is defined as in equation (6): R,  - P,  = -6 + (1-a).&.  For all but one market (Dire 
Dawa), the margins with Addis Ababa are positive, so that a higher margin corresponds to a lower value 
for a. Margins are also a function of &.  The higher &, the higher a needs to be to keep the level of the 
margin the same. The latter may confuse the conclusions somewhat. In particular. the mean Addis Ababa 
price before liberalization was about 126 birr per quintal; after liberalization but before 'peace' 119 birr 
per quintal and afterwards 124 birr. Consequently, the same level of the margin before or after 
liberalization (or peace) would actually require a,  (or a,), given the estimated values for a?  to be (up to) 
+0.05 (or +0.04 for a,). In other words, to conclude safely that a lower long-run margin pertained before 
liberalization (or after peace), would require the estimated values of a,  (a,) to reach values well above 5 
percent (or 4 percent for a,). 
16. See the previous note. 
17. Given the failure of cointegration tests, the interpretation of the results for Debre Markos can only be 
suggestive. 
18. Also. little difference could be found between the residuals from the long-run solution to the ADL- 
model and those of the cointegrating regression. The dynamic analysis was later repeated with the 
estimated residuals from the ADL-model as the error-correction term, but, as expected. this did not affect 
any of the conclusions. 
19. Implicitly we therefore allowed that all markets are endogenous, but that all interaction between 
different markets will be happening through the Addis Ababa market. 
20.  This is not to say that the Nazret market has fulIy adjusted towards price movements in Dire Dawa. 
First, multivariate cointegration tests showed that adding Dire Dawa prices to cointegrating regression 
with Nazret prices explained by Addis Ababa prices, gave insignificant results for the Dire Dawa price terms. Also, a bivariate dynamic model was estimated with the change in Navet prices explained by the 
appropriate terms of Dire Dawa prices and an error correction term from a cointegrating regression of 
Nazret on Dire Dawa prices. This dynamic model had substantial explanatory power, but short run 
integration was rejected in all three sub-periods. If there has been a reversal of flows in which teff is 
moved from Nazret to Dire Dawa instead of to Addis Ababa, this does not (yet) imply that Nazret .-ad 
Dire Dawa are integrated in the short run.  Finally, the breakdown of short run integration between (~ddis 
Ababa and Nazret after the EPRDF take-over was also found to pre-date the reversal in the relative level 
of prices: short-run integration was also rejected in the period between the 'peace' and the end of May 
1993, before Nazret prices became higher than Addis Ababa prices. The conclusion is that some 
adjustment in flows is likely to be happening, but short-run arbitrage seems not to have been fully 
restored. For a systematic treatment of the spatial relationship between two markets with potentially 
reversing trade flows, see Dahlgran and Blank [1992]. Figure i Retail  price  White  Teff  Addis  Ababa 
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Table 1. Unit Root Tests for All Variables 












2. Differences (I(2) vs. I(1))  DW  DF  ADF (4 lags) 
OAddis Ababa  1.9  -7.895**  -4.959** 
ONazret  2.1  -8.51 1  **  -3.984** 
OWolliso  2.1  -8.621**  -4.650** 
OAmbo  2.5  -10.450**  -4.717** 
ODire Dawa  2.5  - 10.560**  -4.404** 
ODebre Markos  1.7  -7.270**  -3.970* * 
OKombolcha  1.7  -7.141**  -4.817** 
ODebre Zeit  2.3  -9.727**  -4.71 1 ** 
OHoseanna  2.4  -10.690**  -5.210** 
OShashemene  2.3  -9.873**  -5.625** 
OZiway  1.9  -8.4 17**  -4.662** 
** = rejecting H at 1 percent (in case of DF and ADF). Table 2. Long-run Solution to Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model 
(4 lags for dependent and independent variables) 
Price = Constant + a,.dummy,.R + a,.dummy,.R  + a,.dummy,.R 
with R = price in reference market (Addis Ababa) 
dummy, = 1 from 7/87 until 2/90, then 0 
dummy, = 1 from 7/87 until 9/93 
.  dummy, = 1 from 6/91 until 9/93, before 0 
Addis Ababa 
Constant  El  a?  Q3 
Wolliso  11.14 
-0.55 
Debre Zeit  51.19 
-2.95 
Nazret  34.03 
-2.56 
Ambo  34.3  1 
-1.14 
Debre Markos  8.42 
-0.27 
Dire Dawa  24.87  0.02  0.98  -0.03 
-0.95  (0.32)  (4.44)  (-0.55) 
Kom bolcha  48.87  -0.16  0.55  -0.00 
-1.38  (-3.08)  (1.91)  (-0.05) 
Hoseanna  52.6  -0.12  0.28  0.08 
-5.2 1  (-6.62)  (3.32)  (4.07) 
Shashemene  54.18  -0.13  0.42  0.07 
-5.58  (-7.19)  (5.17)  (3.44) 
Ziway  39.18  -0.15  0.60  0.04 
-3.05  (-6.70)  (5.55)  (1.88) Table 3. Granger-causality Test: Do Addis Ababa Prices Granger-cause Others? 
Wald test for linear restrictions (4 lags for dependent and independent variables) 
1. QWOLLISO: 
2. QDEBRE ZEIT: 
3. ONAZRET: 
4. OAMBO: 





- = significant at 10 % 
* = significant at 5 % 
** = significant at 1 % Table 4. Auxiliary Regression (for Wu-test of Endogeneity) 
Modelling OAA by OLS (1987 (10) to 1993 (9)) 
Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  PartRZ Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  PartRZ Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value  PartR2 
R2 = 0.962858  a =  5.56255 DW = 1.90 
* Some variables had to be excluded since singularity of matrix for inversion during estimation. Table 5. Endogeneity Tests 
(two lags for dependent and independent variables) 
First test: add fitted value for hAA from auxiliary regression, as well as hAA interacted with the 
dummy, (pre-liberalisation) and dummy, (post-peace). Test is joint significance of three tenns. 
Second test: add fitted value for hAA from auxiliary regression. Test is significance of this term. 
(All tests are Wald-tests for linear restrictions.) 
1. h  WOL:  (1) LinRes  F( 3,55) =  2.30 [0.09]- 
(2) LinRes  F( 1, 57) =  2.54 [O. 121 
2. hDZ:  (1) LinRes  F( 3,55) =  1.21  [0.31] 
(2) LinRes  F( 1, 57) =  2.50 [0.11] 
3. hNAZ:  (1) LinRes  F( 3, 55) =  0.79 [0.5 11 
(2) LinRes  F( 1, 57) =  0.5 1 [0.48] 
4. OAM:  (1) LinRes  F( 3, 55) =  1.36 [0.27] 
(2) LinRes  F( 1, 57) =  0.44 [0.5 11 
5. ODD:  (1) LinRes  F( 3,55)  =  0.5 1 [0.68] 
(2) LinRes  F( 1, 57) =  0.98 [0.33] 
6. hKO:  (1) LinRes  F( 3, 55) =  0.98 [0.41] 
(2) LinRes  F( 1, 57) =  0.1  1 [0.74] 
7. hHO:  (1) LinRes  F( 3, 55) =  0.30 [0.83] 
(2) LinRes  F( 1, 57) =  0.1 1 [0.75:1 
8. hSH:  (1) LinRes  F( 3, 55) =  0.47 [0.70] 
(2) LinRes  F( 1, 57) =  0.5 1  [0.48] 
9. OZI:  (1) LinRes  F( 3, 55) =  0.55 [0.65] 
(2) LinRes  F( 1,57)  =  1.12 10.291 
- = rejected at 10 % Table 6. Variable Names 
AA  = 
WOL  = 
DZ  = 
NAZ  = 
AM  = 
DM  = 
DD  = 
KO  = 
HO  = 
SH  = 












...p  ea = variable multiplied by dummy,,  implying variable zero except for period 6/91 until 9/93. 
...p  re = variable multiplied by dummy,, implying variable zero except for period 7/87 until 2/91. 
Res = residual from cointegrating relationship. Table 7. Short Run Dynamic Equations (1)-(3) 
EQ(1) Modelling AWOL by OLS 
The present sample is:  1987 (10) to 1993 (9) 
Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value 








A AA peace-2 
Res WOLPre-1  0.28122  0.29  169  0.964 
Res WOLPea-1  0.30637  0.367  0.835 
R2 = 0.477365  a = 6.84989  DW = 1.95 
EQ(2) Modelling ADZ by OLS 
The present sample is:  1987 (10) to 1993 (9) 
Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value 
ADZ-]  -0.2 1067  0.14732  -  1.43 
AAA 
A AA-  11 
AAAprelib 
AAApreli-1 
A AApeace  -0.1 1203  0.22638  -0.495 EQ(3) Modelling ANAZ by OLS 
The present sample is:  1987 (1 0) to 1993 (9) 
Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value 
ANAZ-1  0.1 1342  0.13345  0.85 
AAA 
AAA-I 
AAAprelib  -0.13838  0.20192  -0.685 
A AA peace  -0.013274  0.22  175  -0.06 
ResNAZpe-  1  -0.043357  0.37055  -0.1 17 
R2 = 0.408536  a = 5.24222  DW =  2.05 
EQ(4) Modelling AAM by OLS 
The present sample is:  1987 (10) to 1993 (9) 
Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value 









ResAMpre-  1  -0.033  189  0.2753  1  -0.121 
ResAM pea-  1  -0.06800  1  0.37507  -0.181 
R2 = 0.457627  a = 8.47496  DW = 1.98 EQ(5) Modelling ADD by OLS 
The present sample is:  1987 (1 0) to 1993 (9) 
Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value 
ADD-1  -0.0 1 1755  0.1371  -0.086 
ADD-2  -0.027053  0.1 1621  -0.233 
AAA  0.83479  0.26394  3.163 
AAA-1  -0.00 10809  0.29107  -0.004 
AAA-2  -0.47285  0.27607  -1.713 
AAAprelib  -0.39964  0.35857  -1.1  15 
AAApreli-1  -0.241 16  0.37289  -0.647 
AAApreli-2  0.25563  0.33462  0.764 
AAApeace  0.14771  0.44284  0.334 
AAApeace-1  0.057207  0.40933  0.14 
AAApeace-2  0.72371  0.41038  1.764 
ResDD-1  -  1.2867  0.48336  -2.662 
ResDDpre-1  0.61206  0.49873  1.227 
ResDDpea-1  0.93496  0.5201  1.798 
R2 = 0.498357  a = 8.97905  DW = 1.97 
EQ(6) Modelling AKO by OLS 
The present sample is:  1987 (10) to 1993 (9) 
Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value 
A KO-  1  0.1895  0.1465 1  1.293 
' A  KO-2  0.069 1 
A AA  0.48395 
AAA-I  0.07885 1 
AAA-2  0.069392 
AAAprelib  -0.19535 
~AApreli-1  -0.058647 
AAAprel i-2  -0.087047 
AAApeace  0.2482 
A AApeace- 1  -0.23279 
AAApeace-2  0.25593 
ResKOM-1  -0.61393 
ResKOMpr- 1  0.24363 
ResKOM pe-  1  0.054779 
R2 = 0.388707  a = 6.8  1589  DW = 1.95 EQ(7) Modelling AH0 by OLS 
The present sample is:  1987 (10) to 1993 (9) 
Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value 
AHO-1  0.26488  0.1351 1  1.96 1 
AAA  0.30788  0.20 145  1.528 
A AA peace  -0.0  19429  0.3097  -0.063 
EQ:~) Modelling ASH by OLS 
The present sample is:  1987 (10) to 1993 (9) 
Variable  Coefficient  ,,  Std.Error  t-value 
ASH-1  0.12985  0.12537  1.036 
ASH-2  0.048348  0.10656  0.454 
AAA  0.29797  0.16828  1.771 
A AA peace  0.15894  0.2807 1  0.566 EQ(9) Modelling AZI  by OLS 
The present sample is:  1987 (10) to 1993 (9) 
Variable  Coefficient  Std.Error  t-value 
AZI-1  0.25585  0.1247  2.052 
Az1-2  0.032221  0.10348  0.31 1 
AAA  0.43942  0.15388  2.856 
A AA  peace 
AAApeace-l Table 8. Long-run Integration (F(1,58)) 
(in model with hvo lags for dependent and independent variables) 
Addis Ababa to:  718 7-2/90  3190-519  1  619 1-7/93 
Wolliso  0.34  0.13  0.17 
Debre Zeit  0.42  2.58  1.18 
Nazret  0.43  0.58  0 
Dire Dawa  7.52**  2.92-  0.23 
Kom bolcha  0.4  0.03  0.58 
Hosaenna  0.22  5.4 1 *  0.02 
S hashemene  0.1 1  0.08  0.25 
Ziway  0.07  0.19  2.22 
*=rejected at 5 percent. 
**=rejected at 1  percent. Chapter 7 
Fiscal Aspects of the Transition from War to Peace: 
with Illustrations from Uganda and Ethiopia 
David Bevan and Sanjay Pradlian 
1. Introduction 
When a country emerges from a lengthy war, it is 
inevitable that the transition to a peacetime econ- 
omy  should  have  profound  budgetary  con- 
sequences. A number of African countries have 
embarked on this transition in recent years, and it 
is to be hoped that others will soon follow suit. In 
these  circumstances,  it  is  natural  to  enquire 
whether the  fiscal  challenges and  opportunities 
accompanying the transition have common  fea- 
tures,  and  whether  the experience  of countries 
which began the process relatively early may be 
useful in the formulation of policy in  the others. 
This  paper  considers  this  question,  using  the 
experiences of Uganda and Ethiopia to illustrate. 
Section 2 identifies a number of potentially sys- 
tematic features, and later sections look at these in 
more  detail.  Section  3  discusses  the  revenue 
characteristics  of  the  transition  and  Section  4 
considers expenditure  patterns.  Section  5  looks 
briefly at the impetus to decentralize, and Section 
6 concludes. 
2. Fiscal Characteristics of Transition 
In one sense the fiscal implications of the cessation 
of hostilities must be  benign. At the very least, 
there will be the possibility of a substantial redirec- 
tion of government spending from military to civil 
and,  hopefully,  socially  productive  purposes; 
alternatively, the resources can be released from 
public to private control, permitting a reduction in 
government financing. Unfortunately, it does not 
follow that there is a substantial "peace dividend" 
for distribution  in  the short run,  relative to the 
period  immediately  before  the  cease-fire.  The 
potential redirection or reduction is relative only to 
what would have been possible had the war contin- 
ued. 
To make the point clear, we may contrast two 
hypothetical  transitions. In the first, the country 
had been engaged in a long-running border dispute, 
had never lost control of territory, and had reached 
a military  stalemate and fiscal steady state. The 
war was costly but sustainable, and the end of it 
does release resources which can be slhifted into 
beneficial uses. In the second example, the country 
had  been  engaged  in  an  exhausting  civil  war. 
Neither of the warring factions had been able to 
maintain control of national territory, and the war 
led to the steady erosion of the country's infrastruc- 
ture,  its  productive base,  and  the government's 
revenue base. Eventually, the war became unsus- 
tainable as a result of economic and fiscal exhaus- 
tion,  and ended.  Since  it  would  not  have  been 
feasible to continue military spending at its previ- 
ous  inflated  level,  the end  of the war does not 
releases  resources  for civil  purposes.  Far  from 
there being any peace dividend in the conventional 
sense,  the  economic  and  fiscal  collapse  which 
accompanies  the  transition  may  mean  that  the 
government's resources are falling faster than its 
commitments.  Without  an  increase  in  external 
finance, the short run outlook for civil expendi- 
tures  would  then  be  contractionary  rather  than 
expansionary. Of course, these circumstances also 
offer the prospect  of accelerated  change  in  the 
medium or long run as the lost ground is recov- 
ered. 
While these two cases are stylized, they serve 
to demonstrate how very different the fiscal conse- 
quences of transition may be, depending on  the 
antecedent  circumstances.  The  overwhelming majority of military disputes in Africa involve civil 
war, so that very substantial damage to the infra- 
structure and to the economy in general is routine. 
Both Uganda and Ethiopia fall into this category. 
The immediate post war period is therefore charac- 
terized by unusually high expenditure requirements 
for  rehabilitation.  Whether  the  government's 
revenue base (relative to the inevitably diminished 
GDP) has also been damaged is more various; in 
Uganda, for example, it had been massively con- 
tracted for some time before the peace, while in 
Ethiopia it remained at a very high level. In conse- 
quence,  the  immediate  revenue  prospects  were 
quite different  in the two countries. In  Uganda, 
there was every reason to suppose that revenue 
effort could  usefully be increased, though it  re- 
mained unclear how fast revenue actually collected 
could be raised. In Ethiopia, the very high wartime 
collections reflected an unacceptably authoritarian 
approach,  rather  than  an  efficient  structure  of 
taxation. Domestic revenue would inevitably fall 
sharply in this case, prior to a probably slow and 
partial recovery as a reformed structure is put in 
place. 
Even the view that military expenditure must 
necessarily fall is mistaken. In a civil war, there 
are (at least) two armies; during the fighting, only 
one of these is on-budget. It may not be thought 
prudent immediately to release the defeated army 
because of the dangers of banditry or insurrection, 
and it may be felt necessary to reward the victori- 
ous guerilla contingents by regularizing them. In 
the short run, the new government may end  up 
financing two armies. To the extent that the mili- 
tary hardware was supplied off-budget by foreign 
governments, there may be little scope for major 
reductions in material military spending either. In 
consequence, the compressibility of the military 
budget  in  the short run may be quite limited or 
even perverse.  Both Ethiopia and Uganda, how- 
ever,  have  managed  to compress  their  military 
budgets to some extent, though the process took 
longer in  Uganda and resulted in  initially higher 
levels of spending. 
To summarize the argument, in African transi- 
tions there need not necessarily be any substantial, 
domestically generated peace dividend in the short 
run. Expenditure needs may be temporarily high 
and  revenue  temporarily  low.  The  real  peace 
dividend lies in the enhanced flow of aid which is 
typically triggered by the ending of hostilities. This 
carries with it three distinct fiscal complications. 
First. since the level of aid is typically very sub- 
stantial and  must  be expected  to decline in  the 
medium term, there is an important issue concern- 
ing  the  feasibility  of  substitution  of  domestic 
revenue andlor contraction of expenditure  in the 
medium term. Second.  since the aid necessarily 
accrues as foreign exchange, whereas the govern- 
ment's  rehabilitation  spending  could  well  be 
largely nontradable. the real exchange rate will be 
affected. Third, aid flows are subject to condition- 
ality and a  variety of release  procedures  which 
means the flow of revenue is volatile and unpre- 
dictable. These issues are not unique to economies 
undergoing war to peace transitions; indeed very 
similar circumstances arise in countries like Zam- 
bia where the trigger for serious increases in aid is 
the combination  of thoroughgoing political and 
economic reform. However, it is certainly likely to 
be a systematic and important feature of war to 
peace transitions.  Finally, one feature of enhanced 
aid flows in the transition is their potential role in 
providing a signal  of international donor confi- 
dence in the government's overall economic pro- 
gram.  Given uncertainty and apprehension in the 
aftermath of war, donors' effective underwriting of 
the economic program could become an important 
factor  in  allaying  some of  the  private  sector's 
hesitancy in making irreversible investments. 
The discussion so far has focused on a fairly 
narrow interpretation of fiscal impact; in effect, we 
have assumed that the underlying view of the role 
appropriate to the state is little changed. The war 
may have devastated  the economy,  it may have 
severely damaged the public capital stock, it may 
have eroded the institutions of government them- 
selves. In consequence, it may have distorted the 
shape and scale of government for a time, but in 
due course it is intended to revert to the original 
pattern.  This  is  a  perfectly  plausible  outcome, 
particularly when  the incumbent  government  is 
victorious. However, there is an alternative possi- 
bility, which is more likely when the government 
is overthrown, so that the peacetime administration 
marks a break from that which fought the war as 
government.  In  this case,  it  is  possible that the 
transition  will  be  more  thoroughgoing,  with  a 
general reconsideration of the purposes and mech- 
anisms of public activity. There are examples of both  types  of transition  in  Africa.  but  recently 
cases where the  incumbent  is  overthrown  have 
predominated; both Uganda and Ethiopia fall into 
this category. 
There are a number of reasons why an incom- 
ing administration may wish to break not only with 
selected policies but with the entire policy regime 
of its defeated predecessor. One follows naturally 
if  the  war  was  fought  partly  on  ideological 
grounds.  Curiously  enough, this does  not  well 
describe recent events in either Uganda or Ethio- 
pia. In both countries, a government of predomi- 
nantly socialist - or at least interventionist - lean- 
ings  was  defeated  by  forces  of  rather  similar 
economic outlook. While in both cases the transi- 
tion has been marked by a profound shift in the 
role  that  is  perceived  to be appropriate for the 
state, that was not a consequence in any profound 
way of the incoming government's prior economic 
philosophy. 
A second  reason  is that the policies of the 
defeated  regime  may  have  become  discredited, 
either by simple association, or more comprehen- 
sively as a contributory factor in the defeat. In this 
case extensive changes may be attractive, even in 
the  absence  of  any  ideological  commitment, 
simply because what went before is perceived not 
to have  worked.  In fact, substantial changes  in 
economic regime may have been inevitable even in 
the absence of the switch in political regime; the 
latter may simply permit the former to take place 
more rapidly and comprehensively. An interesting 
illustration  is  provided  by  Ethiopia; as already 
noted, the economic philosophy of the incoming 
regime differed little from that which had charac- 
terized  their  predecessors.  Indeed,  inexorable 
economic decline had persuaded those predeces- 
sors to adopt a substantial package of liberalizing 
reforms;  in  the first  months of the transition  it 
appeared possible that the new government might 
attempt to put the clock back, and refuse to main- 
tain the impetus to reform. In the event, this para- 
doxical outcome did not materialize. However, it 
is clear that important components in the economic 
policy switch predate the end of the war and the 
associated change of government. 
A  third reason,  not wholly  unrelated  to the 
second, is that the incoming regime typically has 
no experience of government, or experience of an 
unusual  kind,  for  example  that  obtained  when 
territorial gains are made but do not include the 
administrative institutions of government. In these 
circumstances, the leaders of a guerrilla army may 
have to undertake  at least a  limited delivery of 
public  services  outwith  the  usual  institutional 
channels.  Good  examples  of  this  process  are 
provided by the organs of the National Resistance 
Movement in Uganda, and by those of Ithe Eritrean 
People's Liberation Front which  had effectively 
barred the institutions of the Ethiopian government 
from operating in Eritrea for some years before the 
end of the war. These institutional improvisations 
may prove quite durable after the end of hostilities. 
First,  they  constitute  an  important  part  of  the 
apparatus which brought the new regime to power, 
may still provide a significant power base subse- 
quently,  and  may  also  engage  many  loyalties. 
Second,  they  may  be  perceived  to  have  been 
effective vehicles for the delivery of local services 
and other functions, and this against a background 
where the more routine institutions of government 
are perceived to have failed. These circumstances 
are calculated to induce a relatively experimental 
approach to institution building by the incoming 
regime. 
There is a fourth reason, linked to the second 
and third;  it is that ousting the previous regime 
required a coalition to be assembled,  of groups 
which had been previously excluded from power. 
This process is likely to bring into the successor 
regime ethnic and other groups which are suspi- 
cious of centralization. Indeed, in the limiting case, 
the war  may  have  been  fought  on  secessionist 
grounds. More generally, the transition  may in- 
volve a powerful impetus towards devolution. The 
secession of Eritrea is an example of the former 
extreme,  but  there  is  ample  evidence  in  both 
Uganda  and  the  remainder  of Ethiopia  of the 
strength of the latter. The circumstance in which a 
government is overthrown also means that the old 
constitution  is  effectively suspended;  while the 
new regime could in principle simply adopt the old 
constitution, in practice it typically does not. The 
actions of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia 
provide a case in  point, with an extended process 
of constitutional redefinition  still  under way as 
well as an accompanying redrafting of legislation. 
Finally, there is the fact that, for the reasons 
outlined  earlier, the successor  government will 
both  be  in  need of, and able  (conditionally)  to obtain. enhanced donor financing. The nature of 
the conditionality will vary only in minor respects, 
and will largely reflect the international commu- 
nity's current view of good  practice. This is not 
only understandable, it is in many respects admira- 
ble. However, conventional wisdom is itself some- 
what fickle, and not ideology free. When an in- 
coming government does not have a deeply en- 
trenched position in  respect of some public activ- 
ity, and is in need both of funds and guidance, it is 
not only vulnerable to external pressure,  it may 
even welcome some aspects of it. In these circum- 
stances, part of a policy shift may simply reflect an 
external agenda, whether this has been imposed or 
accepted by the domestic government. 
Several of these reasons tend to reinforce each 
other in  shaping the type of policy shift that oc- 
curs.  Since the ousted  regime was often  highly 
centralized, interventionist, and perceived to lack 
both  legitimacy and competence, and since the 
international  community  has  been  pressing  for 
liberalization and deregulation, there is a conver- 
gence of forces toward markets and away from 
controls;  toward  devolution  and  away from  the 
center; toward expenditure on social services and 
away  from  (non-infrastructural)  economic  ser- 
vices; and toward greater fiscal prudence. 
These various strands may be summarized, for 
a representative case, as follows. There need not 
necessarily be a real prospect of a domestic peace 
dividend  in  the  short  run;  on the contrary, the 
immediate prospect may be one of low or falling 
domestic  revenues  and  elevated  expenditure 
requirements.  A key issue is whether countries 
will be able to reduce their military budgets in the 
aftermath of war.  More significantly, there is the 
likelihood of a substantial temporary increase in 
aid.  The  success  in the expenditure  transition 
depends upon whether countries are able to make 
major  changes  in  ,public expenditure  patterns 
towards the civilian sector, and within the civilian 
sector, towards economic infrastructure and social 
spending.  However, the phasing of these shifts is 
uncertain, and the process may be slow. 
3. The Revenue Transition 
As the preceding discussion stressed, the revenue 
positions inherited by new regimes are extremely 
varied. Ethiopia and Uganda had very contrasting 
initial positions. both as regards explicit tax and 
non-tax revenue, and as regards the availability of 
seigniorage. 
Ethiopia  has had a remarkably varied fiscal 
history, culminating in the later years of the Derg 
in  a very high rate of resource extractior! by  the 
government, albeit with a still higher rate oi  public 
spending.  Since the overthrow  of the Derg in 
1991, there has been a substantial fall in  revenue 
collection. 
The data for the 1980s exhibit a number of 
striking features.(Bevan, 1992) Tax revenue itself 
was  not  unusually  high  by  African  standards, 
averaging 17 per cent of GDP over the decade, 
with  relatively little  trend. Non-tax revenue,  by 
contrast, was both substantial, and broadly rising, 
so that total revenue averaged 24 per cent over the 
decade (22 per cent in the first five years, 27 per 
cent in  the second).  This non-tax revenue was 
comprised largely of the residual surplus of public 
enterprises.  Despite the relatively high level of 
total revenue, it fell very substantially short of total 
expenditure, which climbed rapidly at the begin- 
ning of the  1980s, to settle thereafter at a fairly 
trendless  level around 39 per cent of GDP.  In 
consequence, the overall deficit between 198213 
and 1989190 only twice dipped below 10 per cent 
of GDP, and averaged 13 per cent.  A little over 
half of this was externally financed (7 per cent), 
with the domestically financed component being 
more or less entirely financed by bank borrowing. 
It has been a remarkable, and much discussed. 
feature of the Ethiopian economy that such a high 
rate of  monetization of the deficit  should  have 
been associated with so little inflation especially 
given  the  lack  of  real  growth.  The  Ethiopian 
government's record is often described as one of 
fiscal prudence, but this can only be justified by 
the fact that it  did  not engender a  high  rate of 
inflation. Approaching the matter from the other 
end, an overall deficit of 13% of GDP, half fi- 
nanced from the banking system, looks anything 
but prudent. The rapid monetary deepening that 
made this fiscal  stance consistent  with so little 
inflation  may  have  been  a  transitional  process 
leading to a permanent shift in the economy, or it 
may have been a temporary and reversible process 
which will be unwound in the near future.  How- 
ever, it seems inconceivable that this process of 
deepening could continue.  Equally, it is not feasi- ble for Ethiopia's  external debt to be much in- 
creased, except on the softest of terms.  In conse- 
quence, a  very  substantial  reduction  in  budget 
deficit had become a necessity towards the end of 
the war as a  matter  of financing imperatives if 
accelerating inflation or excessive debt service was 
to be avoided. 
Two further aspects of the inherited situation 
are important.  First, despite the very substantial 
scale of the fiscal intrusion into the economy that 
is revealed by these data, they significantly under- 
estimate the real weight of the government's fiscal 
operations.  In  particular,  the direct taxation  of 
agriculture  embodied  in  the reported figures  is 
only a small  part of the total, since there was 
heavy  implicit  taxation  via  compulsory  quotas 
levied on producers at artificially depressed prices 
as well as a  plethora of forced contributions in 
kind, in cash and in labor services. 
Secondly, and notwithstanding this substantial 
degree of under-reporting of fiscal impact, the data 
do make it clear that, by any conventional stan- 
dards, the Ethiopian government had become too 
big relative to the economy.  It would probably not 
have been feasible and would certainly not have 
been desirable to attempt to close the excessively 
large budget deficit by increasing revenue; the bulk 
of the adjustment  inevitably had to take place on 
the side of expenditure. (World Bank, 1990) Even 
if the present short run revenue problems are put to 
one side, the longer run perspective must be that 
the fiscal stance of the 1980s was unsustainable, 
and that  massive expenditure  reductions would 
relatively soon have become inevitable. 
To put the matter somewhat differently,  the 
direct fiscal costs of the war were being carried 
either  off-budget  (as  already  noted)  or  by  an 
unsustainable  increase  in  the  deficit.  Indeed, 
ostensible, on-budget  defense expenditure aver- 
aged a little under 10 per cent of GDP over 198012 
- 8718, compared to the average budget deficit over 
this period of a little under 12 per cent of GDP.  In 
consequence,  there  was virtually  no scope  for 
substituting peaceful government expenditure for 
the reduced military spending; in the absence of 
peace, any continuation of military expenditure at 
its previous level would have required both contin- 
ued (dejacto)  grants of equipment from the East- 
em bloc and a reduction in non-military spending. 
In this sense, the transition to peace did not so 
much provide a fiscal dividend as avert a fiscal 
catastrophe. 
In any event, the early part of the transition has 
been  accompanied  by  a sharp fall  in domestic 
revenue, from 25% of GDP in 1989190 to 20% in 
199019  1 and around 16% in 199  1/92. Of this, tax 
revenue amounts to barely 1 I%, down from around 
17%; this fall  partly reflects the operation of a 
relatively  primitive and as yet  somewhat  unre- 
formed  tax system  when  excessive coercion  is 
removed.  One feature  that  has  been much dis- 
cussed is the virtual disappearance of revenue from 
the explicit taxation of agriculture. This was partly 
due to the collapse of the institutions which acted 
as tax collectors,  partly to the fall in  the world 
coffee price and the increase in smuggling, partly 
to the relatively tenuous control which the central 
government  was  initially  able  to exert  in  the 
regions of agricultural surplus, and partly to the 
decentralizing thmst of its fiscal thinking. 
Non-tax revenue - mainly from state-owned 
enterprises  -  continued  to  provide  substantial 
resources to central government, though not at the 
previous  scale.  Similarly,  financing  from  the 
domestic banking system fell over the period from 
around 10% of GDP to less than 4%. Apart from a 
brief surge in  prices as the war came to a close, 
inflation  has remained low and the level of sei- 
gniorage revenue high. (For example, seigniorage 
of nearly 3% of GDP will be available if inflation 
remains at its current level of around  lo%, real 
growth is at the level assumed for planning pur- 
poses of 5.5%, and the main money to GDP ratios 
are stable.)  Finally, foreign financing has risen 
from  about 10% of GDP in  1989196) to 13% in 
1992193,  in each case very roughly evenly split 
between grants and loans. 
The aggregate fiscal experience of these four 
years, two before and two after the end of the war, 
may be summarized as follows. Domestic revenue 
fell by 8 percentage points, from 25% to 17%; total 
expenditure fell  by  12  percentage  points, from 
46% to 34%; in consequence the overall deficit 
narrowed from 21% to 17%. The contribution of 
foreign financing rose from 10% to 13%, and that 
of domestic financing (overwhelmingly from the 
banking system) fell from  11% to 4%. The  in- 
crease in external finance was therefore less than 
sufficient to match the much needed contraction in 
domestic  borrowing,  and  spending  had  to  fall Ethiopian  case,  defense  spending  grew  in  the 
initial years of the transition, reflecting problems 
in financial management and provision of uniforms 
and basic supplies for the victorious army.  In the 
first two years of the transition, defense spending 
grew by  40% per annum  in  real terms, (World 
Bank,  199 1  ) and its share grew to 46% of recurrent 
expenditures and 3% of GDP in  1987188.  How- 
ever, since attention began to focus on this growth, 
on the severe underfunding of the economic and 
social sectors, and the consequent  unsatisfactory 
provision of public services, the share of defense 
spending  has  been  reduced  substantially;  by 
1992193 it had fallen to 28% of recurrent expendi- 
tures and 1.5% of GDP (see Tables 7.4 and 7.5). 
The Government has also embarked upon a care- 
fully  designed  demobilization  program,  funded 
through external assistance.  At  the same time, 
reflecting  increased  concerns about  poor health 
and education indicators, the share of social sectors 
has  increased  from  27%  to  33%  of  recurrent 
expenditures. 
Overall,  the  increase  in  external  assistance 
combined  with  expenditure  restructuring  has 
permitted  Uganda  also to begin  the process  of 
redirecting expenditures towards priority sectors. 
A central feature of Uganda's expenditure transi- 
tion has been the emphasis placed upon and suc- 
cess achieved  in  the rehabilitation of  physical 
infrastructure.  War  inflicts  very  substantial 
damage to infrastructure, and its rehabilitation is 
vital  for  restoring economic  activity,  fostering 
market integration, and inducing the private sector 
to make irreversible investments.  Indeed, in the 
first few years of the transition, all major trunk 
roads in  Uganda were rehabilitated  and this has 
been a key factor in the revival of economic activ- 
ity and initial high levels of growth.  Given the 
constraints  on  domestic  resource  mobilization 
stressed  above,  external  financing  played  the 
dominant role in  this rehabilitation.  As the at- 
tached  map  of donor  participation  in  the road 
sector  indicates,  donors  effectively  carved  up 
major regions in Uganda as their principal domain 
of responsibility. 
In order to examine the economic implications 
of  this  infrastructure  rehabilitation,  a  detailed 
survey was canied out for all the major infrastruc- 
ture rehabilitation projects financed by each donor 
during the transition.  The results are summarized 
in  Table 7.7 which shows that donors financed 
85%  of  the  rehabilitation  costs.  The  potential 
concern  that  donor  financing  of  infrastructure 
rehabilitation may have a Dutch Disease impact 
was noted earlier. As it turns out, this problem may 
not materialize in the aftermath of war: given the 
collapse of the construction sector and the lack of 
availability of materials and equipment, the bulk of 
project  costs  consist  of imports,  mitigating the 
Dutch Disease impact.  As Table 7.7 shows, the 
average foreign exchange component of the infra- 
structure rehabilitation projects amounted to 85% 
of total costs!  Moreover, given the constraints on 
implementation capacity in the aftermath of war, 
there was a heavy reliance on importing manage- 
rial services and using foreign contractors. 
The contribution of the resulting infrastructure 
rehabilitation in  Uganda can be seen in the very 
high estimated economic rates of return,  which 
average close to 40%.  The value of infrastructure 
rehabilitation is also seen in the results of a 1990 
survey of rural households in Uganda conducted 
by Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa.  In this survey, 
respondents were asked to name the single biggest 
improvement  in  the area  brought  about  by  the 
government since 1985; 48% of the respondents 
listed improvements to the road network. 
While donor financing of infrastructure reha- 
bilitation  has made an important contribution,  it 
also highlights likely medium- to long-term prob- 
lems of sustainability.  Indeed, while the major 
trunk  roads  have  been  rehabilitated,  there  is a 
massive  maintenance  crisis  looming  over  the 
rehabilitated roads.  This will call for considerably 
enhanced  and  sustained  recurrent  expenditures, 
and will necessitate that over time domestic re- 
source mobilization substitute for external assis- 
tance. 
Another critical characteristic of a budget so 
dependent on external finance, particularly in the 
context of very low monetization, was discussed in 
the opening section of the paper. It is the poten- 
tially great vulnerability of macroeconomic stabil- 
ity to the vagaries of donor finance, in particular to 
relatively minor lags in the release of funds. The 
Ugandan  experience  of  199 1/92  illustrates  the 
point well. There was a shortfall in import support 
receipts early in the fiscal year, due to implementa- 
tion delays. Expenditure continued at programmed 
levels, before being cut back later in the year. The consequent deficit, which was financed through the 
domestic banking system, barely exceeded 1 % of 
GDP. Given the excess sensitivity noted earlier, 
this  small  monetary  shock  triggered  a  serious 
inflationary surge, at an annual rate of 70% (with 
the monthly rate reaching 10%). The response of 
the government to this unwelcome demonstration 
of the vulnerability  of its  program to relatively 
minor  aid  shocks  was  to adopt  monthly  cash 
budgeting. If the path of revenue is volatile, then 
the path  of expenditure  is made equally  so.  If 
properly executed, this system does indeed prevent 
unprogrammed deficits from materializing, but at 
the cost of a disruption in the delivery of services 
and in efficient public activity. Once again, there 
is nothing in this story which fixes it uniquely into 
the war peace framework; indeed, a more or less 
identical story could be told for Zambia. However, 
war peace transitions are more likely than most to 
be  characterized  by  the  combination  of  heavy 
external dependence and inflation sensitivity which 
makes this outcome likely. 
5. Decentralization 
While emergence from a war is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for an impetus towards 
decentralization, there is evidence for a strong link, 
at least when the incumbent regime loses a civil 
war. There is  certainly such an impetus in  both 
Ethiopia and Uganda, which appears to be partly 
rooted in the guerrilla origins of the resistance, and 
partly  a  response  to the  imperialistic  behavior 
attributed to the defeated center. By way of con- 
trast, there appears to be no decentralizing impetus 
of comparable strength  in  countries  undergoing 
thoroughgoing but  peaceful transitions,  such as 
Zambia. 
Ethiopia  has  a  long  history  of  centralized 
government, a feature carried over from the impe- 
rial period and maintained after the revolution. In 
consequence, political institutions outside of the 
center are rudimentary, and there is little adminis- 
trative experience or capacity at the regional and 
district level. This high degree of past centraliza- 
tion  is perceived  as being intimately  connected 
with a history of unsatisfactory and authoritarian 
government. (Eshetu Chole, 1992) There is now a 
song political commitment to create a substantial 
clegree of decentralization, and statements to this 
effect were among the first actions of the Transi- 
tional  Government.  While  it  would  have  been 
possible to pursue this aim by devolution of power 
within a unitary state. the present intention is to go 
further than this and adopt a federal constitution. 
Fourteen regions were declared in the transitional 
charter (subsequently reduced to ten) and a series 
of  proclamations have  been  issued  which  have 
progressively  defined  regional  policy.  Elected 
councils  are  now  in  place  in  all  regions.  Two 
complications with the new structure should be 
noted. First,  the regional boundaries have been 
determined to a great extent by ethnic rather than 
administrative or economic considerations. Conse- 
quently, they vary enormously in nature, size and 
viability, and will pose difficult challenges to the 
designers of the federal constitution. Particularly 
acute difficulties will be involved in the design of 
the revenue sharing arrangements. Second, the new 
regions have been inserted into an already existing 
local government structure, and it is far from clear 
how the various parts of the system will relate to 
each other. 
While the question of regionalisation is im- 
mensely pervasive and there have been a number 
of policy statements, it remains unclear what the 
net effects will be, not least in the fiscal sphere. 
(Bevan, 1993) It is very difficult to assess what the 
partition of revenue will be, either between center 
and regions in aggregate, or amongst the regions 
themselves. This partly reflects uncertainties over 
the eventual ownership of state assets, partly the 
absence to date of any public statement concerning 
the rules for partitioning joint revenues, and partly 
the  lack  of  a  comprehensive  fiscal  data  base. 
However, it appears inevitable that all the regions 
will require heavy subsidization, given the scale of 
the obligations devolved to them. This suggests 
that the central government not only possesses the 
means to maintain  macroeconomic control (via 
borrowing restrictions) but, informally, will have 
the bargaining power to control the composition of 
expenditure as well. 
There  have  also  been  extensive  statements 
setting out the powers and duties of central and 
regional governments. The most interesting feature 
of these atrangements is the dual accountability 
that is implicit in  them, with a  regional  bureau 
typically responsible both to the regional govern- 
ment of which it is an executive agency, and to the Ministry  which  formulated  the  policy  it  must 
implement.  This  construction  seems  certain  to 
cause  considerable  tension  both  between  the 
central and  regional  tiers and  within  each  tier, 
between  the executive and  budgetary  branches. 
Indeed  it  may  prove an  unworkable  hybrid  be- 
tween administrative decentralization and a more 
thoroughgoing federalism. 
The administrative aspects of the new arrange- 
ments are also far from  clear. There have been 
movements  of  personnel  between  central  and 
regional administrations, and  some  between  re- 
gions.  However, in  view of the general lack of 
capacity with which the regions started, most of 
them remain well short of being capable of execut- 
ing their new responsibilities.  So far it has been 
necessary for the central government to continue to 
fulfil  functions  which  have  theoretically  been 
devolved; in some ways, this may have postponed 
some of the potential efficiency losses. 
While in other respects the Ugandan transition 
is further advanced than that in Ethiopia, this is not 
true of its decentralization program. As in Ethio- 
pia, the eventual shape of the institutional arrange- 
ments and their fiscal consequences remain ob- 
scure. Two major differences are the more highly 
disaggregated structure in  Uganda (39 districts), 
and  what  appears  to  be  a  less  thoroughgoing 
degree of devolution. However, primary education 
and health are now the responsibility of the district 
councils, as of the Ethiopian  regions, and there 
seem to be similar ambiguities as regards the chain 
of command and the financing arrangements which 
will permit these responsibilities to be executed. In 
both countries, policy in this area is being made 
"on the hoof'. 
Drawing these various considerations together, 
what  can  be said about  the likely fiscal conse- 
quences of these developments? First, will decen- 
tralization  reduce the efficiency with which the 
rest of the transition is managed? The main danger 
here is probably the potential diversion of scarce 
political  and  administrative  resources.  So  far, 
though the relatively small cadre of policy makers 
in  both  countries  is  very  stretched,  there is  no 
evidence that the devolution issue has impacted 
adversely on other policy areas. 
Second, will expenditure rise as a consequence 
of duplication? In the long run, as in other coun- 
tries which have undertaken extensive devolution. 
this appears all too likely. However. in the short 
run. the sheer lack of appropriately qualified and 
experienced  personnel  should  prevent  this out- 
come,  always  provided  that  reasonabi.:  tight 
control of recruitment is maintained. 
Third, will the central government's c,\:ltrol of 
macroeconomic management be compromised? In 
the case of Uganda, the district budgets will appar- 
ently be considered within the central budgetary 
process, so there should be no additional problem. 
In  Ethiopia, the central government is likely de 
facto  to  retain  more  direct  control  of  general 
government outcomes than was intended, because 
of the practical difficulty of devolution in the short 
run; but the new arrangements appear in any case 
to give  adequate  control,  provided  that  proper 
budgeting  and  accounting  procedures  can  be 
operated. A serious danger in the medium run may 
be the difficulty of maintaining macroeconomic 
control in a federal system if many of the constitu- 
ent governments are incapable of producing accu- 
rate and timely management information. 
Fourth, will the central government be able to 
maintain control over the composition of public 
expenditure? Here again, the retention of central 
control over the national policy agenda should in 
theory  ensure  this.  The  two  caveats  are  first, 
whether the informational base will be adequate to 
permit effective control, second whether the new 
arrangements  are politically workable. In particu- 
lar, will the lower tier governments go on being 
content to accept policy from the center, and what 
action  will the center  be  prepared  to take if its 
policies are not implemented? 
6. Conclusion 
The  three  preceding sections  have  summarized 
aspects of the two countries' fiscal experience that 
bear  on  the  issues  raised  in  the  introduction. 
Despite  remarkably  different  initial  conditions, 
they provide ample evidence that while a reduction 
in military spending is feasible to some extent in 
the transition, it offers only limited possibilities of 
a peace dividend. The increased spending on social 
services and infrastructure that is certainly required 
must therefore be found by reducing other catego- 
ries of civil expenditure, which appears dificult to 
execute though  the  process  has  begun  in  each 
country, or by increased flows of aid, which appear easier to achieve.  There is an added.  important 
benefit from external assistance in the transition. 
Donor assistance. especially from the IMF and the 
World  Bank. effectively  underwrites the overall 
economic  program.  and  provides  an  important 
positive  signal  to  a  cautious  and  apprehensive 
private sector in the aftermath of war. 
One danger of going this route is that it may 
induce a  form  of Dutch Disease,  inhibiting  the 
structural recovery of the economy. This is most 
likely  if the government uses  import support to 
finance nontradable  activities. However, if it  is 
also liberalizing the economy. and correcting for 
an overvalued exchange rate, the effect may only 
be  to slow the reallocation of resources.  not to 
reverse it. In any case. the alternative is a radically 
smaller  level  of  government  activity,  which  is 
likely to constitute a still more serious brake on 
economic rehabilitation.  Moreover. to the extent 
that donor assistance has also been used to finance 
high return infrastructure  rehabilitation  projects, 
the bulk of which consists  of foreign exchange 
requirements, the Dutch Disease concern is likely 
to be mitigated. 
There are, however. three other problems with 
this dependence on aid. For one. the volatility and 
potential  inflationary  leverage  of  aid,  Uganda 
provides a cautionary note. For the other two, the 
jury is still out. Whether it will prove possible to 
substitute domestic  revenue for aid  rapidly and 
durably enough as aid tapers down, and whether 
governments can reacquire effective capacity for 
public service provision remains to be seen.  On a 
more positive note and despite these uncertainties, 
the difficult process of expenditure restructuring -- 
redirecting expenditures towards economic infra- 
structure and social spending -- has begun in both 
countries, although much more remains to be done. UGANDA 
Donor Financing for Road Rehabditatiomaintenance 
ADB 
1YE  UGANDA  CLASSIFIED  ROAD NEMBRK Table 7.1. Ethiopia: fiscal accounts 
(Oh of GDP) 
FYS7  FYSS  FY89  FY90  FY91  FY92  FY93  FY94 
Variables  act.  act.  act.  act.  act.  act.  prlm.  proj. 
Tax Revenue  18.4  19.6  19.1  17.4  15.5  11.3  12.2  16.1 
Non-tax Revenue  7.3  9.7  12.3  7.5  4.3  4.3  5.4  2.8 
Total Revenue  25.7  29.3  3  1.4  24.9  19.8  15.6  17.6  18.9 
Grants  2.8  5.4  6.4  3.7  3.5  3.3  5.8  9.5 
Revenue and Grants  28.5  34.7  37.8  28.6  23.3  18.9  23.4  28.4 
Recurrent Expenditures  23.0  28.9  3  1.0  34.0  27.4  22.5  22.1  22.5 
Capital Expenditure  12.1  12.3  15.6  11.2  8.9  6.7  12.2  15.2 
Total Expenditure  35.1  41.2  46.6  45.2  36.3  29.2  34.3  37.7 
Deficit before Grants  9.4  11.9  15.2  20.3  16.5  13.6  16.7  18.8 
Deficit after Grants  6.6  6.5  8.8  16.6  13.0  10.3  10.9  9.3 
Net External Financing  3.5  3.4  5.4  5.5  3.3  1.8  6.5  7.6 
Domestic Financing  3.1  3.1  3.4  11.1  9.7  8.5  4.4  1.7 
Sources: MOF Table 7.2. Ethiopia: Public Expenditures Budget 
(% of GDP) 
Variables  1987  1988  1989  1993  1994 
General Administration  3.12  2.88  2.82  3.18  3.19 
Defense  8.8 1  10.7  13.5  4.89  3.40 
Economic Infrastructure  0.58  0.52  0.43  0.53  0.6 1 
Education  3.27  3.12  3.13  3.96  3.87 
Health  1.04  1.01  0.99  1.33  1.46 
Other Economic Services  0.97  1.12  1.24  1.53  1.63 









Other Social Development 
Others 
Total 
111. Sector Budget 
Economic Infrastructure 
Health and Education 
Total 
Note: a pension, debt servicing, subsidies, safety net, and external assistance 
Sources: MOF Table 7.3.  Ethiopia-Composition of Public Expenditures 
FYI987  to FYI994 
A.  Recurrent Budget 
Sector 
1.  General Administration 
2.  Defense 
3.  Economic Infrastructure 
4.  Education 
5.  Health 
6.  Other economic services 
7.  Other social services 
8.  Others(1) 
TOTAL 
B.  Capital Budget 
1.  Economic Development 
2.  Economic Infrastructure 
3.  Health 
4.  Education 
5.  Other Social Development 
6.  Others 
TOTAL 
NOTE:  Figures in per cent of total.  For absolute expenditure levels see annex tables 2.1 A, 
and 2.1B. 
(1) These include pensions, debt servicing, subsidies, safety net. and external 
assistance. 
SOURCE:  Ministry of Finance Table 7.4.  Uganda--Composition of Recurrent Expenditures 
(% Recurrent Expenditures) 
UGANDA  1993194  1992193  199 1/92  199019 1  1989190  1988190 














'I Excludes Section 1 from the Ministry of Defense. Table 7.5.  Uganda--Recurrent Expenditures 
(% of GDP) 
1993194  1 992193  199 1192  199019 1  1 989190  1988189 
Budget  Actuals  Actuals  Actuals  Actuals  Actuals 
GDP at MP - U Sh millions  4,501,000  3,888,676  2,7 18,870  1,82 1,485  1,395,073  901,936 












TOTAL  7.1  %  5.4%  7.6%  5.6%  6.3%  5.7% 
Excludes Section 1 from the Ministry of Defense  , 'Pable 7.6.  llganda -Central Government Operations (As a % of CDP) 
Current Expenditure 
Repayment  1.8  2.2  1.7  I .O  1.3  1.5  2.0  3.2  4.6  3.2  2.7  2.0  **  ** 
Debt Relief  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.6  1.2  3.2  1.5  4.9  1.9  0.6  0.6  **  ** 
Domestic  2.8  3.1  2.2  3.4  2.0  1.5  -1.6  0.5  2.1  -0.6  -0.1  -0.8  **  tt 
Bank  -0.3  3.2  1.4  3.8  2.0  1.4  -1.4  0.2  1.9  -0.4  -0.3  -0.9  **  + 1. 
Non-Bank  3.1  -0.1  0.9  -0.3  0.0  0.1  -0.2  0.3  0.2  -0.2  0.3  0.1  **  ** 
Memorandum Item: 
Revenue and Grants  11.7  9.7  8.0  5.1  7.4  6.9  8.2  11.4  14.0  15.3  15.7  14.1  14.6  15.1 
Overall Deficit plus Grants  -2.1  -4.0  -3.3  -3.7  -3.9  -3.3  -4.3  -3.4  -7.4  -3.2  -3.3  -3.5  -2.8  -2.6 
Source:  Ministry of Finance, INF, and staff estimates Tablc 7.7.  Economic Characteristics of  Infrastructure  Projects  in  llgrrndn 
(blillion  of  USS) 
Project Name  TIME  'TC  FOREIGN  LOCAL  0I)A  COVER'T  I'A/CONSU~.T  ERR(%) 
WB: THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT\  84-87  74  58  16  5 8  16  7.12  58% 
WB:  FOURTH HIGI~WAY  PROJECT" 
UK:  ROAD MAINTENANCE  PROJECT^ 
UK: ROAD MAINTENANCE  PROJECT IID 
EC: NORTH CORRIDOR  ROAD I~IPROVEMENT  PROJECT 
EC: NORTH  CORRIDOR  ROAD IMPROVEMENT  PROJECT I1 
EC: KAMPALA-MASAKA ROAD A+B+C  PROJECT 
EC: KAMPALA-MASAKA ROAD D PROJEC~ 
EC: KABALE-RATUNA  PROJECT 
GERMANY: HIGHWAYS REHABILITATION  PROJECT 
GERMANY: HIGHWAYS REHABILITATION  PROJECT I1 
GERMANY: HIGHWAYS  REHABILITATION  OST-UGANDA PROJECI 
WB: RAILWAYS  PROJECT^^ 
WB: WATER &  SANITATION  PROJECT 














































A. REQLJIRE 400  MAN-~IONTH  CONSULTANT  SERVICES 
s.  REQUIRE  5 15 MAN-MONTH CONSULTANT SERVICES 
C.  WITH PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE US$0.05 MILI.ION 
D. WITH STAFF EMOLUMENT US$O. 12  LIII.LION 
E. REQUIRE 48  MAN-MONTH CONSULTANT SERVICES 
F. NEW UNITS WERE SET UPTOOPl?RATETllE  PROJECT SOCIAL SECTOR 
HEALTH RECOVERY 
EDUCATION IV 
STRUC-TLIRE  AWUS'I'MENT 
ECONOMIC  RECOVERY  I 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY H 
AGRICULTURE 
AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT 
Sour11  Wen  AGRICULTURE REHAHILITATION TABLE 7.9.  WORLD BANK PROJECTS UCASDA, 1984-1 989 
PROJECT SECTOR  # OF PROJECT  TC(MILLION  OF US)  % OF PROJECT  %  OF TC 
INFRASTRUCTURE  7  197.2  39  69.6 
SOCIAL  SECTOR  2  64.5  11  13.3 
STRUCTURE ADJUSTMENT  2  1  15.7  11  24 
AGRICULTURE  4  57.9  22  12 
INDUSTRY  1  I5  5.6  3.1 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE  2  3  3  11  6.8 
TOTAL  18  483.3  100  100 Chapter 8 
Economic Aspects of the Ethiopian Transition to Peace 
David Bevan 
1. Introduction 
The war in Ethiopia is usually regarded as having 
continued  for the thirty  years  from  September 
196  1, when the first armed engagement between 
the Government and the Eritrean Liberation Front 
took  place,  until the fall of the Dergue  in  May 
199 1, so that by any standards it was a lengthy and 
very  damaging  conflict.  However,  while  sheer 
duration is probably its most striking characteris- 
tic, there are three other features which are central 
to any  analysis  of  the  problems  posed  by  the 
transition to peace. 
First, there was really not one war, but a set of 
wars which took place in parallel: the Eritrean war 
lasted  for the full thirty years, while the others 
were of varying but shorter durations. For most of 
the period, there was fighting on more than one 
front: what was common to each of these subsid- 
iary  wars  was that  they (almost  invariably)  in- 
volved the Government as a participant, not that 
they involved a coordinated or cohesive opposi- 
tion.  The  intensity  of  fighting  shifted  between 
different fronts over time, as did the identity of the 
opposing groups in particular regions. This feature 
had two important consequences, one in splitting 
the Government's forces, dividing its attention and 
making  its  ultimate  failure  more  probable;  the 
other  in  reinforcing  the  centrifugal  tendencies 
which  were  in  any  case  likely  to  be  important 
during the peace. 
Second, the identity of the Government itself 
changed dramatically in the middle of the conflict 
(and arguably partly in  response to it), when the 
Emperor  was overthrown  in  the coup of  1974. 
While the ideological orientation of the govern- 
ment  and  many  of  its  policies  were  radically 
altered, the powerful centralizing thrust of govern- 
ment was unaffected. This had the consequence of 
delinking the objectives of the war(s) very largely 
from broader political or economic issues. 
Third.  prior to the lengthy set of wars under 
consideration here, the area presently covered by 
Ethiopia and Eritrea had seen a very long history 
of territorial conflict of a brutal and feudal kind, 
with armies of both sides living off the land and 
the victors being rewarded with grants of occupied 
land, coupled with the services of the occupiers. 
Since the prosecution of this traditionall type of war 
required any army to sequester the agrarian sur- 
plus, there was an alternative strategy to that of 
direct military engagement,  namely to pursue a 
scorched earth policy which denied the opposing 
army the means of sustenance. while incidentally 
inflicting great hardship on the civil population. 
These traditions were largely carried over into the 
more recent conflicts, which meant that the dam- 
age to productive activity was substantially greater 
than  would  necessarily have followed from the 
scale of the military actions themselves. Since the 
bulk of the action took place in the rural hinter- 
land, the consequences were particularly severe for 
the rural populations and for agricultural activity 
and development. 
While events have moved rapidly since the end 
of the war, not least in the secession of Eritrea, the 
transition is still at an early stage of a necessarily 
protracted process. The longer run characteristics 
of the successor states are uncertain, so that both 
the destination and the path toward it are difficult 
to discern. However the idiosyncratic features of 
the conflict itself are bound to loom large in any 
likely transition. First. the evolution of agriculture 
has been powerfully affected; provided the restora- 
tion  of  peace  is  accompanied  by  appropriate 
policies, there must be scope for a very substantial and extended growth in  production. Second. the 
defeat of a distant, predatory and highly central- 
ized  government  by  a subset of  a widely disaf- 
fected set of regions has pushed the likely succes- 
sor state (in  Ethiopia) towards a smaller. more 
devolved and possibly federalist political structure. 
Interestingly, Ethiopia  has escaped  one typical 
inheritance of so extensive and protracted a war, 
namely extreme macroeconomic imbalance result- 
ing  in  a  collapse in  confidence and  very  high 
inflation. 
This paper examines salient features of the 
Ethiopian  transition;  it  makes  reference to  the 
companion papers which discuss particular themes 
in  this transition, but does not summarize or para- 
phrase those discussions. It is structured as fol- 
lows. Sections 2,3 and 4 examine the issues raised 
in  the  preceding paragraph in  more detail, and 
trace the effects of the war and implications of 
peace for agriculture and the rural economy, for 
the macroeconomy and for the structures of gov- 
ernment  respectively.  Section  5  considers the 
possible responses of various agents to the changed 
situation further, and concludes. 
2. The Rural Economy 
According to the 1984 census, nearly 90 per cent 
of Ethiopia's population was then rural, the over- 
whelming majority of them peasants. Nomadic and 
semi-nomadic pastoralists accounted for only 10 
per cent of the population, though they ranged over 
60  per  cent  of  the  land  area,  and  non-peasant 
agricultural production (formerly private estates, 
later state farms) engaged only  1 or 2 per cent of 
the population (Clapham, 1988). Since more than 
three-quarters of all Ethiopians are peasants, the 
fortunes of the whole economy are necessarily 
heavily  dependent  on  what  happens  in  peasant 
agriculture. It is conceivable for a civil war to be 
conducted in a fashion that impacts relatively little 
on the peasant economy, or where the main impact 
is  to  restrict  the  access of  peasants  to  market 
interactions, leaving them free to substitute into 
relatively undisturbed subsistence activities. This 
was very far from being the pattern in Ethiopia. As 
noted in  the introduction, the government viewed 
the peasant population as central to the conduct of 
the war,  both as a source of resources for itself, 
and as a potential source of support and resources 
to the various insurgents. In consequence peasant 
agriculture was subject to massive interventions, 
both by means of taxes, levies and confiscation of 
produce, and by means of actions to destroy live- 
stock, standing crops and productive assets  These 
interventions were compounded after 197 - by  the 
revolutionary government's attempts to caryrr  out a 
sociaIist transformation of agriculture. While the 
original impetus for these policies is not attribut- 
able to the war, the energy with which they were 
pursued, and the shape they took, were profoundly 
influenced by it. 
The rural economy of Ethiopia, particularly in 
the Northern Highlands, is characterized by a very 
uneven degree of local self-sufficiency. In conse- 
quence inter-regional sales of grain from surplus to 
deficit areas, and migration of labor in  the con- 
verse  direction have  been  crucial  to sustaining 
adequate  consumption  in  normal  times and  in 
permitting survival in bad ones. The government 
did  not content itself with directly attacking the 
means of rural production, the producers and the 
product in  insurgent areas: it also acted to stifle 
markets and to prevent traditional migration. This 
was  achieved  both  by  legislation in  respect  of 
trading and  the  hiring of  labor,  and  by  direct 
military  means  such  as  bombing  markets  and 
vehicles. (Africa Watch, 1991). The effect predict- 
ably was to severely damage market integration, 
reduce  the  rural  economy's  capacity to  handle 
shocks and to create the conditions which turned 
the 1984 drought into a major human catastrophe. 
Closely  related  to the  war  itself and  to  its 
consequences are four sets of policies; land reform, 
agricultural marketing, resettlement and  villagis 
ation. Land reform was the central component in 
the revolutionary government's plans to transform 
rural agriculture and was instituted in  April 1975, 
six months or so after the fall of the Emperor. It 
abolished all existing forms of tenure, making all 
rural land the collective property of the Ethiopian 
people; restricted the maximum size of holding; 
prohibited the hiring of labor to work the land; and 
established  peasants'  associations,  whose  most 
important task  was the allocation of land,  both 
immediately after the reform and every two or 
three years thereafter. (Their other major role was 
to have been to induce  a move towards voluntary 
cooperativisation, but in  this they met with very 
restricted success). Given the complexity of the previous  tenure  systems and  the prevalence  of 
litigation they had induced, the reform was carried 
out remarkably successfully. In those areas under 
the government's control, (and these comprised by 
far the greater part of cultivated land) the reorgani- 
zation was rapid, effective and relatively complete 
(Clapham,  1988).  In  Eritrea and  Tigray only a 
proportion of households  was covered and  this 
varied  substantially with the territorial ebb and 
flow of the war. The identity of the gainers and 
losers and the size of the gains and losses also 
varied substantially across the country. Where the 
pre-revolution  peasants  had owned most of the 
land they worked, they had little to gain from the 
abolition of tenancy, and their plots were some- 
times smaller after the reform than they had been 
before: but in areas which had been taken over by 
settler landlords, as in much of the south. the bulk 
of the population had been tenants, wage laborers 
and landless. For them the gains were potentially 
substantial, either in obtaining access to adequately 
sized plots, or in being relieved of the exactions of 
the  pre-revolutionary  landlord  (this  relief  was 
frequently worth a quarter of the crop, sometimes - 
as in coffee-growing Kaffa - more like a half of it). 
Since  there  had  been  relatively  few  large 
private  estates  prior  to the  revolution,  and  the 
largest of these had been taken over intact as state 
farms, the reform did not increase the total land 
available  to  peasants  appreciably,  unlike  land 
reform  in some other countries.  In  addition, the 
very process which guaranteed peasants access to 
land in their own area denied them access to land 
elsewhere,  and  halted  the tradition  of  landless 
peasants migrating south in search of land. Cou- 
pled  with low  rates of pay on  state farms,  the 
prohibition on private hiring of agricultural labor, 
and restrictions on movements to the towns, these 
policies impeded the operation of factor markets 
just as those discussed earlier impeded the opera- 
tion of goods markets. In the context of a difficult 
climate and difficult  terrain, the impact was to lock 
peasants  into an  initial  configuration which  be- 
came progressively less adapted to circumstances. 
The  leaders  of  the  peasants'  associations  also 
became progressively more divorced  from their 
constituents, as the associations  became  instru- 
ments of central government, rather than agencies 
for self administration. 
In 1976 the Agricultural Marketing Coopera- 
tive was established, and its powers were consoli- 
dated  and extended  over the  following several 
years. While there was always a parallel system of 
private traders, their freedom of action  became 
steadily more circumscribed. They not only had to 
be licensed and operate subject to AMC restric- 
tions, which restricted grain movements between 
regions, but they had to deliver a  proportion of 
their purchases to the AMC at official (low) prices. 
This  proportion  was  raised  over  time  until  it 
covered all purchases in many cases. Meanwhile, 
a system of quotas was established in a hierarchi- 
cal arrangement running from the regional admin- 
istrations right down to the individual household, 
under the aegis of the peasants' association. The 
AMC was not in general able to achieve its quotas, 
but the  pressure  placed  on  peasants  was often 
intolerable, and led to them having to make pur- 
chases at the (substantially higher) open market 
price to meet their quota. The overall impact of 
these arrangements was twofold. First, they rein- 
stated the system whereby a large share of peasant 
production  reverted  to non-peasants.  However, 
these exactions were now universal, and not lim- 
ited as before to tenants; and in place of landlords, 
the beneficiaries were now the urban population, 
especially the inhabitants of Addis Ababa, and the 
army, or more generally the constituency favored 
by  the  government.  Second,  they  powerfully 
reinforced the impact of the other developments 
noted above in ensuring the progressive fragmenta- 
tion of Ethiopia into a set of insulated local mar- 
kets. 
What the policies had not achieved was any 
very  significant  growth  in  voluntary  co- 
operativisation. The government's response was to 
abandon the emphasis on voluntarism, and embark 
on a  program of villagisation. A major national 
campaign was operated between  1984 and 1990, 
but there had been prior experience, both in the 
south and in the north, of using villagisation as part 
of counter-insurgency operations (involving  the 
construction  of  fortified  "strategic  hamlets"). 
Remarkably, a very substantial proportion of the 
rural  population  was successfully villagised,  at 
least in the south, despite the very considerable 
initial costs of compliance and the very uncertain 
and generally negative long run consequences. The 
latter  include  increased  difficulties in  obtaining 
water and firewood, increased distances between dwelling and fields, and severe problems of live- 
stock management, which sometimes enforced the 
abandonment of traditional mixed farminglherding 
in  favor of wholly sedentary agriculture. These 
difficulties  were  exacerbated  by  the  strategic 
agenda in the program, which dictated that village 
locations should permit rapid access (often along 
roads constructed using compulsory labor levied 
from the villagers). Against this incomplete list of 
costs, it is dificult to set any clear benefits, at least 
for the peasants. From the government's perspec- 
tive, villagisation  may  well  have  increased the 
possibility of efficient extraction of the agricultural 
surplus, even if its main effect was to reduce the 
size of the surplus. The lack of violent resistance, 
particularly  in  the south,  possibly reflected the 
long  history (dating  back  to the  imperial cam- 
paigns of the nineteenth century) of severe repri- 
sals  if  the government's writ  were  not  closely 
followed. In any event, by 1988 the government 
was reporting that more than 12 million individu- 
als had been villagised, or fully half of the rural 
population in the areas it then controlled. 
The other major policy of moving peasants 
was the much longer range one of resettlement, 
largely from the north to the south. There has been 
much  debate about  the  motives,  necessity and 
consequences of this policy. In one perception, it 
was a device for moving the population away from 
the control of the insurgents; in another, it was an 
attempt to achieve the type of internal migration 
which would have taken place atomistically and 
automatically if land reform and related policies 
had not inhibited it; in another, related to the last, 
it was a necessary response to the emergence of 
sustained food deficits and environmental degrada- 
tion in the north. Whatever the rationale, there is 
no doubt that extensive coercion was involved in 
recruiting  individual settlers,  ranging  from  the 
conditional use of food aid, through quotas oper- 
ated by the peasant associations, to people being 
rounded up at gun-point. The whole exercise was 
very costly, both in  material and  human  terms, 
with very high mortality rates amongst the reset- 
tled (Africa Watch, 199  1). 
It was inevitable that this immensely disrup- 
tive  compound  of  policies  and  events  would 
severely  damage  the  functioning  of  the  rural 
economy, paralyse its capacity for adaptation, and 
greatly inhibit innovation and  investment. Land 
reform had not provided peasants with any guaran- 
tee of retained control of any specific piece of land 
(as opposed to rights to an allocation in the area). 
In consequence the incentive to undertake long 
term investments in  terracing, planting trees and 
the like was much weakened. Indeed, given the 
political  control  over  allocation, energetic im- 
provement  of  land  might  actually  shorten  the 
household's tenure of  it.  Far  from  encouraging 
investment, the system  was  better  designed  to 
induce asset stripping and  disinvestment. These 
effects were magnified by the asset losses occa- 
sioned  by  the war,  both directly from  military 
action, and in consequence of the famines, which 
forced massive slaughter and sales of  livestock, 
including ploughing oxen. The role of the state in 
inducing or making investment in the sector was 
directed at the state farms and producer coopera- 
tives which yielded very low returns. 
Given this background, even the  very  lack 
lustre performance exhibited by  peasant agricul- 
ture over the last decade or two is quite creditable. 
While yields did not increase, at least they did not 
fall, which could easily have been the consequence 
of SO sustained an "economic war" on the peas- 
antry. However, since the area under cultivation 
was also stationary - and probably had been since 
the 1960s (World Bank, 1990) - while the popula- 
tion was growing rapidly, per capita food produc- 
tion trended strongly downwards. This required 
increased food  imports with  no  increase in  the 
volume of export crops (and a sharp deterioration 
in  the terms of trade) to pay for them. In conse- 
quence,  there  was  a  growing  macroeconomic 
imbalance, as well as a deterioration in average 
nutritional adequacy and an increased vulnerability 
to adverse shocks. 
Partly  in  response to the evident failure of 
these policies, many of them were beginning to be 
abandoned or reversed, even prior to the fall of the 
Dergue. Liberalization of internal trade had been 
implemented systematically in the areas under the 
control of the EPRDF from 1989, and the Aovern- 
ment's  own  position  shifted decisively rn  1990. 
This shift was in one sense overtaken by events, 
with the defeat of the regime the following year, 
but since in  many respects the incoming govern- 
ment pursued a similar reforming trajectory to that 
belatedly initiated by the Dergue, there was more 
continuity in  economic than in  political matters from 1990. 
It  remains to consider the  likely impact of 
these reforms. Preliminary studies of agricultural 
supply response in Ethiopia (Soares, 1992) have 
estimated supply elasticities of the type usually 
found  in  such studies,  positive but  well  below 
unity. It can be argued that the most significant 
short run impact of liberalization is not to be found 
in aggregate supply changes, but in the reintegra- 
tion of the regional markets. Studies have found a 
marked reduction in the regional price dispersion 
for grain, and a reduction in  the average trading 
margin, consistent with prior expectation (Azam, 
1992; Dercon 1993). 
Other aspects of the transition are less satisfac- 
tory. Mile  much of the dismantling of institutions 
is inevitable and often desirable (as with the hated 
producer cooperatives), some institutions of value 
have been damaged too. For example, the service 
cooperatives  had  played  a  central  role  in  the 
distribution of inputs and provision of services to 
peasant farmers, and they, or similar successor 
agencies, will have a major and expanded role in 
the economic transformation of peasant agriculture 
which is vital to the longer run prospects of the 
Ethiopian economy. However, in the north, many 
of these cooperatives and their assets were effec- 
tively destroyed during the war, and most of those 
in the rest of the country were incapacitated soon 
after the fall of the Dergue. This was a result of the 
power vacuum which was created in most locali- 
ties,  and  the  consequent  uncertainties,  which 
permitted and encouraged asset stripping even of 
socially useful institutions (Kello, 1992). 
Most serious of all has been the refusal of the 
Transitional Government to resolve the issue of the 
ownership of rural land. The initial policy guide- 
lines made it clear that this would have to await a 
referendum  following the eventual transition to 
democratic  government.  If  anything,  this  has 
increased uncertainty about security of tenure and 
the appropriability of  the  returns to  individual 
investments. While the government has success- 
fully addressed some of the problems constraining 
short run recovery in the sector, it has not done so 
in  respect of this crucial constraint on  long run 
recovery and growth. Other requirements for the 
long run  are  in  hand,  but  inevitably some will 
require many years to achieve. A major example is 
the provision of adequate transport, where deregu- 
lation of the freight system and importation of new 
ve'hicles and  replacement parts can  be  achieved 
relatively quickly, but construction and rehabilita- 
tion  of  an  always  inadequate and  now  highly 
degraded rural road system cannot. 
It  seems clear  that there  is  scope for very 
substantial growth in agricultural output, if only 
because of the history of stagnation, low invest- 
ment and  lack of innovation. Since this lack of 
progressiveness is all too easily explained by the 
self-reinforcing  mix  of  warfare  and  perverse 
intervention, there need be  no inference that the 
Ethiopian  peasantry (who  are  in  any  case  ex- 
tremely  heterogeneous  both  ethnically  and  in 
agricultural practices) are constitutionally lacking 
in dynamism. However, advancing from such a 
low base. and with a history so inimical to initia- 
tive, it would be unreasonable to expect the growth 
to be very rapid. 
3. The Macroeconomy 
The  macroeconomic  evolution  of  Ethiopia  is 
notable  in  two ways. First, and  unsurprisingly, 
aggregate growth has been erratic and on average 
very  slow;  since  1974  per  capita  income  has 
declined  at  roughly  0.5  per  cent  per  annum. 
Though other sectors have grown more rapidly and 
consistently than agriculture, the latter is dominant 
and its poor performance has seriously retarded the 
whole economy. Second, severe macro imbalances 
emerged, but, surprisingly, these did not lead to 
rapid  inflation or to a rapid  depreciation of the 
parallel exchange rate. Inflation rarely exceeded 10 
per cent per annum, and the parallel rate depreci- 
ated against the dollar at an average annual rate of 
only 4 per cent over the entire 30 years of the war 
(Collier and Gunning, 1993). 
It  is clear that the budget was a major de- 
stabilising  influence  in  the  macroeconomy  for 
many  years  (Bevan, 1992,  1993a,  1993b). The 
interesting question is why this did not engender 
more  inflation than  it  did. The  rapid  monetary 
deepening that made this possible may have been 
a transitional process involving a permanent shift 
in  the private sector's behavior, or it  may  have 
been a temporary and reversible process which will 
be unwound in  the future. For this to have hap- 
pened,  events  in  the  1980s  must  have  had  an 
asymmetric  impact  on  savings  and  investment behavior, with investment becoming temporarily 
infeasible or unattractive to a much greater extent 
than was the case for savings. 
It  is extremely difficult to obtain a reliable 
picture of either investment or saving in the Ethio- 
pian case. Government capital formation figures 
are presently available only up to 1987/88, data on 
public enterprise are incomplete, and those on the 
private sector are more or less non-existent. How- 
ever, for what they are worth. the available figures 
suggest that in the mid  1980s, private investment 
accounted for only 2 percentage points out of a 
national investment total running at the low level 
of 14 per cent of GDP.  While this may well be an 
underestimate, it does imply an immensely inhib- 
ited  rate of provision for the hture. Since these 
figures are gross, it is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that the private sector was dis-investing in  real 
assets at a fairly rapid rate. This is not implausible, 
given the options available. These did not include 
real estate to any great extent, since it was forbid- 
den to own more than one modest house, and all 
land, both rural and urban, was vested in the state. 
Investment  in  productive  assets  was  rendered 
difficult or unattractive by  a number of factors; 
these included the war itself (a major concentration 
of industry had  been  located in  Eritrea), the im- 
mense difficulty of negotiating for a site, the labor 
and other codes which virtually prohibited flexible 
operation, the difficulty of obtaining inputs, and 
the  general.  hostility  of  government to  private 
enterprise. Taken together, these conditions must 
inevitably have greatly dampened the enthusiasm 
of potential investors. 
Private saving figures are probably even less 
reliable,  but  the observed  monetary deepening 
itself  suggests that  saving  held  up  better  than 
investment in  real assets, and whether or not there 
was  substantial  capita1 flight,  the domestically 
retained share was also substantial. This presum- 
ably means that even though the confidence was 
lacking for real investment in  the short run, there 
was  no  comparable  loss  of  confidence  in  the 
currency, or in the longer run possibilities. It was 
acceptable to go liquid in the domestic currency 
and wait on events (Since a sizeable share of these 
liquid funds were probably generated in  parallel 
exchange  dealings,  the option  of  capital flight 
would have been readily available, if desired). 
The macroeconomic inheritance of the incom- 
ing government comprised an economy in which 
growth of output had failed to match population 
growth  for  nearly  a  decade;  where  aggregate 
investment had probably fallen below replacement 
levels, and private investment all but disappeared; 
where private savings were very low and  public 
sector savings negligible; where the overall budget 
deficit was typically in  excess of 10 per cent of 
GDP,  and  substantially financed  by  borrowing 
from  domestic  banks;  where  there  was  severe 
import  compression  and  a  significantly over- 
valued  exchange rate.  As  remarked above, this 
catalogue of problems had  not yet engendered a 
runaway inflation, but the position was clearly not 
sustainable. After a period of hesitation, the new 
government devalued the currency (from 2.07 birr 
to the US dollar to 5 birr to the dollar). This did not 
set off the inflationary response which the govern- 
ment had  feared, since the domestic price level 
already reflected the scarcity of foreign exchmge. 
It also continued with the program of reform and 
market  liberalization  which  had  been  initiated 
belatedly by  its  predecessor.  This  program  in- 
cluded sweeping reforms of some aspects of the 
regulatory structure impeding  private  initiative, 
such as the labor code and grain marketing ar- 
rangements, and a statement of its intention gradu- 
ally to limit its role in productive economic activi- 
ties in favor of the private sector. 
While the end of the war saw a large reduction 
in  military expenditures, it also saw a collapse in 
revenues (Bevan, op. cit.). Even with the signifi- 
cant increase in aid inflows which has taken place, 
if domestic financing is to be held within prudent 
limits, it is only possible for total civil spending to 
be maintained at its war-time level, not increased. 
Whatever the long run implications of the end of 
the war may be,  there is certainly no short run 
fiscal peace dividend  in  the sense of  increased 
resources for the government's social and  eco- 
nomic activities. 
The  previous point  referred  to the  govern- 
ment's resourcing in terms of flows; it remains to 
consider whether there is  scope for temporarily 
relaxing the resource constraint by  selling assets 
and generating capital revenues. This is particu- 
larly attractive in a context where the end of war, 
and  the concomitant need  for wholesale recon- 
struction and rehabilitation, is combined with a 
transition from socialism, where the redefinition of the scope appropriate to the state includes a sub- 
stantial reduction in the type and quantity of assets 
it should hold. In Ethiopia, the state currently owns 
all land, both rural and urban; it also owns a high 
proportion of the urban housing stock. the bulk of 
the country's industrial assets, and a great deal of 
military  hardware,  in  addition  to the economic 
infrastructure which  is state owned, as in  most 
countries. Leaving the last category aside, there 
might appear to be extensive scope for realizing 
asset values, and generating revenue, while shift- 
ing to a more appropriate portfolio. Unfortunately, 
there are difficulties with each of these assets. 
It is essential that some redefinition of rural 
land rights be made to increase peasants' actual and 
perceived security of tenure and provide assurance 
that they will be able to appropriate the returns to 
their  own  efforts  and  investments.  In  general, 
much the simplest and most reliable way of achiev 
ing this is to vest ownership of small holdings in 
the peasants themselves. However, achieving this 
in Ethiopia would probably be a politically fraught, 
acrimonious and lengthy process, partly because it 
would  not  involve a return to a clearly defined 
original  position,  partly  because  of  the  large 
amount of involuntary locational shifting that has 
taken  place over the last 15 years.  In any case, 
vesting the land in peasants as poor as these is not 
3 mechanism for raising substantial cash revenues. 
If it were seriously intended to sell government 
owned rural land, rather than merely transfer title, 
then this would  have to  be to third  parties, and 
would re-create a class of landlords; it does not 
appear conceivable or desirable that the govern- 
ment should obtain capital revenue by auctioning 
re-created rental rights over peasants. For whatever 
reason, the government has refused to address the 
issue of ownership to date, so this is not on the 
agenda as a revenue device. 
The circumstances governing urban land are 
rather different; while land occupied by dwellings 
carries a similar political charge, and  may have 
somewhat similar properties to those just discussed 
(occupiers do not currently reimburse the state for 
the implicit rental; however they may still end up 
paying it if they are in the private sector), land for 
industrial  use does  not. While outright sales of 
freehold are not on the agenda, sales of long leases 
certainly  are. These  may generate  considerable 
revenues, depending on the strength and speed of 
the recovery in private investment. Since the land 
is now vested in the regional governments, not in 
the central  government, these revenues will  not 
accrue directly to the central budget. However, the 
regions are likely to be in receipt of grant aid from 
the center for the foreseeable future, so this may 
make little difference in practice. 
Sale of government owned housing is actively 
under consideration,  but  is unlikeb to generate 
substantial revenues in the short nln. Current rents 
are very much below market rates, the bulk of the 
occupiers have very low incomes (and many are 
not on the public sector payroll, so could not be 
compensated for rental rises), and could not afford 
to buy: sales would have to be at very deep dis- 
counts or to third parties, with the danger of subse- 
quent eviction.  Privatization of productive  para 
statals  is  also  in  process,  but  as elsewhere  in 
Africa, this will inevitably be a lengthy business, 
and will not yield large revenues in the short run. 
Finally,  sale  of  military  hardware  as scrap  is 
unlikely to generate large revenhes, and sale in 
working order raises difficult mcrral and political 
issues. 
All in all there are a range of political, social 
and  economic constraints  which  mean  that  the 
desirable switch in the government's portfolio is 
unlikely significantly to ameliorqte its resourcing 
constraints. Equally, it leaves the government with 
a  problem  if  success  in  creating  a  climate for 
private investment leads to a swkch out of liquid 
assets as private portfolios are switched into real 
assets. It must either create an attr~ctive  longer run 
government liability (which would also have the 
perverse effect of partially crowding out the pri- 
vate investment recovery) or run a domestic sur- 
plus to correct the domestic finanking balance. To 
the  extent that  it  can  engineer  rapid  economic 
growth, and/or an increase in the private propen- 
sity to save, these difficulties will be correspond- 
ingly reduced. 
In the longer run, the government should be 
able to engineer some recovery ih domestic reve- 
nue, partly by reform of the relatively antiquated 
tax system,  partly  as economic  recovery  shifts 
activity  into  a  more  tradable,  and  hence  more 
taxable,  configuration.  However,  the  share  of 
revenue  in  GDP will  not  recover  to the  levels 
reached under the previous regime, which involved 
a politically unacceptable and economically dam- aging degree of coercion. In the plausible circum- 
stance that donor preparedness to close the fiscal 
gap does not remain indefinitely at its present high 
level  (around  13  per  cent of GDP),  it  may  be 
difficult to maintain spending at its present level 
(around 34 per cent of GDP). While the present 
macroeconomic position appears to be comfortably 
under control, the medium term will require care- 
ful managpent. A tapering of aid inflows, cou- 
pled  with  a  sluggish  revenue  response  to  tax 
reforms and an unwillingness to grasp the nettle of 
expenditure control would lead to a rapid re-emer- 
gence of high domestic deficits in circumstances 
where they had ceased to be financeable. 
4. Government Structures 
Changes as momentous as those that have taken 
place in Ethiopia are bound to have major conse- 
quences  for  the  nature  of  government  and  its 
structures. This section focuses on three of these. 
Both the Dergue and the imperial regime which 
preceded  it  were highly  centralized  and  highly 
authoritarian; in addition, until almost the very end 
of its period in  power, the Dergue was strongly 
committed to a socialized scheme of ownership 
and control, and to a rejection of market processes. 
The military defeat of the Dergue, the nature of the 
coalition that defeated it, and the evident failure of 
its economic program jointly implied a revulsion 
from these three attributes. 
The unifying theme in the history of govern- 
ment in Ethiopia, running from Tewodros through 
Menelik and Selassie to Mengistu, was the attempt 
to create an ever more powerful centralized state, 
while imposing the progressive subordination of 
regional movements and nationalities. In the later 
years, this saw the government fighting a succes- 
sion of unwinnable wars, in ever more desperate 
attempts to enforce unitary control, in the face of 
endemic economic failure and in  the face of in- 
creasing alienation of the population, even in areas 
which  were  not  in  revolt.  Since  defeat  was 
achieved by forces from the periphery, and not by 
an insiders' coup, it never seemed likely that this 
centralizing thrust would be maintained after the 
fall of the Dergue; a more serious danger is that the 
whole Ethiopian state will unravel after the fashion 
of the USSR. 
It  is clear that  national  unity could  not  be 
imposed by force after the fall of the Dergue, and 
the EPRDF, in its new incarnation as the Transi- 
tional Government of Ethiopia, adopted a strategy 
of recognizing ethnic differences within a loosely 
defined federal structure. The secession of Eritrea 
was bitterly resented by those who still subscribed 
to the  concept  of an  inclusive  and centralized 
Ethiopian state, but attempting to block this seces- 
sion was never really an option for the EPRDF. 
Given its political base in Tigray, a small, poor and 
distant part of the country, and given that it had 
itself no secessionist aspirations, the EPRDF faced 
a problem. If Ethiopia could no longer be governed 
by military force, least of all from the periphery, it 
would be necessary to build some form of ruling 
coalition. However, this requires different skills 
from those appropriate to waging a guerilla war. 
Equally serious, if a coalition has to be forged 
out  of  the country's  different  nationalities  and 
regions, is the disparity between these. Tigray is in 
many respects atypical; it is coherent, with a strong 
sense of regional identity, and no serious problem 
of internal  minorities (it has not been subject to 
inward migration). It has been an integral part of 
Ethiopia from the beginning, aspires to a substan- 
tial degree of autonomy within it,  but stands to 
gain substantially from transfers from the center. 
Most of the other regions are much less clearly 
defined  both as to nature and as to interests; a 
process of sharpening this definition should logi- 
cally precede the process of coalition-building. In 
the meantime, it is extraordinarily difficult either 
to start negotiations, or to agree on a concrete form 
for the ensuing federal structure. 
There  has  been  a  great deal  of activity  on 
devolution, with proclamations defining (at least 
broadly) the physical boundaries and rights and 
responsibilities of the regional governments, and 
announcements of budgetary allocations. However, 
the real shape of the future structure, including 
how  truly federal  it  proves to  be,  remains  pro- 
foundly obscure (Bevan, 1993~).  On the resolution 
of this issue, much depends. It appears that there 
can be no going back to the old centralized pattern, 
but  what  has  replaced  it  is  still  evolving.  It is 
unclear  whether  this  evolution  will  settle  in  a 
configuration which permits a healthy federated 
Ethiopia to flourish; in one which is plagued with 
instability,  political  tension  and  unproductive 
ethnic rivalry; or whether the country will end up tearing itself apart with all the horrors of ethnic 
cleansing culminating in further secessions. 
It is also difficult to discern how complete a 
transition will be achieved from Ethiopia's authori- 
tarian tradition of government to a more respon- 
sive, democratic one. The original timetable within 
which the Transitional Government undertook to 
hold national elections has already been extended. 
While the scale and  urgency of the agenda for 
economic reform and the need for prior work on a 
new  constitution  make this  understandable,  the 
precedents of deferred elections elsewhere in the 
continent are not encouraging. Questions have also 
been  raised  about  the conduct  of the  regional 
elections, which have already  been  held.  While 
continuation of an Ethiopian state clearly requires 
that a viable form of power sharing be developed, 
there is no guarantee that this will be embodied in 
democratic processes. These issues should begin to 
be clarified in the very near future. 
Since the nature of the successor  regime  is 
unclear, so is the extent of future disengagement 
from  socialist  interventions.  The  retreat  from 
wholesale market intervention seems to be well 
established, and there does not appear to be any 
constituency for systematic reversion. However, 
while the liberalizing thrust of economic reforms 
may  be  secure,  attitudes  to the ownership and 
control of productive assets are much more ambig- 
uous. The unwillingness of government to contem- 
plate outright sales of land has already been dis- 
cussed. There is also a great deal of policy ambiva- 
lence on the relative roles of public and private 
sectors in production, with no unambiguous com- 
mitment to privatization.  Indeed,  the  TGE  has 
reserved a number of industrial activities to be the 
exclusive preserve of the state, on the ground that 
they are  "essential  for the development of the 
economy" (Eshetu  Chole,  1992).  On  the other 
hand, despite the large extent of the state-owned 
enterprise sector in Ethiopia, it has probably been 
less problematic than elsewhere on the continent. 
While the previous structure of incentives, price 
controls  and  protection  meant  that  they  were 
sometimes foreign exchange absorbing rather than 
foreign exchange generating, they were usually 
profitable, unlike the experience of many African 
countries  (World  Bank,  1985,  1989).  Indeed, 
Ethiopia has been remarkable in the region in its 
capacity  to maintain  a  high  level of managerial 
effectiveness in difficult circumstances. 
The direct efficiency costs of retaining a large 
public sector presence in productive activities need 
not, therefore, be high, but two aspects of it may 
prove more problematic. The first relates to the 
general  perceptions of the business community, 
who remain deeply skeptical of the government's 
willingness  to create  an  appropriately  enabling 
environment for their activities, and whose skepti- 
cism  is  reinforced  by  its intention to remain  a 
major player on the allegedly level playing field. 
The other danger is that current arrangements may 
encourage the regionalisation of public enterprise 
activity.  Regional  governments are likely to be 
short of revenue sources, and it will be tempting to 
utilize their control of industrial land to engage in 
extensive joint or sole enterprise activities using 
land both as a bargaining counter and as a potential 
barrier to competitive entry. Even if the successor 
regime in central government adopts a stance more 
committed  to private enterprise, it might not be 
able to ensure that this was pursued nationally. 
Whatever  the  balance  betw'een  public  and 
private  participation  may  be,  the  two  sectors 
jointly face a daunting challenge in mobilizing a 
very  large  and  substantially  unemployed  urban 
labor force (Mengistae, 1992). A survey conducted 
in  1990  implied that  half of the: younger urban 
adult  population  was then  unemployed,  and the 
situation will have worsened follbwing demobili- 
zation, since many ex-soldiers  remained  in the 
towns,  particularly  Addis  Ababa.  This  level  of 
unemployment, apart from being a potent source of 
poverty and its associated  misefy, is a potential 
source of political unrest. To date, however there 
has been relatively little sign of increased crime or 
banditry  following the end  of the  war and  the 
demobilization (Collier, 1993). 
5. Conclusion 
Amongst  the  many  unknowns  that  make  any 
present  assessment  of  Ethiopia's  prospects  so 
speculative the most  important are the ways in 
which different agents, both  public and  private, 
respond to the opportunities and challenges facing 
them, and to each others' actions. Circumstances 
now permit major beneficial shifts in behavior, but 
these require both that ingrained habits be broken 
and that individuals have some confidence in the stability and reliability of the new economic and 
political environment. Unfortunately governments, 
whether old ones proclaiming they have reformed, 
or new ones claiming they are different, have a 
serious credibility \problem  in announcing that the 
environment will in future be more supportive to 
private agents. The only reliable way of establish- 
ing  a  reputation is  to earn  it  in  execution,  by 
building  an  observable  track  record.  If  private 
agents reasonably decibe to defer irreversible and 
costly decisions, @d wait and see, the payoff to the 
new government strategy will certainly be post- 
poned, and\  may be aborted altogether. 
While there may be no short cut in  this pro- 
cess, it is certainly possible to prolong it, by  post- 
poning crucial choices, leaving major policy issues 
ambiguous,  and  generating  mistrust and  uncer- 
tainty. The Ethiopian authorities are in somewhat 
of a cleft stick; it has been mandatory that they 
orchestrate a major break with the past, and the 
choices  involved,  such  as  those  over  the  new 
constitution and the regions, require a great deal of 
time. Indeed, in some respects it would be  more 
appropriate  to  criticize  them  for  moving  too 
quickly rather than the converse. However, there 
are areas in which it would have been possible and 
desirable to have moved more quickly, and which 
have still not been resolved. One is the vexed issue 
of  finding  a  mechanism  for  ensuring adequate 
tenure of land; another is the need to demarcate 
very clearly the conditions under  which  private 
enterprise  may  operate  and  the  safeguards  on 
which it may rely, not least from incursions by the 
state. 
The speed with which the economy is able to 
emerge from its current state depends on releasing 
energies which have been dormant or directed into 
privately  but  not  socially  profitable  uses. One 
difficulty  is that, just as honing the skills required 
to win a guerilla war may be a poor preparation for 
government by  coalition, so the skills required to 
flourish in a set of black markets may not lay the 
foundation for successful productive entrepreneur- 
ship. In this case, private agents with liquidity may 
not be  best placed fruitfully to invest it, while the 
banking system has no experience of the type of 
intermediation required to resolve the difficulty. 
However, experience of the subsequent success of 
those who  made fortunes in  wartime elsewhere 
suggests that entrepreneurial skills may in fact be 
rather transferable between different activities. The 
problem,  as  indicated  earlier,  may  be  more  a 
matter of residual mistrust of government by  the 
business community, coupled with some genuine 
remaining "objective" difficulties in  thebway of 
private productive activity. Experience of  struc- 
tural adjustment in Africa provides a warning that 
private investment may take a very long time to 
recover, and it is difficult to know where to place 
Ethiopia in this context. On the one hand, the scale 
and depth of the intrusion by the state was extraor- 
dinarily great, so that suspicion and distrust might 
be more entrenched than elsewhere. On the other, 
the fall of the previous regime has been particu- 
larly decisive and irrevocable, and there does exist 
a substantial diaspora of successful emigre Ethio- 
pian  businessmen. In  consequence, the familiar 
gap  between  inexperienced  and  illiquid  local 
entrepreneurs and a reluctant international business 
community probably does not hold in the case of 
Ethiopia. 
Recovery in the rural economy is also subject 
to uncertainties. Apart from that associated with 
the climate itself, the most significant is the ques- 
tion of tenure. One complicating factor is that the 
resettlement and villagisation programs have left 
many farmers in  locations they are desperate to 
leave. There are other displaced persons in need of 
relocation,  notably  many  demobilized soldiers. 
Some relocation has taken place spontaneously, 
but the process is very far from complete. There is 
also  the  ruinous state of much  of the transport 
system. In these circumstances, the rate at which 
investment and innovation will occur is also highly 
uncertain. 
There are two  main  conclusions from  this 
discussion, neither surprising. First, while the main 
problems  and  opportunities facing Ethiopia are 
relatively  easy  to  characterize,  the  transitional 
process is at an early stage, and it is profoundly 
unclear how it will evolve. Second, the sheer scale 
of the damage, and the scope of the changes that 
are needed means that the adjustment horizon must 
be  very long indeed. Fortunately, the end of the 
war does not appear to have unleashed an unsus- 
tainable revolution in expectations, so that Ethio- 
pia may  be spared the intolerable political pres- 
sures under which some adjusting governments 
have to operate. Chapter 9 
Economic Aspects of the Ugandan Transition to Peace 
Paul Collier and Sanjay Pradhan 
1.  Introduction: The Economic Meaning of 'War' 
This paper applies aspects of the analytic papers 
developed in the study to the case of the Ugandan 
civil war and the subsequent recovery. Section 2 
considers the macroeconomy and some sectoral 
disaggregation. Sections 3 and 4 consider private 
and government behavior respectively. Section 5 
considers the third  important actor, namely the 
donors.  First,  however,  I discuss the economic 
meaning of the Ugandan war. 
Whereas international wars can invariably be 
precisely dated, civil wars are less precise. Here I 
will date the start of the war to 1972, the time of 
the declaration by  the Amingovernment of 'Eco- 
nomic  War'  on  its  Asian  community  and  the 
resulting expulsion of that community. Civil war 
subsequently engulfed far larger groups than the 
Asian community: during the Amin era (  1972-79) 
up to 500,000 Ugandans died as a result of the 
regime. Exiles in Tanzania mounted two invasion 
attempts,  the  latter  in  1979  being  successful. 
Whereas the 1979 campaign was short and deci- 
sive, the first part of the 1980s was one of extreme 
military  instability  as  successive  governments 
gradually  lost  control  of  territory to  insurgent 
forces. By 1985 some 7% of the population was 
displaced or refugees. In  January  1986 the Na- 
tional Resistance Army gained control of Kampala 
and secured more complete territorial control the 
following year, this marking the start of the return 
to peace. Just as the Asian community was the first 
to be embroiled in the war, it has been among the 
last to be incorporated in the peace. The return of 
confiscated assets is still in  process, and to date 
only a small proportion of the community and 
those assets which  it  expatriated have  returned 
despite strenuous efforts on the part of the NRM 
government. In addition to the slow  process of 
Asian repatriation, Northern Uganda has not yet 
been  entirely  integrated  into  the  present  civil 
society. 
Once a government declares 'economic war' on 
a part of its population, it  abandons the central 
economic functions of government: the provision 
of  impartial arbitration, protection and contract 
enforcement. While some of these functions can in 
principle be provided privately, in  Uganda as in 
most societies, the state had reserved to itself the 
monopoly of supply and so the sudden cessation of 
state provision could not be met from alternative 
sources. Hence, a defining economic feature of the 
Ugandan civil war was that public officials, mili- 
tary personnel and private agents were to a consid- 
erable extent able to behave outside due process of 
law.  This  extended  beyond  the  expropriations 
suffered  by  Asian  entrepreneurs.  Many  of  the 
Asian businesses were acquired in  a rather con- 
fused and ad hoc manner by soldiers, ministers and 
other members of the political elite. There was 
generally de facto control but not the acquisition of 
good title, giving rise to insecurity of tenure and 
non-marketability  of  the  enterprises.  In  these 
circumstances there was a tendency for those who 
currently controlled the enterprise to strip it of its 
assets. 
The economic consequences of civil war in 
Uganda  are  not,  therefore, primarily  related  to 
military expenditure and material destruction, they 
are about the removal of legitimate authority. It is 
this which makes the economic consequences of 
civil war quite different from those of a conven- 
tional international war: civil war removes legiti- 
mate authority. Consequently, the restoration of 
'economic peace' is not the automatic corollary of military victory, it is the reconstruction of systems 
of legitimacy. 
The longer a society stays in  a state of civil 
war the more do conventions of legitimate conduct 
decay. In  this sense, the period  1972-86 was a 
fairly continuous descent from civil society, while 
the post- 1986 period is better conceptualized not as 
post-war material reconstruction but as the gradual 
re- emergence of the institutions and conventions 
of civil society. 1971 marks the last full year of 
peace, 1986 marks the nadir of economic civil war, 
and  1986-93 marks the period of a graduai and 
partial return to economic peace. 
2.  Aggregate  Consequences  of  War  and 
Peace: Production, Expenditure and Their 
Composition 
I begin by describing the salient changes in  the 
levei and composition of production and expendi- 
ture during and after the war. I then introduce a 
disaggregation which attempts to rank activities by 
their vulnerability to war. 
Between 1971 and  1986  GDP  declined  by 
13  %  . Since fertility far exceeded mortality, this is 
an amazing scale of  contraction. For example, a 
normal  slow-growing  African economy  would 
have expanded by around 3.5% p.a. during this 
period. Had the Ugandan economy grown at this 
rate  it  would have been double  its actual 1986 
size.  To  a  small  extent  the  decline  in  output 
relative to this counterfactual is due to endogenous 
losses  of  the  laborforce  through  emigration. 
Although only a  small  proportion of  the labor 
force left Uganda, this was disproportionately the 
most productive. The expelled Asian community 
was highly skilled, and the Arnin regime systemat- 
ically targeted the educated. Hence, not only did 
these groups have the best earning opportunities 
abroad, they had pressing reasons to leave. How- 
ever, a decline on this scale must predominantly 
be explained by a reduction in the productivity of 
a given stock of labor. This was partly a matter of 
reduced  productivity in  all  sectors,  and  partly 
reallocation between sectors to those with initially 
lower returns. With the return to peace post-1986, 
some  of  this  output  loss  has  been  recovered. 
Between 1986 and 1992 GDP has grown by 37%. 
Although above the growth rate for the region, the 
economy  is  still  far  short  of  1971  per  capita 
production. In the first two years of peace there 
was rapid growth of over 8% p.a., but this was 
followed  by  four  years  in  which  growth  was 
modest. Only in  1992/93 did growth recwer. It 
may be that peace delivers some readily rctliizable 
economic gains, but that sustained rapid recovery 
depends  upon  the  restoration  of  prl-,*qte  sector 
confidence wnich in Uganda is only r  w happen- 
ing. 
During the war the decline in per capita GDE 
exceeded that in GDP. This was for both exoge- 
nous and endogenous reasons. Exogenously, the 
terms  of  trade  deteriorated  though  with  major 
fluctuations. Endogenously, the disproportionate 
decline  in  the  export  sector  (discussed  below) 
reduced the real income of the economy,  being 
equivalent in terms of  income loss to the introduc- 
tion of severe trade restrictions. A second endoge- 
nous income loss was the decline in aid. Neither 
the Amin regime nor its successors  were very 
attractive to donors and had little appeal to com- 
mercial banks. Hence,  relative to need, Uganda 
was  considerably  underborrowed  by  1986.  In- 
deed, during the first half of the 1980s the balance 
of official merchandise trade was approximately 
zero. Further, as argued below in our analysis of 
private  response, there is likely to  have been a 
private capital outflow.  There were thus three 
endogenous reasons why expenditure relative to 
GDP was lower than in the counterfactual. Post- 
1986 there was a more rapid reversion in aggre- 
gate expenditure than  in aggregate  production. 
First, the shift of  resources back into the tradable 
sector  produced  a  trade-liberalization  effect, 
enhancing real income for a given level of  pro- 
duction. 
Secondly, there was a resumption of aid flows 
on a large and conceivably unsustainable scale. 
This seems to be a common pattern in war-peace 
transitions, for exarr,ple in the first three post-war 
years  Zimbabwe  was  able  to  run  a  payments 
deficit approaching ten percent of GDP. Thirdly, 
there was some repatriation of private capital. In 
1992  private  capital  inflows  totalled  $200m. 
Offsetting these endogenous gains there was an 
exogenous loss due to the collapse in the world 
coffee  price.  The  resulting  collapse  in  export 
earnings is temporary in that the coffee price will 
probably recover somewhat from its historic low, and  the  Ugandan  economy  will  diversify  its 
exports away from the extraordinary dependence 
upon coffee which was a by-product of  the war, 
however, during the post- 1986 period the endog- 
enous gain was approximately offset by the exoge- 
nous loss. 
The severe decline in the size of the economy 
was  accentuated by  a  change in  its  shape,  re- 
sources moving to less productive activities. Table 
9.1 depicts the change in the composition of GDP 
during the period. The Table is organized around 
the  concept of  transactions costs  pioneered by 
North (1992). There are two broad mechanisms 
by which civil war changes the composition of an 
economy. First, directly productive activities vary 
in their vulnerability to civil war according to two 
characteristics:  transactions-intensity and  asset- 
intensity.  Transactions  depend,  to  a  varying 
degree upon the institutions of civil society, but at 
a minimum expose the transactors to a degree of 
visibility  and  potential  predation.  Assets  are 
vulnerable  because  their  continued  possession 
depends upon defensible property rights which are 
eroded by  civil war.  Because activities vary  in 
these  two  intensities,  civil  war  changes  their 
relative cost and so shifts resources between them. 
The second mechanism by which the composition 
of  activity is changed is  that some other sectors 
supply either transactions services or assets to the 
directly productive sectors and these face a col- 
lapse in demand. 
Table 9.1.  The Composition of GDP by War-Vulnerability 
(% share of GDP) 
at 1987 constant prices 
Manufacturing 
Marketed agric 





Livestock (inc sub) 
Construction 
Note: The National Accounts provide data at 1987 prices for 1981-92. The 1971 data has been put onto 
an approximation of 1987 prices as follows. Both 1971 and 1981 data are available at constant 1966 prices. 
The estimated share of sector i in GDP in 1971 at 1987 prices is then its share at 1966 prices multiplied 
by (share of i in 1981 at 1987 priceslshare of i in 1981 at 1966 prices). Table 9.2.  Index of Components of GDP  by War-Vulnerability 
(index, 1972 =  100) 
value-added at 1966 prices, 197  1-86 
at 1991 prices, 1986-92 
Manufacturing  100  37  73 
Export crops  100  (75  88 
Marketed food  100  {  97 
Subsistence  100  100  127 
Transport  100  85  113 
Commerce  100  58  86 
Livestock (inc sub) 
Construction  100  45  96 
Memo 
GDP  100  87  119 
Government  100  166  198 
Four sectors might  be  distinguished as  'di- 
rectly  productive',  but  having  very  different 
degrees of  vulnerability to  war:  manufacturing, 
export crops, marketed food production, and the 
subsistence economy. Of  these four sectors it  is 
evident that the subsistence economy is the least 
transaction- intensive. However, it is still exposed 
to  war.  First,  it  is  still to  an extent dependent 
upon transactions, since it is only 'subsistence' in 
the sense that  its  output  is  not  sold, whereas it 
depends  upon  purchased  inputs.  Secondly,  it 
depends upon assets some of  which are acutely 
vulnerable to war, namely stores of seed grain. A 
hungry army will attempt to asset-strip subsistence 
agriculture.  These  two  negative  effects  may 
explain  why,  although  the  subsistence  sector 
gained very considerably relative to other sectors, 
its total output  was  no  higher  in  1986 than  in 
197 1. The next activity up the scale of vulnerabil- 
ity is likely to be marketed food. The marketing 
channels  can  be  highly  informal  and  food  is 
sufficiently standardized that transactions can be 
anonymous with little cost, since there is little role 
for  reputation.  Although more  vulnerable  than 
subsistence  in  that  a  transaction  is  involved, 
marketed  food  production  involves  less  asset- 
holding than subsistence since output can be sold 
immediately after harvest. Arguably more vulner- 
able than marketed food is marketed export crops. 
The decision to produce these crops is  the deci- 
sion to sell or stor2 them, since they cannot be 
consumed. Hence, if  there is a risk of  increased 
predation, rhe  safe course of  action is  to  grow 
food  crops,  the  marketing  decision being  post 
ponable.  Further,  export crops  by  their  nature 
have a higher value-to-  weight  ratio  than food 
crops and so predation (for purposes other than 
hunger)  is  more  attractive,  and  they  must  be 
transported right through the country rather than 
just to the nearest purchaser of  food. The most vulnerable of the directly productive 
activities  is  manufacturing. First,  it  is  transac- 
tion-intensive. The ratio of  the value of  transac- 
tions per shilling of  value-added is much higher 
than in agriculture and the number and variety of 
transactions is also higher.  Further, the output is 
less standardized and so reputation is more impor- 
tant, requiring repeated transactions with the same 
agent and a higher profile. In addition to transac- 
tion- intensity, manufacturing  is  asset-intensive 
and  its  scale  economies  imply  that  assets  are 
geographically concentrated. 
This pattern of vulnerability is consistent with 
the changes  in the shares of  the four activities 
during and after the war. The sector which bene- 
fited most from the war was subsistence agricul- 
ture, which increased from 30% to 40%  of GDP. 
The sectors which contracted most severely were 
market  agriculture and  manufacturing.  Official 
exports, which were an important subset of mar- 
ket  agriculture,  declined  in  overall volume  by 
around 60  %.  Indeed, only coffee survived as an 
official export activity, all other official exports 
declining by close to 100  % . Manufacturing more 
than  halved as a  share of  GDP.  Post-war, the 
structure of output has tended to revert but only 
partially. Subsistence activities have grown least 
(25%), though remain at 36% of GDP, so that 
only around half of the retreat in subsistence has 
been  reversed. Manufacturing output has  more 
than doubled, but is still one third smaller relative 
to GDP than in 1972. 
The  next  group  of  activities  identified  in 
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 supply transactions services: 
transport  and  commerce.  In  aggregate  these 
services indeed reached their nadir as a share of 
GDP in 1986 and have thereafter partially recov- 
ered. The argument is that since these sectors are 
supplying transactions services they are peculiarly 
vulnerable. They  are also intensive in  lootable 
assets. 
The final pair of  activities identified in the 
Tables are asset-related. Livestock is an activity 
which is peculiarly intensive in lootable assets and 
so particularly vulnerable: it is harder to conceal 
livestock than to conceal grain. The construction 
sector is not only subject to a transactions- inten- 
sity similar to that of the manufacturing 
sector.  but  its  output is  irreversible investment 
which cannot be removed from the country. The 
willingness  to  make  this  sort  of  commitment 
evaporates during the uncertainties of war and so 
the construction sector suffers a demand collapse. 
This behavior has persisted through to the present. 
The supply response to the change in transac- 
tions costs and the resulting changes in demand 
for transactions services and asset-related activi- 
ties in turn changed relative prices. The sector- 
specific GDP deflators are shown in Table 9.3, 
however, for much of the period they are unfortu- 
nately highly unreliable. For what they are worth, 
prices are shown relative to the deflator used for 
the subsistence sector, and with the relative price 
structure in 1971 set to unity. Thus, the numeraire 
is subsistence output. For example, the figure of 
152 for commerce in 1986 implies that the price 
of a unit of value-added in commerce rose relative 
to a unit of subsistence by 52 % between 1971 and 
1986.  The  changes  in  transaction-using  prices 
relative to subsistence are modest. The deflator on 
subsistence is,  however, derived  from that for 
marketed agriculture and so would be unlikely to 
deviate substantially from it. The manufacturing 
deflator may, however, indicate that despite the 
war the trade regime was relatively liberal. That 
is, the collapse of the customs seIivice implied de 
facto trade liberalization, so that domestic manu- 
facturers were restricted in their capacity to raise 
prices.  Manufactures  entered  the  economy 
through informal trading channels which were not 
substantially inconvenienced by  the war. On this 
account, the rise in unit costs in manufacturing 
due  to  its  transactions  intensity  could  not  be 
passed on to consumers and so resulted in a yet 
more severe quantity contraction. Turning to the 
transaction-providing sectors, the apparent fall in 
the relative cost of transport during the war period 
is evidently spurious, presumably failing to take 
into account quantity rationing. The sharp rise and 
subsequent fall in the unit price of commerce is 
consistent with what might have been expected. 
The sharp  rise in construction costs despite the 
collapse  in  demand  for  construction  services 
demonstrates that there was a severe cost shock to 
the sector. Table 9.3.  Relative Price Changes by War-Vulnerability 
(relative to subsistence, 1971 relative prices = 100) 
Transaction-using 
Manufacturing 
Marketed agric  100 
Subsistence  100 
Transport  100 
Commerce  100 
Construction  100 
Less is known about the change in the compo- 
sition  of  expenditure  than  that  of  production 
because there are not yet any expenditure National 
Accounts.  However,  the  war gave  rise  to  two 
major shifts  in  expenditure  composition. First, 
expenditure shifted away from investment. The 
share  of  investment in GDP fell  from  12% in 
197  1 to 2.9% by  1978 (the peak of  the coffee 
boom) and thereafter if anything declined further. 
Secondly, expenditure was privatized: the share of 
government expenditure in GDP fell from 20% in 
1971 to 10% by 1986. Between them, these two 
responses  cushioned  the  other  expenditures of 
private agents against the 40  % fall in per capita 
production. Both of these changes in composition 
were reversed post-  1986. Investment increased by 
about 70  % during 1986-9  1, whereas consumption 
rose  by  only  around  27%. Within  investment, 
there was a modest switch towards non-tradable 
capital  goods  as  opposed  to  imported  capital. 
Most  of  the  investment  recovery  was  private: 
private investment  more  than doubled  whereas 
public investment rose by around 40  % . By  1991 
private investment was slightly higher than public 
investment. The leading role played by the private 
sector in investment recovery was despite a strong 
recovery in public expenditure. By  1991, govern- 
ment expenditure had fully recovered its pre-war 
share of GDP, being back to 2  1  % . However, the 
increase in government expenditure was skewed 
towards consumption. Whereas private consump- 
tion rose by  20 % , public consumption  rose  by 
nearly 50  % . 
To  summarize,  war  caused  a  collapse  in 
aggregate output and an even more severe col- 
lapse in expenditure. It shifted production out of 
transaction-intensive, transaction providing  and 
asset- vulnerable sectors, and expenditure out of 
investment and the public sector.  During nearly 
seven years of peace the economy has only par- 
tially  reverted  to  its  pre-war  characteristics. 
Expenditure levels and composition have reverted 
much more swiftly than production. Both the slow 
recovery of production and the swift recovery of 
expenditure warrant further analysis. The incom- 
plete  recovery  of  production  might  reflect  an 
incomplete fall in  transactions costs rather than 
just slow adjustment to  a complete reversion in 
transactions costs. Below we therefore investigate 
further what is involved in their reduction.  The 
rapid expenditure reversion has been achieved by 
the public sector raising its consumption whereas 
the private sector has raised its investment. The 
recovery  in the share  of  public expenditure  re- 
flects both the increase in  the tax base and the 
effects of  aid.  The  recovery in  the  tax  base  is 
brought  about  because  taxation  falls  dispro 
portionately upon the tradable sector of the econ- omy and least upon the subsistence and smuggling 
parts  of  the  economy,  so  that  the  shift  in  the 
structure of  the  private economy endogenously 
raises the share of  public revenue. However, in 
Uganda  this effect has  been fairly  modest pre- 
cisely because the private recovery has been so 
incomplete. Whereas in 1972 revenue was 15% of 
GDP and at its trough in 1986 was only 4.5  % , it 
has only recovered to 8%.  The major reason for 
the  recovery  in  government  expenditure  has 
therefore  been  due  to  the  channelling  of  aid 
through the budget rather than directly to private 
agents. Since the sustainable recovery of  public 
expenditure depends upon the recovery of taxable 
activities,  the primary focus of  attention should 
therefore be upon the impediments to that recov- 
ery. Why  has  the  private sector  not shifted re- 
sources  back  into  the  tradable  and  marketable 
components of the economy more swiftly? I turn 
to private responses to the return of peace. 
3. Private Responses to Peace 
Asset Responses 
In War, Peace and Private Po~olios  (Collier and 
Gunning, 1993) we  suggested that during civil 
wars entrepreneurs  build  up  large  holdings  of 
financial assets and that in  Uganda these assets 
took the f~rm  of dollars. Government estimates of 
coffee smuggling  imply  that during  the  coffee 
boom of 1976-79 unofficial exports were $520m. 
While some of  this  will  have been counterbal- 
anced by unofficial imports, this gives some idea 
of  the possible scale of foreign asset holdings. I 
begin with an implication of this high liquidity in 
foreign assets for domestic financial markets and 
then discuss the switch back into domestic real 
assets. Because of the large accumulated holdings 
of foreign  exchange,  the  capital  account is  de 
facto open even prior  to de jure  liberalization. 
Hence,  once  the  domestic  financial  market  is 
liberalized, the domestic interest rate becomes set 
by the conventional open capital account condition 
that it should equal the interest rate on dollars plus 
the expected depreciation of  the shilling against 
the dollar.  In turn,  the expected exchange rate 
reflected  the  credibility  of  the  government's 
macroeconomic strategy. A transition government 
has had little opportunity to acquire reputation and 
the  economy is  subject to  external aid  shocks. 
Hence, private agents attach some probability to 
a  high-inflation  scenario.  Interviews  with  the 
business community in March 1993 established 
that the  consensus expectation%f the exchange 
rate for the end of  1993 was 1500 shillings per 
dollar,  as against 1200 at  the time of  the inter- 
views.  The  differential  between  domestic  and 
foreign interest rates prevailing at the time were 
consistent with those expectations of depreciation. 
However,  in  the  event,  the  government's  tight 
macroeconomic policy was sustained so that by 
late-November 1993 the actual exchange rate had 
appreciated  to  1150.  The  result  was  that  real 
interest  rates  for  borrowing  denominated  in 
domestic currency were around 30  % ,  whereas the 
real interest rate for those who  were financing 
investment in foreign currency Was  around zero. 
This  created  considerable  tewion,  since  the 
entrepreneurs  with  foreign  assets  were  dis- 
proportionately  Asian,  whereas  newly  entering 
African businessmen needed to borrow locally and 
were thus at a heavy disadvantage. This configu- 
ration of  incredible disinflation leading to high 
real interest rates for a part of the business com- 
munity is not unique to war-peace transition, but 
it may be a common feature given the conjunction 
of dollarisation of financial assets and the likeli- 
hood of bouts of high inflation during the transi- 
tion period as the budget is subject to shocks and 
the demand for money function shifts in an unpre- 
dictable manner. For example, no matter what a 
post-war  Angolan  government  were  to  do,  it 
would be unable initially to generate a credible 
expectation of sustained single figure inflation. 
The domestic financial sector is doubly dam- 
aged by civil war and its aftermath. First, using 
the  classification of  the  previous section  it  is 
transactions-providing, and so contracts sharply 
during the war. Additionally, it  is intensive in a 
government-provided service, namely a numeraire 
and this is undermined both during and after the 
war.  In those sophisticated economies in which 
the government has a history of high and variable 
inflation, such  as  much  of  Latih  America,  the 
government  nevertheless  provides a  numeraire 
through the publication of a reliable CPI, permit- 
ting indexation of  contracts. In Uganda the gov- 
ernment is not trusted to produce a price index. In 
fact the government has invested in an accurate and rapid consumer price index, but in interviews 
it  was evident that its use for purposes of index- 
ation of contracts was not practicable given pri- 
vate  skepticism.  Indeed,  an article  in  Uganda 
Confidential  had claimed (inaccurately) that the 
CPI was manipulated by the government. Hence, 
the domestic financial sector lacks a  numeraire 
which can be trusted to maintain its  value. The 
government  therefore  faces the dilemma  that it 
either grants the private sector the inflation which 
it  expects,  achieving low  real interest  rates but 
high inflation, or maintains low inflation. yielding 
high real interest rates until private expectations 
adjust. The latter option continually wrong-foots 
the private sector. For example, during 1992-93 
the government  disinflated  from  an annualized 
inflation rate of 230% to 0%.  Although this was 
unexpected, so that real interest rates became very 
high; the disruption cost was remarkably low. The 
economy  grew  at  7.2%  during  the  year.  The 
reason for the low cost of  disinflation was that 
there were few long term contracts denominated 
in domestic currency and in particular few credit 
transactions. Thus,  the legacy of the civil war was 
an  inability of  the  domestic financial  sector  to 
function  and  this  in  turn  made  disinflation  an 
unusually cheap option. An implication is that the 
early  post-transition  years,  during  which  the 
domestic financial sector is inevitably truncated, 
are a good time for the government to invest in a 
once-and-for-all disinflation.  However, the price 
of  this  will  be  that  the  credit  market  will  be 
bifurcated  into a  predominant low  real  interest 
rate foreign currency denominated market, and a 
minor but politically sensitive high real interest 
rate domestic currency market. 
1 now turn to the switch from foreign financial 
assets to domestic real assets.  As noted, private 
investment recovered rapidly, but even by 1991 it 
was  only  around  7% of  private  income.  This 
suggests that upto that date there had been little if 
any net repatriation into real assets. The Kampala 
household  survey  of  1990  (Bigsten  and  Kayis 
si-Mugerwa  (1992))  asked  some  long  recall 
questions on asset transactions and migration, and 
so provides some basis for comparing the immedi- 
ate post-war situation with that four years after 
recovery. One marked change was the increase in 
land transactions. They argue that this reflected 
the pent-up need for asset transactions and that, 
while peace enabled fairly small-scale land trans- 
actions to take place. transactions in other assets 
remained very difficult. In effect, social conven- 
tions related to land transactions were sufficiently 
strong  that  the restoration of  basic social order 
was sufficient to permit them without recourse to 
the more  complex  legal framework  needed for 
other asset transactions. A second marked change 
was  the  reduction  in  urban-to-rural  migration. 
This is again consistent  with the reversal of the 
retreat to the rural economy induced by the war. 
Private investment tended to be concentrated 
in three types of capital, housing, transport equip- 
ment  and  machinery  for  manufacturing.  The 
housing boom is  picked up in the National Ac- 
counts,  where  the  construction sector  expands 
substantially more rapidly than GDP, and in the 
Bigsten  and  Kayizzi-Mukerwa  survey,  which 
found a high incidence of house construction. The 
concentration on vehicles and machinery is found 
from the breakdown of  investment in data sup- 
plied  by  the  Uganda  Investment  Authority.  As 
discussed in Collier and Gunning (1993, 1993a), 
if  private investors are worried about a reversion 
to  'war'  this may  be the expected  pattern.  The 
advantage of transport equipment is that it can be 
removed from the country if  conditions deterio- 
rate, and since it does not last long, the investor 
does  not  have  to  take  a  favorable view  of  the 
long-term future. Manufacturing machinery is also 
readily removable as long as it is chosen with this 
in mind. Housing has neither of these features: it 
depreciates only slowly and it cannot be removed 
from the country.  However, it  is relatively im- 
mune to war since the flow of its services is not 
transactions-intensive.  The  housing  boom  has 
taken two forms, dwellings for owner-occupation 
and  dwellings  for  rental  to expatriates  ('dollar 
houses'). The former are part of the subsistence 
economy. In effect, were agents to view peace as 
only temporary, they would use the oppomty  of 
the temporary reduction in transactions costs, to 
undertake  the  transaction-intensive  business  of 
investment,  but  locate  the  investment  in  the 
subsistence  part  of  the  economy.  The  dollar 
houses  are  superficially  precisely  the  sort  of 
investment which might appear most difficult to 
attract: irreversible investment in the export sector 
of the economy. However, once the investment 
has  been  made,  the  activity  is  again  transac- tions-extensive.  The  services  provided  by  the 
house are not very dependent upon a production 
process  and  so  are  not  transactions intensive. 
When they are sold to expatriates, the latter can 
pay rent direct from one foreign bank account into 
another, so that the main transaction in this export 
activity  is  relatively  immune  from government 
control.  Finally,  in  the  worst case  scenario in 
which expatriates leave, the house can be occu- 
pied by  the owner.  Although not internationally 
mobile, the capital can thus be switched from the 
export sector into the subsistence sector. Collier 
and  Gunning  argue  that  the  social  return  on 
irreversible investments in transactions-intensive 
sectors is higher than the private return, because 
the latter must allow for the risks of  'war'. Non- 
tradable  investments  are  irreversible (whereas 
imported capital can often be exported if  neces- 
sary).  The  private sector  will  therefore under 
invest in non-tradable capital in the tradable sector 
(the  latter  being  transactions  intensive).  The 
evidence for this  is that of  the  investments  re- 
ported to the Uganda Investment Authority (all 
large scale investment in the economy), currently 
only around 3% is going into agriculture, which 
is the sector most intensive in non-tradable capi- 
tal. Tea estates, for example, could be rehabili- 
tated at a far faster rate. Hence, there is a case for 
public inducement of  private investment of  non- 
tradable capital in the tradable sector. They argue 
that during the 'war' private investment collapsed 
by more than private savings so that there was a 
substantial acquisition of foreign financial assets. 
Hence, private investment is not severely finan- 
cially constrained so much as being deterred by 
high war-related transactions costs, and perceived 
risks of a reversion to 'war'. The complete private 
investment problem then is to encourage repatria- 
tion  into  the  purchase of  non-tradable  capital 
goods for the export sector. The policy instrument 
which best  achieves the desired subsidy  is  the 
exchange  rate.  In  the  1970s  an  over-  valued 
exchange  rate  implicitly subsidized the  use  of 
domestic resources for the purchase of imported 
capital and made the non-tradable sector relatively 
attractive.  Each of  these features of  the  1970s 
implicit subsidy is now needed in reverse. Instead 
of  domestic resources being used to finance the 
investment,  it  is  repatriated  assets;  instead  of 
imported capital being the target of  subsidy it is 
non-tradable capital; instead of the non-tradable 
sector being the targeted recipient, it  is the trad- 
able  sector.  Hence,  the  appropriate  policy  is 
under-valuation of the exchange  -  -  rate. 
2 
Risk-bearing and Market Integration 
The retreat into a subsistence economy reduces 
average  income sharply, and  also  1,eaves some 
private agents more exposed to risk: the represen- 
tative urban household becomes more diversified 
whereas  the  representative rural  household be- 
comes  less  diversified.  The  urban  response  is 
because of  the collapse of  incomes in the formal 
sector. As Bigsten and Kayizzi show, by 1990 the 
typical urban household with a base in the formal 
sector nevertheless drew a substantial part of  its 
income from informal activities, including agricul- 
ture. By  contrast, the representative rural house- 
hold  loses  remittances from  urban  households 
(there is  evidence of  a sharp decline in  remit- 
tances), loses the chance to work in the rural labor 
market as the latter contracts disproportionately, 
withdraws  from  the  non-coffee  export  crops 
almost completely, and reduces its earnings from 
coffee.  Finally,  as  discussed  belaw,  whatever 
domestic financial assets it  is  holding evaporate 
due to inflation. Although there are large foreign 
asset holdings in the economy, these are clearly 
not  held  by  the  poorest  households.  Hence, 
exposure to risk increases in the rural economy 
just as the mechanisms for coping with risk are 
reduced. These features are altered only gradually 
by  the restoration of peace. 
To some extent, risk reduction in  the rural 
economy  is  an  externality  provided  by  other 
agents.  For example, opportunities in the labor 
market reduce risk even for those who choose not 
to enter the market and so enable more lrislq but 
higher- yielding production decisions to be taken. 
Hence, there is a social premium upon the recon- 
struction of markets because of the externality of 
risk-reduction. There is therefore a case for public 
subsidy of transactions. Although it  might seem 
that such a subsidy would be difficult, in fact the 
government has a readily usable instrument at its 
disposal.  One  private  transactions  cost  is  the 
inflation  tax  on  money.  Agents  need  to  hold 
money for transactions purposes and so loss of 
value  of  money  implied  by  inflation is  a  cost which is born not by  economoic activity in  gen- 
eral but  by  transactions. If  the  recovery of  the 
transactions part of  the economy is socially too 
slow  because  the  risk-reducing effect  is  an ex 
ternality,  then  there  is  a  case  for  subsidizing 
transactions. It is very difficult for the government 
directly to subsidize transactions, however, indi- 
rectly it is taxing them through inflation. Since the 
government is short of revenue (see below) there 
would be a case for setting the inflation tax at the 
revenue-maximizing level which may be around 
10% (see Adam (1992) and Adam et al. (1993)). 
However,  the case  for  subsidizing transactions 
tends to offset this case for an implicit tax. Logi- 
cally, it  is possible to subsidize transactions by 
means of a falling price level. However, a falling 
price level gives rise to side effects to the extent 
that there  are  nominal  rigidities such as  wage 
rates. It might therefore be better to aim for price 
stability: the government foregoes implicit taxa- 
tion of transactions in the interest of  compensating 
for the externalities which transactions generate 
for risk- reduction. 
4. Government Responses 
Fiscal Responses 
The war had undermined government revenue and 
thereby gradually reduced expenditure. However, 
whereas the share of government expenditure in 
GDP was  radically  reduced  between  1971 and 
1486,  as  Table  9.2  shows  at  constant  prices 
government was much the most rapidly expanding 
sector.  In  terms of  quantities,  the  government 
sector doubled relative to GDP. Hence, the fall in 
government  expenditure  relative  to  GDP  was 
because of a radical fall in the unit price of gov- 
ernment. During the war the country acquired a 
very large and very low price government sector. 
Post-war the share of government expenditure in 
GDP has reverted to its 1971 level, but the quan- 
tity of government has expanded less rapidly than 
GDP.  Hence,  the  increase  in  expenditure  has 
reflected an increase in the unit price of  govern- 
ment. Comparing 1992 with 1971 the government 
was much larger relative to GDP in quantity terms 
though as a share of expenditure it  was similar. 
The unit cost of government was much lower and 
the quantity of government was correspondingly 
higher. If the 1971 structure is viewed as normal, 
and so in some sense the target to be restored, the 
most striking feature is the failure to contract the 
quantity of government post-  1986. 
During the war the government had not been 
in  a  good  position to  borrow either  abroad or 
domestically, and so it  had resorted to the infla- 
tion tax. Adam (1992) estimates that the long term 
revenue-maximizing inflation tax  rate in Kenya 
has  been  around  10% and  Adam et al.  (1993) 
show that this sort of  range is probably broadly 
true also in Ghana and Tanzania. Were it to apply 
approximately to Uganda, it  would suggest that 
the actual rate of  inflation had grossly exceeded 
the revenue- maximizing rate: the government had 
snatched a short term gain in exceeding it, but this 
gradually reduced the real demand for money and 
so  reduced  the sustainable yield.  By  1986  the 
government had few tax handles. The economy 
had shifted towards subsistence and transactions- 
extensive activities. The civil service had decayed 
to the extent that revenue collection was arbitrary 
and  ineffective.  Because  of  the  exodus of  the 
professional classes, enterprises were operated on 
an informal basis with poor book-keeping, and tax 
officials were not  proficient in applying normal 
accountancy  rules.  The  conjunction  of  these 
features made the taxation of enterprises a process 
of coercion countered by  bluff. Although there are 
always elements of  this in a tax system, the ex- 
treme form reached in Uganda implied that until 
the restoration of a well- functioning civil society, 
extra tax revenue from enterprises would to an 
extent  be at the price of  a higher incidence of 
coercion and arbitrariness: in other words, extra 
revenue from this source would be at the price of 
regression in the  move  to  'peace'  in  its  wider 
meaning. 
The government had relied heavily on coffee 
taxation. The fall in the world coffee price in- 
duced the governmznt to  repeal this tax,  but it 
attempted  to  collect import duties more vigor- 
ously. This switch from export  taxes to import 
taxes in  analytically  immaterial.  By  the Lerner 
equivalence theorem the two have common effects 
with two exceptions. First, that portion of imports 
which is not financed by exports now pays the tax 
whereas  under  export  taxation  it  would  not. 
However, most of these imports are financed by 
government sales of  foreign aid.  Since private agents pay the market-clearing price for imports. 
if the government taxes them then private agents 
will simply offer correspondingly less for the aid 
dollars.  The government is therefore paying its 
own import duty by selling the foreign exchange 
more cheaply than it otherwise would. Secondly, 
that component of  exports which is not coffee, 
was  untaxed  during  the  export  tax  on  coffee 
phase, but is  implicitly taxed when trade taxes are 
levied  on  imports.  In 1986  non-coffee exports 
were negligible and so this was not a significant 
consideration.  Further, since it  is very much in 
the economy's interest that exports  re-diversify 
out of  coffee, it is not clear that the government 
should want to tax them in the short term. Thus, 
if  the case for dropping taxation of  coffee was a 
good one, and it probably was, then there is little 
to be said for replacing it with taxes on imports. 
So far I have suggested that the government's 
major revenue options of extra taxation of enter- 
prises and extra taxation of  imports should not be 
exercised  in  the short  term.  Further,  the  risk 
externality argument set out above, implies that 
the government should forgo the revenue- maxi- 
mizing inflation tax. This implies that the govern- 
ment  should  not  place  much  emphasis  upon 
revenue recovery in the early phase of transition. 
There is a final argument for low taxation 
during the transition phase. As discussed below, 
aid  is  endogenously  very  high during  the early 
stages of  peace.  Since aid  is channelled to  the 
government,  this  enables  public expenditure  to 
recover more swiftly than private expenditure. As 
we  have seen,  public expenditure  doubled as a 
share of GDP in the first five years of peace, fully 
regaining its previous level. It is arguable that this 
pace of recovery is too fast relative to the private 
sector. The most slowly adjusting component of 
the economy is a wide variety of private activities, 
including  private  consumption.  Some  private 
recovery is indeed dependent upon public recov- 
ery, and so to this extent it  is justifiable for the 
public  sector  to  recover  at  a  more  rapid  rate. 
However,  public  recovery  financed  by  higher 
taxation is directly at the cost of private recovery 
and so the indirect effects need to be substantial 
for the net effect to be beneficial. As suggested 
above, some of  the indirect effects, such as the 
arbitrary coercion by the tax authorities, as nega- 
tive. There is therefore a case for part of  the aid 
(which is  there to finance  recovery in both the 
public and  private sectors) should  be passed on 
indirectly  to  the  private sector  by  reduced  tax 
effort  relative  to the  no-aid counterfactual, and 
even conceivably in absolute terms. That is, even 
though  the economy  was  generating  very  little 
government revenue, increasing that would not be 
a high priority. Donor conditionality of  revenue 
recovery,  by  gearing  up  aid  with  tax  revenue, 
forces a rapid recovery in the public sector which 
may  be  at  variance  with  private  sector  needs. 
During  the  war  the  Ugandan  government  was 
predatory and this is how government is perceived 
by  the  population.  During  the  early  stages  of 
peace  this  predation  needs  to  be  downplayed: 
what is most scarce during 'war' is not the mate- 
rial  services  of  government,  but  coherent  and 
restrained  authority.  Services  can be expanded 
massively by the infusion of aid and any change 
through revenue is peripheral. In Uganda, public 
expenditure has more than doubled as a share of 
GDP, increasing by 11 percentage points of GDP, 
Revenue has also nearly doubled, but its increase 
of 3.6 percentage points is evidently a minor part 
of financing. The question is thus whether, given 
that public expenditure has increased by  around 
150 % , the marginal 18  %  has been worth incur- 
ring the 100% increase in predation which it cost? 
Might it not be more appropriate for there to be a 
temporary decrease in predation. If  the objective 
is to re-establish the private activity conditioned 
on peacetime authority patterns, the critical path 
might  be  first  to remove  the  wartime authority 
patterns rather than attempt to get public expendi- 
ture upto  its  peacetime  share  regardless  of  the 
authority patterns which that effort must entail if 
it is to succeed. 
Social Service Provision and Private Priorities 
There is one area in which the government can 
usefully increase revenue and this is through the 
sale of its social services, especially in rural areas. 
The government is a supplier of health and educa- 
tion  services.  As  discussed  above,  these  have 
declined severely during the period of  war, how- 
ever, the government is still a fairly large supplier 
in these markets. Bigsten and Kayizzi (1992) in a 
survey of the use of health facilities, found that in 
rural areas 27%  of  treatments were supplied by government services, and in Kampala 13 % , the 
rest being either mission or private. The govern- 
ment is  a much larger supplier of  education. As 
reported above, the main demand on the part of 
the rural population is for increased public provi- 
sion of health services. The suggestion here is that 
in the short run these services should be run at a 
profit so that their expansion enhances the budget. 
The  sale  of  social services  has  three  potential 
advantages. First, it directly improves the budget. 
Secondly,  it  permits service provision to be 
expanded when there is evidently a demand. 
Thirdly,  by  raising  the  need  of  the  rural 
population for cash, it encourages re-integration 
into  the  market economy.  Since  both  curative 
services  and  education  services  are  used  dis 
proportionately by the better off, the distributional 
implications of  raising revenue in  this  way  are 
probably now worse than the alternatives, whereas 
the incentive effects are probably more favorable. 
Evidence on private prioritization of services 
is  provided  by  a  survey  of  rural  households 
conducted in 1990 (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 
(1992)).  Respondents were  asked  to  name  the 
single biggest improvement in their area brought 
about by the government since 1985. For 34% the 
biggest improvement was peace and for 48% it 
was the  road  network. These responses can  be 
compared with those to identical questions asked 
in surveys conducted in Kenya in 1982 and Tanza- 
nia in 1983 (Bevan et al. (1989)). In Kenya (in 
Central and  Nyanza provinces) the most valued 
public expenditure over the preceding seven years 
was  also  roads,  chosen  by  43% and  55% of 
respondents  respectively.  Hence,  the  Kenyan 
average was virtually the same as the Ugandan. In 
Tanzania,  by  contrast,  road  expenditure  was 
chosen by  less than ten percent of  respondents, 
the most valued service being primary schooling. 
Rural  Tanzania  in  1983  was  in  one  important 
respect  analogous  to  rural  Uganda  in  1986, 
namely, there had been a retreat from the market 
(though for somewhat different reasons). The low 
valuation placed upon road expenditure 1975-83 
in rural Tanzania was not that the government had 
not  made such expenditures, but that they were 
irrelevant to a peasant society which during this 
period was in retreat from the market. By  con- 
trast, the Kenyan peasantry in 1982 had over the 
previous seven years experienced the coffee boom 
and was deeply integrated into the market. Road 
improvements were consequently very important. 
The high valuation of road improvements in rural 
Uganda  1986-90  must  therefore  indiczre  not 
merely that peasants recognized that this was the 
main focus of the public expenditure commitment, 
but that the expenditure was actually found useful. 
Thus, there must have been a desire to remegrate 
into the market. 
The Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerra survey also 
investigated what  people now  most  wanted  the 
government to provide.  Further  expenditure on 
roads was fairly low on the list of priorities. The 
most desired improvement was for health facilities 
(40%) and  the  next  most  wanted  improvement 
(27%)  was the streamlining of the functions of the 
local  administration  (the  resistance  councils). 
These responses can again  be  compared  to  the 
priorities given in rural Kenya in 1982 and rural 
Tanzania  in  1983.  As  in  Uganda,  what people 
most wanted in the future was different from what 
they  had  most  appreciated  in  the  past.  In  both 
Kenyan provinces the most desired expenditure 
was water supply, and in Tanzania it  was health 
services. Thus, in Kenya although the reduction in 
transactions costs implied by road expenditure was 
most appreciated, the new demand was in effect 
for more labor time, since piped water replaced a 
very labor-intensive activity. The Kenyan prioritis 
ations can be interpreted as the move from market 
integration to its consequence, an increased value 
of labor time. The Tanzanian valuations, a switch 
from primary schooling to health, can be inter- 
preted as the response of a peasantry which saw 
less value in market integration and consequently 
had a lower opportunity cost of  labor. The provi- 
sion  of  free primary  education  in  villages had 
largely sated the demand for this social service, 
leaving  health  care  as  the  next  social  service 
demand. The Ugandan prioritization is distinctive, 
but it  is closer to the Tanzanian than to the Ken- 
yan.  It  is  distinctive  in  that  the  high  riority 
placed on the reform of  government local  stitu- 
tions has no parallel. It is akin to Tanzania in that 
social  services  rather  than  output-enhancing 
services are demanded. However, within social 
service provision the ranking is somewhat differ- 
ent. In Tanzania although health care was now the 
top priority, this was because of the satisfaction of 
the  previous priority  of  primary  schooling.  In Uganda. primary schooling featured neither as a 
past  priority nor as  the future one.  Hence, the 
prioritization responses are atypical for the region 
in that the dcsign of  local government is seen as 
an important issue, and greater weight is placed 
upon distress-related social services than either 
education or production-enhancing  services. 
It might seem surprising that the second most 
popular request should be something to do with 
local administration reform. However, this takes 
us back to the wider notion of how  civil war has 
affected the economy. Our argument has been that 
the predominant route is not through the physical 
damage or risk of  violence inherent in war, but 
rather in the more generalized breakdown in the 
institutions of civil society. While the former type 
of  cost  very  largely  ceased (except for  a high 
incidence of crime discussed below), the rebuild- 
ing  of  civil society  after a civil  war is  a slow 
process. Four years after the end of  it, the second 
most important perceived need  in rural Uganda 
was that the power of  public officials should be 
contained  and  clearly  demarcated.  That  this  is 
ranked  above  everything  except  health  care 
suggests that it is regarded as really important. 
The high relative demand for health facilities 
partly reflects their chronic deterioration during 
the war. The World Bank (1993) estimates that by 
1985  government  real  expenditure  on  health 
services had declined by 9  1  7% from its 1972 level. 
Additionally, the legacy of warfare and vagrancy 
was  an  unusually  high  level  of  sickness  and 
debility.  As  discussed  in  'Demobilization and 
Insecurity', this has implications for the design of 
demobilization. 
However, the high ranking of  health is also 
partly due to the relatively low demand for public 
expenditure on education. This is consistent with 
evidence on the private returns to education in 
rural areas.  Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa con- 
struct agricultural production functions and find 
that  formal  schooling  does  not  contribute  to 
agricultural  productivity  in  Uganda.  Previous 
studies have found different results for Kenya, but 
the contrast is consistent with the Schultz hypothe- 
sis that while peasants are confined to traditional 
activities they are efficient, so that education is 
only  useful  in  modernizing environments. War 
I  produces  a  'traditionalising'  environment.  A 
recent comparative study of  the rate of  return to 
agricultural technology transfer in various parts of 
Africa (Oehmke and Crawford (1993)) finds that 
Uganda during the period 1986-91 is a very rare 
exception to a general pattern of  quite high re- 
turns. In Uganda the return was negative (Laker- 
Ojok (1992)). The negative return was attributed 
to the effects of the war, in part the costs involved 
in reconstruction of  buildings and staffing, and in 
part the lack of  an adequate distribution system 
for seed and an adequate market for output. In 
such a context investment in innovation, whether 
public  (i.e.  technology  transfer  programs)  or 
private (i.e. education) does not pay. Bigsten and 
Kayizzi-Mugerwa  also  investigate  the  entry 
decision  into  non-farm  enterprises  using  logit 
analysis and find similarly that in the small scale 
business  sector  education  plays  no  role  in  the 
entry decision. This again is likely to be the case 
only  while  the  range  of  business  activities is 
highly conservative. Essentially, until the econ- 
omy  has surpassed its previous frontier, there is 
no need for innovation and so the private returns 
to education are likely to be low. This showed up 
in  the  Bigsten and  Kayizi-Mugerwa analysis of 
rural income distribution. The high income group 
was landed rather than educated. 
The evidence from prioritization of  past and 
future public expenditures therefore points to the 
Ugandan peasantry re-entering the market (and so 
valuing roads unlike their counterparts in Tanza- 
nia  in  1983) but  not  yet  to  the extent that  the 
valuation of labor time has risen much (so water 
supply  is  not demanded as  it  is  in  Kenya, but 
rather  social  services as  in  Tanzania).  Within 
social services, both private priorities and objec- 
tive  evidence from  earnings functions and  the 
return on agricultural technology transfer point  to 
the low return to education. The take-up of school 
places is correspondingly low in rural Uganda and 
we now consider whether this is a socially optimal 
response,  given  the  circumstances which  have 
produced a low rate of return, or whether there is 
a case for public intervention. 
The decline in private investment in education 
need  not  be  socially  sub-optimal.  While  the 
private economy has retreated into subsistence and 
non- tradable activities, the social return to educa- 
tion has fallen and so the case for public invest- 
ment  in  education is  correspondingly reduced. 
However, the low current returns to education are likely to be temporary. Once the economy returns 
to the production frontier the returns to education 
will  then  rise.  Since  the  gestation  period  on 
primary education is  extremeIy long, the returns 
now are a poor guide to the returns on new invest- 
ments  in  education. There is  a case for social 
intervention in that the present signals generating 
private decisions are a temporary reflection of  the 
effects of  war and so are predictably lower than 
the returns which will apply to children educated 
now.  Private decisions  reflect current  returns, 
social decisions can legitimately anticipate what 
the returns will be once the economy has recov- 
ered to the old frontier. 
Further, there is evidence that private invest- 
ment  decisions  in East  African agriculture are 
influenced quite strongly by  social learning (Bur- 
ger et  al.  (1993)):  households copy each other 
rather than just calculating the returns based on 
their  own  information.  The  popularity  of  an 
investment  is  therefore self-reinforcing.  In  the 
context of the spread of a new technology social 
learning can be socially beneficial, accelerating 
adoption. However, in the context of the decline 
in the return to an existing asset, it  can lead to 
excess disinvestment. There is therefore a role for 
the state in offsetting 'social herding'. 
5. Donor Responses 
Peace brings an aid boom. Uganda and Ethiopia, 
being in addition extremely poor and relatively 
high profile in the media, are receiving substantial 
inflows of private charity through NGOs. Both the 
donors and the NGOs have their own priorities. 
It is quite possible that the government of a 
post-war  state  has  a  greater  interest  in  fiscal 
probity and output-enhancing public expenditure 
than some  of  the  donors.  Both  the  NGOs  and 
some of the bilaterals have a constituency moti- 
vated by  immediate perceived social need rather 
than  longer-term  considerations  of  economic 
management.  For  example, in  Uganda  Danida 
during 1993 and the EC during 1992 were Iobby- 
ing for increased public expenditure at the price of 
more  rapid  inflation.  Most  of  the donors have 
emphasized social expenditures as a priority and 
have  attempted  to  attach  conditionality to  the 
composition of expenditure with this in mind. An 
alternative approach may  be  for  the donors  to 
purchase some of  the  social expenditure which 
they and their constituents desire, without interfer- 
ing with the budget. At present, only a small share 
of  expenditure upon rural health and education 
services goes through the budget, since mostly it 
is  private.  Rather  than  donors  attempting  to 
increase government expenditures on these items, 
which  would  first  require  that  the  ministries 
function much  better  than at present (which  in 
turn requires very large increases in salaries), the 
donors might simply by-pass the government for 
at least part of  this component of  their aid, en- 
couraging NGOs or private initiatives. The lower 
priority of the government for social expenditures 
might be quite appropriate given the priorities of 
reconstruction, and yet incompatible with donor 
constituencies. 
A related donor priority has been accountabil- 
ity for program aid. Much aid takes the form of 
program aid because of the very limited capacity 
of  post-war government to implement projects. 
Hence, an aid boom must be program-unspecific. 
Yet the high inherited level of military expendi- 
ture produces an acute concern that scrutiny is 
necessary  to avoid the money  being wasted on 
armaments. In  Uganda  the donor  demands for 
scrutiny delayed the reform program. The object 
of  scrutiny  was  the  import  program,  and  the 
method  chosen  was  the  inspection  of  import 
documentation. Because of  the  collapse of  the 
normal institutions of government during the war, 
notably the customs service, the only reasonably 
reliable way in which these documents could be 
generated was by linking them to the disbursement 
of  foreign  exchange.  Thus,  the  apparatus  of 
foreign exchange control was needed for donor 
scrutiny and the move to an inter-bank market was 
consequently  resisted  by  the  government until 
November 1993. In the Ugandan context it  was 
reasonable of donors to demand scrutiny of  the 
composition of impcrts. However, the imposition 
of documentation requirements failed to take into 
account the extent of  the decay in government 
institutions. The donors had a ready alternative in 
that  they  could  have  acquired  more  accurate 
evidence  on  imports  from  Direction of  Trade 
statistics rather than from import documentation. 
This is indeed how the Ugandan Statistics Depart- 
ment (bureau of statistics) itself gathers data on 
Ugandan  imports,  having decided  that  customs data  is  unusable.  The  grounds  which  made  it 
sensible for donor contributions to be atypically 
large during the post-war phase, and for much of 
this to be project-unspecific, also make it appro- 
priate  for the mechanisms  of  monitoring  to be 
modified. 
6. Conclusion: Commitment  and  Adjust- 
ment in a Frightened Society 
Dornbusch has recently suggested that the adjust- 
ment costs of policy reform are higher in societies 
which  are polarized.  The two key  adjustments 
which he has in mind are disinflation and trade 
liberalization.  The  underlying  argument  is  that 
polarized  societies  are  particularly  sensitive  to 
redistribution and are organized so as to block it. 
Uganda does not accord well with the Dorbusch 
hypothesis.  Whatever  is meant by  a  'polarized' 
society, it would be hard to maintain a definition 
on which in the aftermath of a civil war polariza- 
tion is other than extreme: onto the disputes which 
provoked  the  war  are  added  the  legacy  of 
atrocities  committed  during  the  war.  Yet  in 
Uganda during 1989-9  1 there was a comprehen- 
sive trade liberalization,  and during 1992 there 
was a spectacular disinflation from 230  % to - 1  7%. 
The ease of reform in a post-civil war context is 
perhaps explicable in terms of three features. 
First,  few  people  benefit  from  a  wartime 
regime.  Government  expenditure  is  so  heavily 
skewed towards the military that, other than the 
political  problem  of  demobilization,  there  is 
unlikely to be a major group which suffers from 
recomposition of public expenditure. 
In  Uganda  non-military  public  expenditure 
was such a small fraction of GDP that no group 
needed to be squeezed. The same is broadly true 
of trade policy. As suggested by Table 9.3  above, 
in Uganda the borders were sufficiently  porous 
during the war that the underlying  trade regime 
was free trade other than for a certain level of 
export  confiscation.  In  particular,  it  was  not 
possible  for  industries  to  gain  protection  from 
imports by quantitative restrictions. Secondly, as 
discussed above, the transactions-intensive activi- 
ties such as import- substitute manufacturing were 
particularly vulnerable to civil war and so con 
tracted. It was therefore a weak lobby and a lobby 
much more concerned with the ending of preda- 
tion than the removal of trade restrictions which 
were  in  any  case  notional.  With  the  gradual 
reduction  in  predation,  the  import-substitute 
manufacturing  sector  has  been  able  to  double 
between 1987 and 1993 despite trade liberaliza- 
tion. 
Secondly,  people have become used to flux 
and  so  have  avoided  the  irreversible  specific 
commitments  which  are  the  source  of  the  re 
distributive effects of policy reform. The Ugandan 
disinflation  is  a  remarkable  instance.  In  most 
societies  such  a  rapid  disinflation  would  have 
produced  enormous  inter-private  transfers.  In 
Uganda the credit market was so limited that such 
transfers were small. 
Thirdly,  in  Olsen's  hypothesis,  defeat  in 
international war breaks up the domesitic coalitions 
which normally  block policy change. By  exten- 
sion,  if  civil  war  is  resolved  by  defeat  of  the 
government as in Uganda and Ethiopia, the vested 
interests which must be challenged are predomi- 
nantly those of the enemy, and the fact that the 
enemy has just been defeated means that the new 
regime has the power to impose change. 
Hence, the period of the transition to peace is 
a  particularly  suitable  time  for  radical  policy 
reform despite  the high degree of  polarization. 
The policy inheritance makes reform necessary, 
and  the  uncertainty  surrounding  prospective 
reform  will  reinforce  the  reluctance  to  make 
irreversible  decisions  until  reforms  have  been 
implemented.  Far  from  increasing  uncertainty, 
speedy reform will reduce it. This is important not 
only because the reforms are desirable in them- 
selves,  but  because  it  is  the  reluctance  of  the 
private  sector  to  make  irreversible  decisions 
which is perhaps the major impediment to rapid 
recovery.  After  a  civil  war  private  agents  are 
frightened. They are frightened of each other, and 
most of all they are frightened of the government 
in its various forms. The transition to peace is not 
primarily  the  reconstruction  of  darnaged infra- 
structure,  it  is the  transition from  fear and the 
defensive  responses  which  have  become  in 
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